

# Accountability Arrangements to Combat **Corruption** in the **Delivery of Infrastructure** Services in **Bangladesh**

CASE STUDY

Institute for Development Policy  
Analysis and Advocacy (IDPAA)  
at PROSHIKA

Partnering to  
**COMBAT CORRUPTION**

*Series Editor: M. Sohail*



Accountability Arrangements to Combat Corruption in the  
Delivery of Infrastructure Services in Bangladesh



# Accountability Arrangements to Combat Corruption in the Delivery of Infrastructure Services in Bangladesh

A case study

Institute for Development Policy Analysis and Advocacy (IDPAA) at PROSHIKA

Bangladesh

2007



Water, Engineering and Development Centre  
Loughborough University  
Leicestershire  
LE11 3TU UK

© WEDC, Loughborough University, 2007

Any part of this publication, including the illustrations (except items taken from other publications where the authors do not hold copyright) may be copied, reproduced or adapted to meet local needs, without permission from the author/s or publisher, provided the parts reproduced are distributed free, or at cost and not for commercial ends, and the source is fully acknowledged as given below. Please send copies of any materials in which text or illustrations have been used to WEDC Publications at the address given above.

A reference copy of this publication is also available online at:  
<http://www.lboro.ac.uk/wedc/publications/>

Institute for Development Policy Analysis and Advocacy (IDPAA) at PROSHIKA (2007)  
*Accountability Arrangements to Combat Corruption in the Delivery of Infrastructure Services in Bangladesh*  
From the Partnering to Combat Corruption series  
Series Editor: M.Sohail

WEDC, Loughborough University, UK.

ISBN: 978 1 84380 115 3

Please note:

The views expressed in this document are not necessarily those of the Department for International Development or WEDC, Loughborough University.

Designed and produced at WEDC by Glenda McMahon and Rod Shaw

# Contents

List of Figures.....	viii
List of Maps.....	viii
List of Tables.....	ix
AACC Study Team Members.....	xi
Acknowledgements.....	xii
Acronyms and abbreviations.....	xiii
Executive Summary.....	xv
<b>1. Introduction.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Background.....	1
1.2 Purpose of the study.....	3
1.3 Research questions.....	3
1.4 Methodology and Process.....	4
1.4.1 Processes.....	4
1.4.2 Selection of the Study Locale.....	5
1.4.3 Determination of the sample size.....	7
1.5 Basic Infrastructure Services at the Study Locale.....	7
1.6 Demographic attributes.....	9
1.6.1 Household Size and Sex.....	9
1.6.2 Religion.....	9
1.6.3 Marital Status of Households Members.....	10
1.6.4 Educational Status.....	10
1.6.5 Sources of Livelihood.....	10
1.6.6 Important Social Groups.....	11
1.6.7 Income Status.....	11
1.7 Institutions in Connection to Service Delivery in the Study Locale.....	12
1.7.1 DCC.....	12
1.7.2 DWASA.....	12
1.7.3 DESCO.....	12
1.7.4 PROSHIKA.....	13
1.7.5 CUP.....	13
1.7.6 DSK.....	13
1.8 Organization of the Report.....	13

<b>2.</b>	<b>Literature review .....</b>	<b>15</b>
2.1	Introduction .....	15
2.2	Understanding Corruption.....	15
	2.2.1 <i>By Definition</i> .....	15
	2.2.2 <i>Analyzing typologies</i> .....	16
	2.2.3 <i>Underlying corruption perceptions</i> .....	16
2.3	Trends .....	17
	2.3.1 <i>Cultural and political patronage</i> .....	17
	2.3.2 <i>Economic exchange</i> .....	17
	2.3.3 <i>Corporate culture</i> .....	17
2.4	Causes of corruption.....	18
	2.4.1 <i>Governance failure</i> .....	18
	2.4.2 <i>Political reasons</i> .....	18
	2.4.3 <i>Absence of competition</i> .....	18
	2.4.4 <i>Cultural Determinants</i> .....	18
	2.4.5 <i>Colonialism</i> .....	19
2.5	Effects of corruption/costs of corruption .....	19
2.6	Corruption combating strategies.....	20
<b>3.</b>	<b>Forms and stage of Infrastructure Service Delivery .....</b>	<b>21</b>
3.1	Introduction .....	21
3.2	Forms and stages of Infrastructure Services .....	21
	3.2.1 <i>Water supply</i> .....	21
	3.2.2 <i>Sanitation</i> .....	26
	3.2.3 <i>Electricity and Street Lighting</i> .....	28
	3.2.4 <i>Roads and paving</i> .....	33
	3.2.5 <i>Drainage</i> .....	35
	3.2.6 <i>Solid Waste Management</i> .....	37
3.3	Conclusion .....	39
<b>4.</b>	<b>Overview of Corruption in Infrastructure Service Delivery.....</b>	<b>41</b>
4.1	Introduction .....	41
4.2	How is corruption perceived by the urban people?.....	41
4.3	Causes of corruption .....	43
4.4	The effects of corruption on the livelihoods of the poor .....	45
	4.4.1 <i>Impact of paying bribes on households' livelihoods</i> .....	46
	4.4.2 <i>Feelings about the experience of corruption</i> .....	48

4.4.3	<i>Prime victims of corruption</i> .....	48
4.4.4	<i>Coping with corruption</i> .....	49
4.5	Experiences of those who are corrupt .....	50
4.6	Conclusion .....	52
<b>5.</b>	<b>Anti-corruption mechanisms- A critical review</b> .....	<b>53</b>
5.1	Introduction .....	53
5.2	The accountability arrangements in place .....	53
5.2.1	<i>Surface Level</i> .....	53
5.2.2	<i>Mid level</i> .....	56
5.2.3	<i>Upper level</i> .....	57
5.2.4	<i>Accountability in CSO led Service Delivery</i> .....	57
5.3	Accountability arrangements at policy/institutional level.....	58
5.3.1	<i>Traditional policies and practices</i> .....	58
5.3.2	<i>New Initiatives</i> .....	61
5.4	Successful versus unsuccessful initiatives: Sanitation and Water Services in Focus .....	62
5.4.1	<i>Accountability mechanisms in relation to Water and Sanitation Services</i> .....	62
5.5	Lessons learnt .....	66
<b>6.</b>	<b>Conclusion and recommendations</b> .....	<b>67</b>
6.1	Conclusion .....	67
6.2	Recommendations.....	67
	<b>References</b> .....	<b>69</b>
	<b>Appendices</b> .....	<b>75</b>
	Appendix 1. Tables for Executive Summary .....	75
	Appendix 2. Tables for Figures .....	76
	Appendix 3. Questionnaire for Household Survey .....	80
	Appendix 4. Checklist for Focus Group Discussion .....	90
	Appendix 5. Questionnaire for Semi-structured Interviews/Informal Discussion with Service Providers .....	91
	Appendix 6. Questionnaire for Semi-structured Interviews/Informal Discussion with Contractors .....	94
	Appendix 7. Checklist for Elected Representatives.....	97

## List of Figures

Figure 1.1.	Conceptual Framework .....	2
Figure 1.2.	Levels of Primary Information Collection .....	4
Figure 1.3.	Educational status of the household members (% of Households).....	10
Figure 1.4.	Income Status of the Studied Households (% of Households).....	11
Figure 3.1.	Access and use of water service (% of Households) .....	23
Figure 3.2.	Faced problems with water supply (% of Households).....	24
Figure 3.3.	Satisfaction and dissatisfaction about Water Service Delivery (% of Households).....	25
Figure 3.4.	Monthly Service Cost for Water Service (% of Households) .....	26
Figure 3.5.	Access and use of Sanitary Service (% of Households) .....	27
Figure 3.6.	Satisfaction and dissatisfaction about Sanitation Service Delivery (% of Households).....	27
Figure 3.7.	Access and use of Electricity and Street Lighting Service (% of Households).....	30
Figure 3.8.	Faced problems with electricity and street lighting (% of Households) .....	30
Figure 3.9.	Satisfaction and dissatisfaction about electricity and street lighting (% of Households).....	32
Figure 3.10.	Monthly service cost for electricity and street lighting (% of Households).....	33
Figure 3.11.	Access and Use of Roads and Paving Service (% of Households) .....	34
Figure 3.12.	Satisfaction and dissatisfaction about Roads and Paving Service (% of Households).....	34
Figure 3.13.	Access and use of Drainage Service (% of Households).....	36
Figure 3.14.	Satisfaction and dissatisfaction about Drainage Service Delivery (% of Households).....	36
Figure 3.15.	Satisfaction and dissatisfaction about Solid Waste Management Service (% of Households).....	39
Figure 4.1.	Prime victims of corruption (% of Households).....	49
Figure 5.1.	The accountability arrangements in place .....	54

## List of Maps

Map I.	Showing the Country Location.....	5
Map II.	Location of the <i>Korail</i> Slum in Dhaka City .....	6

## List of Tables

Table 1.1.	Stakeholder levels and relative tools and techniques .....	4
Table 1.2.	Distribution of Sample and Gender Composition (% of Households) .....	9
Table 1.3.	Religion of the Respondents (% of Households) .....	9
Table 1.4.	Marital Status of the Household Members (% of Households) .....	10
Table 1.5.	Sources of Livelihood of the Respondents (% of Households).....	11
Table 1.6.	Service-Providing Institutions in the Study Location .....	12
Table 3.1.	Nature/types of problems with water supply (% of Households) .....	24
Table 3.2.	Monthly Service Cost for Sanitary Service (% of Households).....	28
Table 3.3.	Types/nature of problems with electricity and street lighting (% of Households) .....	31
Table 3.4.	Monthly Service Cost for Roads and Paving Service (% of Households) .....	35
Table 3.5.	Monthly Service Cost for Drainage Service (% of Households) .....	37
Table 3.6.	Access and Use of Solid Waste Management Service (% of Households) .....	38
Table 3.7.	Monthly Service Cost for Solid Waste Management (% of Households) .....	39
Table 4.1.	Definition/meaning of corruption (% of Households).....	43
Table 4.2.	Main causes of corruption (% of Households) .....	45
Table 4.3.	Impact of paying bribe on households (% of Households).....	47
Table 4.4.	Feelings to confront any kind of corruption (% of Households) .....	48
Table 4.5.	Institutions/persons who can be consulted in case of experiencing corruption (% of Households) .....	50
Table 5.1.	Arguments of the <i>Korail</i> slum dwellers may be relevant from the purpose.....	54
Table 5.2.	CSOs-DWASA approach at a glance.....	63
Table 5.3.	Percentages recoverable from the different category households against the provided infrastructure services .....	64
Table A1.1.	Access and uses of different services (% of Households) .....	75
Table A1.2.	Satisfaction and dissatisfaction of different services (% of Households) .....	75
Table A2.1.	Educational status of the household members (% of Households) (see Figure 1.1) .....	76

Table A2.2. Income status of the studied households (% of Households) (see Figure 1.2) .....	76
Table A2.3. Access and use of water service (% of Households) (see Figure 3.1.).....	76
Table A2.4. Faced problems with water supply (% of Households) (see Figure 3.2) .....	76
Table A2.5. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction of water service (% of Households) (see Figure 3.3) .....	77
Table A2.6. Monthly service cost for water service (% of Households) (see Figure 3.4).....	77
Table A2.7. Access and use of sanitary service (% of Households) (see Figure 3.5) .....	77
Table A2.8. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction of sanitation service (% of Households) (see Figure 3.6) .....	77
Table A2.9. Access and use of electricity and street lighting service (% of Households) (see Figure 3.7) .....	77
Table A2.10. Faced problems with electricity and street lighting (% of Households) (see Figure 3.8).....	78
Table A2.11. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction of electricity and street lighting service (% of Households) (see Figure 3.9).....	78
Table A2.12. Monthly service cost for electricity and street lighting (% of Households) (see Figure 3.10) .....	78
Table A2.13. Access and use of roads and paving service (% of Households) (see Figure 3.11) .....	78
Table A2.14. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction of roads and paving service delivery (% of Households) (see Figure 3.12).....	78
Table A2.15. Access and use of drainage service (% of Households) (see Figure 3.13).....	79
Table A2.16. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction about drainage service delivery (% of Households) (see Figure 3.14).....	79
Table A2.17. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction about solid waste management (% of Households) (see Figure 3.15).....	79
Table A2.18. Prime victims of corruption (% of Households) (see Figure 4.1) .....	79

## **AACC Study Team Members, Proshika, Bangladesh**

Team Leader: Md. Shahabuddin  
Deputy Team Leader: Fatema Mahmuda  
Researcher: Md. Manirul Islam  
Research Associates: Md. Maniruzzaman  
Kazi Rumisa Khanam  
Data Analyst: Md. Shohel Ahmed Tarafder  
Editor: Golam Faruque Khan  
Communication Coordinator: Bayezid Dawla

## Acknowledgements

In preparing the report we have much benefited from various secondary materials such as the relevant literature, Internet and daily newspapers.

First of all, we express our sincere gratitude to the Water, Engineering and Development Centre at Loughborough University, UK which initiated the study and the UK Department for International Development (DFID) which funded it.

Md. Shahabuddin, Director, IDPAA, PROSHIKA made it possible for us to conduct the study. At this stage we express our heartfelt gratitude to him. Mr. Asgar Ali Sabri the then acting head of Policy Research Department, IDPAA, dealt with the study at its initial stage. Later he helped us by providing study materials and comments from time to time. We take this opportunity to thank him for his generous support.

A special note of appreciation is due to Acting Team Leader Dr. Iqbal Alam Khan, Head of Impact Monitoring and Evaluation Cell, and Deputy Director, PROSHIKA - whose supervisory role helped the work take its present shape.

Mr. Bayezid Dawla acted as the communication coordinator of the study. In certain cases he provided valuable comments as well as suggestions. The study acknowledges his contribution.

Special thanks are due to Md. Shohel Ahmed Tarafder for helping us in data analysis and computer related technical support.

Finally, we would like to thank all stakeholders belonging to the state, market and civil society for their heartiest co-operation and valuable insights.

The authors, however, are responsible for any error or omission remaining in the report.

The authors and the series editor gratefully acknowledge the many different people who have willingly contributed in knowledge, opinion and time to the development of this series.

It is very difficult to provide an exhaustive list of contributors who developed this series. We would like to thank particularly DFID for funding this project. Our special thanks to Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman of the Yale University, USA for providing valuable comments on some documents in the series. Thanks to Dr. Sue Cavill for providing academic support to the series editor and to Jane Lanigan for technical editing.

We thank all of the people who have provided us information confidentially on such a sensitive issue as corruption.

Special thanks to the people from the low-income settlements in the various case locations who have contributed to the research and have provided their perspectives on the issues. We feel greatly indebted to them.

## Acronyms and abbreviations

ARBAN	-	Association for the Realization of Basic Needs
ASD	-	Assistance for Slum Dwellers
Bajar	-	Market
BBS	-	Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics
BGMEA	-	The Bangladesh Garments Manufactures and Exporters Association
BNP	-	Bangladesh Nationalist Party
BPDB	-	Bangladesh Power Development Board
BRCT	-	Bangladesh Rehabilitation Centre for Trauma Victims
BUP	-	Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad
BRAC	-	Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
BOSC	-	Busti Odhikar Surokha Committee - Slum Rights Protection Committee
CBOs	-	Community based Organizations
CBOs	-	Local Community based Organizations
CCO	-	Chief Conservancy officer of DCC
CSOs	-	Civil Society Organizations
CUP	-	Coalition for the Urban Poor
CUS	-	Center for Urban Studies
DCC	-	Dhaka City Corporation
DESA	-	Dhaka Electric Supply Authority
DESCO	-	Dhaka Electric Supply Company
DFID	-	Department for International Development
DPHE	-	Department of Public Health Engineering
DSK	-	Dushtha Shasthya Kendra
Dui Numbari Kaj	-	Illegal Activities
Durniti	-	Corruption
DWASA	-	Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage Authority
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
Ghush	-	Bribe
GO	-	Government
H&SD	-	Housing and Settlement Directorate
ICSOs	-	International Civil Society Organizations
Jhil	-	A Long Pool of Water
Khushi Kora	-	Making Happy

Kolshi	-	Vessel
KRSP	-	A National Civil Society Organization
Kuya	-	A ring well/a draw well
Mastaans	-	Musclemen associated with political parties
MDGs	-	Millennium Development Goals
NCSOs	-	National Civil Society Organizations
NGO	-	Non-government organization
PDB	-	Power Development Board
PHULKI	-	A Local NGO
PRA	-	Participatory Rapid Appraisal
PROSHIKA	-	One of the largest non-government organizations in Bangladesh
PRSP	-	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSTC	-	Population Service and Training Centre
R&HD	-	Roads and Highways Department
RAJUK	-	Rajdhani Unnayan Kartipakhya
RHDS	-	Rural Health and Development Society
T&T	-	Telegraph and Telephone
TEOs	-	Thana Education Officers
TI	-	Transparency International
TI-B	-	Transparency International-Bangladesh
Taka	-	Bangla currency valued at 129 taka for one GB pound
Thana	-	Police Station
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
UN	-	United Nations
UPDP	-	Urban Poor Development Programme of PROSHIKA
UPRP	-	Urban Poverty Reduction Project of CUS
WB	-	World Bank

# Executive Summary

## Introduction

In Bangladesh, lack of access to infrastructure services exacerbates poverty by lowering people's income, degrading their health, decreasing the quality of their education and increasing vulnerability shocks as reflected in various global policy instruments such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Participatory Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). In line with these global policy instruments a few national endeavours have already been made for creating an enabling environment to improve the quality of people's life through enhancing access to basic infrastructure services. However, the efforts on the ground are still far from adequate.

This case study was undertaken in order to better understand the links between corruption and poor people's inaccessibility to infrastructure services. The objective of the study was to gain a clear understanding about effective interventions for the improvement of infrastructure service delivery for the poor urban communities. Six infrastructure services such as water supply, sanitation, electricity and street lighting, drainage, access to roads and paving and solid waste management have been considered under the study. The WEDC Institute, Department of Civil and Building Engineering at Loughborough University, UK with due assistance from the UK Department for International Development (DFID) supported the study.

A combination of both qualitative and quantitative approaches have been adopted in the study and information has been collected both from primary and secondary sources. The case study and literature review methods specially employed by the study have been supported by a variety of tools and techniques. The semi-structured interviews/ informal discussions were conducted at the different institutional levels, while the questionnaire-led structured interviews and the FGDs guided by checklists were administered at the service recipient level. Besides, to understand the role of civil society actors, the consultation method has been used in the study. The survey for the study has been conducted at Korail, one of the largest slums in Dhaka city. The simultaneous presentation of both quantitative and qualitative information is one of the main features of the study.

The report has been organized into six main sections. The first section is the introductory one that includes amongst others the study rationale, methodology, as well as a brief description of the different influential factors related to the study theme. The second section contains a literature review on corruption. Section III, IV, and V however are the most important sections of the report and deal mainly with the findings of the study. Section VI is the concluding chapter of the report and incorporates the recommendations for service delivery improvement. Below is a brief summary of the study findings.

## Access and use of infrastructure services

The study shows that although inadequate, there are reportedly both legal and illegal services in the slums (Table A1.1 in appendix I). People do receive service, but complain about its quality and price. A mix of Government, NGOs, donors, and private individuals are involved in service delivery. The key point is that the whole slum is formally "illegal". Any services provided are off the books or given out of charity. Thus people can't complain because they always risk being evicted or arrested as illegal occupants. Furthermore, the few people able to get connected to services such as water or electricity then sell that service to other households at high prices. In addition, the collaboration between "musclemen"--that is, middlemen with political clout, and officials is key to understanding the situation. The study shows that corruption is just one part of a complex system that provides low quality services to the poor, maintains political power of some, enriches others, and wastes lots of resources.

## **Satisfaction and dissatisfaction with service delivery**

The slum dwellers' satisfaction with the service is very low. Water, electricity and street lighting, roads and paving and drainage are reportedly more poorly performed services (Table A1.2 in appendix I). In contrast to these, the delivery of sanitation and waste disposal services is better. At one end of the spectrum, on an average less than 10 percent of the respondents are satisfied with the services relating to roads and paving and electricity and street lighting. Conversely, at the other end, 26.7% have expressed their satisfaction with sanitation service and 23% with waste disposal service.

## **Problems with services**

The survey respondents reported a great variety of problems in accessing the services, particularly water and electricity services. Irregular and inadequate supply of water, high cost for services, their low quality, load shedding, voltage fluctuation, low voltage, power breakdown, over-billing and bribery are reportedly the important barriers to accessing the services. Interestingly, all slum dwellers reported their unwillingness to lodge formal complaints with the service providers about perceived irregularities as they think such complaints will produce no results.

## **Service costs**

On the whole, slum dwellers are to spend 50 to 500 taka a month for water. A kolshi of drinking water costs 1 taka and sometimes 2 taka. Though sanitation services are generally provided free of cost almost 50 percent of the house owners reported to spend at least 50 taka a month for accessing this service. The electricity costs however are between 50 to 500 taka a month for every household. Majority house owners in general spend 200-300 taka for electricity consumption and the relative cost for majority of the tenant households is between taka 51 to 100 a month. Usually, the electricity consumption for any single utility such as bulb, fan, television etc. costs 100 taka a month. Besides, slum dwellers are to pay taka 200-500 taka in advance for obtaining an electricity connection.

## **Service providers**

Various estimates suggest that there are 40 government / parastatal organizations, 60 non-government organizations (NGOs) and 1830 community based organizations (CBOs) in the city providing various infrastructural services to the city dwellers. Moreover, there are other voluntary and informal service providing efforts like garbage collection, traffic control, or informal courts. These organizations operate in isolation from one another and as such there is little coordination among them.

## **Causes of corruption**

Failure to implement law, misuse of power, influence peddling, poverty, lack of accountability, bureaucratic excesses, mass unawareness, domination by the local elite, absence of commitment to moral values, opportunity to make black money, greater scope to evade punishment, low salary of the officials and lack of access to information are reportedly the causes for corruption in delivering services. These all again indicate the lack of appropriate policies/instruments and lack of transparency and accountability in the service delivery mechanisms.

## **Effects of corruption**

The study further shows that though each and every sphere of society is affected by the corruption in infrastructure service delivery, it is the urban poor who are affected most. Well above half of the urban poor (65%) reported to have experience economic crisis and debt burdens because of paying bribes. More than a quarter (28% tenants) reported that they could not afford to have necessary food because of corruption in accessing the basic services. Besides, there are a few who noted their deprivation of medical facilities, loss in business and interruption in children's education because of paying bribe. It has been also found that poor people feel powerless and helpless when they experience corruption.

## **Corruption combating strategies**

There are both customary and formal accountability mechanisms to combat corruption in infrastructure service delivery. Middlemen, local leaders with political affiliation, local government representatives, service recipients, and CBOs are found as the principal actors in the customary accountability arrangements. Within the formal accountability arrangements there is a multiplicity of policy instruments and institutions. These include a few constitutional bodies and some centrally produced laws and regulations. Besides, there are specific laws and regulations for each of the service providing organizations.

Ironically, none of these regulations has any specific mandate to provide the poor with the basic services. Also, there is an overlap of functions of the service providing organizations and their respective power and authority is not always clear. Amid these policy controversies a hierarchical top-down service delivery system is in place that admits of no scope for people's participation. Thus, an overlap of policies and service delivery institutions and lack of appropriate policies together with lack of participation of the urban poor in the delivery system have made the decision-making process un-transparent and monitoring difficult. Lack of accountability and transparency in service delivery is therefore leading to corruption and eventually to the exclusion of a large section of the urban poor from the infrastructure service net.

Corruption is embedded in the life of the slum and cannot be tackled in isolation from the conditions that produce it. It will do absolutely no good to arrest a few corrupt officials because under an honest system the poor would receive no services. Thus what is needed is a change in the underlying relationship between the slum dwellers and the state. Their status needs to be legalized. There need to be legal and safe ways for them to complain, and the implicit subsidies caused by the misreading or meters, illegal tapping into lines, etc. need to be replaced by legal subsidies. The current set-up, where inadequate services are provided corruptly, must be replaced with somewhat better services provided honestly.



# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Background

The current development paradigm emphasizes the widening of people's access to infrastructural services as an important step towards poverty reduction, as reflected in two major policy instruments known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Participatory Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). These seek to show that lack of access to infrastructure services exacerbates poverty by lowering people's income, degrading their health, decreasing the quality of their education and increasing vulnerability shocks.


In Bangladesh there are constitutional provisions for creating an enabling environment to improve the quality of life of people through proper access to basic infrastructure services. Even, the current PRSP that has been accepted by the World Bank envisages people's adequate access to basic infrastructural services. However, the efforts on the ground are still far from adequate. The visible initiatives have so far remained confined to the delivery of infrastructure packages mostly encompassing the construction of power plants, water plants and some other physical infrastructures and the restructuring of a few institutions together with a few regulatory measures. But, in reality, such infrastructural packages and restructuring are not sufficient to ensure sustainable access to infrastructure services by the poor, particularly the urban poor. One of the recent estimates suggests that in the city of Dhaka only 2% slum dwellers and squatters enjoy the water and sewerage connection facilities provided by Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage Authority (DWASA)<sup>1</sup>. The Government Score Card Survey of the World Bank (2002) noted less than 20% satisfaction of the city dwellers in respect of electricity supply and transport facilities.

There is a tendency among the policy actors in Bangladesh to attribute the inadequacy of infrastructure services and their skewed distribution to rapid urbanization and resource constraints of the government. However, the relevant literature shows that governance failure, in particular corruption outweighs all other factors in obstructing the delivery of infrastructure services in Bangladesh. Only a small portion of the resources spent in this sector has been properly utilized. It has been further seen that though the volume of infrastructure service delivery has expanded in recent years in response to the needs of the vastly increased urban population, it has benefited mostly those who have already accessed services rather than those who have not.

In view of the above the whole gamut of corruption/governance failure in relation to poorer people's inaccessibility to infrastructure services has been conceptualized in the present study as under:

---

<sup>1</sup> Kamal Siddique (2004), Megacity Governance in South Asia



**Figure 1.1. Conceptual Framework**

As evident from the stated framework, a plurality of institutions, lack of appropriate legislation and regulation and a top-down provider-recipient service delivery mechanism whereby the urban poor are conceived merely as ‘governed’ rather than as active partners in governing their own business are some factors which have weakened the accountability arrangements in the delivery of infrastructural services. There are now about 40 government / parastatal organizations providing various infrastructural services to the city dwellers. These are the Dhaka City Corporation (DCC), Dhaka Water and Sewerage Authority (DWASA), Dhaka Electric Supply Company Limited (DESCO), Dhaka Electricity Supply Authority (DESA), Rajdhani Unnayan Karttripakhya (RAJUK), Housing and Settlement Directorate (H & SD), Roads and Highways Department (R & HD), Titas Gas Transmission and Distribution Company Limited, Department of Social Welfare, Health Directorate and so on. Besides, a good number of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are operating in the city. One of the studies conducted by Kamal Siddiqui and others in 2000 enlisted 60 non-government organizations (NGOs) and 1830 community based organizations (CBOs) in the city. Moreover, there are purely voluntary and informal service-providing efforts like garbage collection, traffic control, or informal trial. Thus, there has been an overcrowding of service providing organizations in the city. Now the problem is that these organizations operate in isolation from one another and as such there is little coordination among them.

Again, there is a multiplicity of policy instruments to regulate the activities of these service-providing agencies. There are some constitutional bodies together with a few centrally produced laws and regulations to ensure the transparency and accountability of these organizations. The Comptroller and Auditor General, the Ombudsman, the Election Commission, the Administrative Tribunals, the Public Accounts Committee, and the judiciary are these constitutional bodies. Of the rules and regulations now in operation the recently enacted ‘Anti-corruption Act 2004’ and ‘Public Procurement Regulation 2003’ are worth mention. Besides, there are specific laws and regulations for each of the service providing organizations such as the DCC ordinance 1983, the DWASA

ordinance 1963 and 1996, the foreign donations regulation ordinance 1978, the foreign contribution ordinance 1982, the government servants rules 1979 and 1985 and so on. Ironically, none of these regulations has any specific mandate to provide the poor with the basic services. Even there is no scope for any consultation with the citizens and experts in the laws. Moreover, there is an overlap of functions of the service providing organizations and their respective power and authority is not always clear. Amid these policy controversies a hierarchical top-down service delivery system is in place that admits of no scope for people's participation. As this set-up is unable to meet the needs and aspirations of poor people a customary delivery mechanism has grown side by side.

Thus, an overlap of policies and service delivery institutions and lack of appropriate policies together with lack of participation of the urban poor in the delivery system have together made the decision-making process intransparent and effective monitoring difficult. Lack of accountability and transparency in service delivery is therefore leading to corruption and eventually to the exclusion of a large section of the urban poor from the infrastructure service net.

With this broad understanding of corruption and poor people's inaccessibility to infrastructural services the present case study has attempted to look into the issue of accountability in the infrastructure service delivery mechanisms. The objective of the study is to gain a clear understanding about effective interventions for service delivery improvement for poor urban communities. In doing so, the study has sought to figure out the magnitude of urban poverty, map out the needs and priorities of the urban poor in terms of service delivery, and analyze the structure and functions of institutions working in this area.

## **1.2 Purpose of the study**

The purpose of the study is to improve governance through appropriate accountability arrangements for combating corruption in the delivery of infrastructure services (such as water supply, sanitation, electricity, drainage, access to roads and paving, solid waste management, and electricity and street lighting) in Dhaka city leading to an improvement of the livelihoods of the poor.

## **1.3 Research questions**

- What are the causes of corruption in infrastructure service delivery (water supply, sanitation, electricity and street lighting, drainage, access roads and paving and solid waste management)?
- What are the effects of corruption in infrastructure service delivery on the livelihoods of the poor?
- What are the accountability arrangements for infrastructure service delivery? How do the instituted reforms tackle the issues of corruption through increased accountability? How do the accountability arrangements promote pro-poor service delivery and how do they work within the context of poor communities?
- What anti-corruption reforms (formal or informal/private sector, NGOs or public sector) have been undertaken in parallel sectors such as water and sanitation? What is the scope to 'transplant' any successful accountability arrangements into the infrastructure sector? If so, how? What general lessons can be learnt from these anti-corruption reforms in parallel sectors for the infrastructure sector?
- How do social actions create service providers' accountability and improve pro-poor services?

## 1.4 Methodology and Process

A combination of both qualitative and quantitative approaches have been adopted in the study. Under this framework information has been collected both from primary and secondary levels.

### Primary Level

Primary level information has been obtained through a series of discussion with three different stakeholder levels, i.e. service providers, service recipients, and policy level actors/experts/professionals. The diagram below shows the levels for primary information collection under the study:




Figure 1.2. Levels of Primary Information Collection

### Secondary Level

Secondary information for the study has been mainly collected from literature (books, research reports, journals etc.), Internet and newspapers.

#### 1.4.1 Processes

The case study and literature review methods specially employed by the study have been supported by a variety of tools and techniques including semi-structured interviews, informal discussions, focus group discussion (FGD), structured questionnaire and checklists. The semi-structured interviews/informal discussions were conducted at the different institutional levels, while the questionnaire-led structured interviews and the FGDs guided by checklists were administered at the service recipient level. Besides, to understand the role of civil society actors, the consultation method has been used in the study. The following table may give a clearer idea of the various tools and techniques used to obtain information.

Table 1.1. Stakeholder levels and relative tools and techniques

Primary-level Stakeholders	Tools and Techniques
State level service providers	Semi-structured interview / informal discussion (10)
Civil society level service providers	Semi-structured interview / informal discussion (5)
State level policy actors	Informal discussion / consultation (12)
Civil society level policy actors	Informal discussion / consultation (8)
Service recipients	Structured interview (225 households) & FGD (6)
Five Levels	Total: 266

### 1.4.2 Selection of the Study Locale

Since the study intended to understand the implications of corruption in infrastructure service delivery for the urban poor community of Bangladesh it was decided to conduct a household survey under the study. Obviously, Dhaka, the capital city of the country, has the highest concentration of infrastructure service delivery. So, the survey has been conducted within this city. According to the Bangladesh Population Census 2001, Dhaka City Corporation (DCC) has an area of 360 sq. km including an estimated 2004 population of 7.5 million. The assumed annual increase rate of the population is 6% only. The same figure has been considered here for 2005, since there are constant debates on the rate of change of the DCC's population. The problem is that there has not been any BBS (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics) survey of the poverty of Dhaka city. Moreover, there are different perceptions of urban poverty in Bangladesh. The BBS estimate 1999-2000 recorded 43% urban poverty in the country.

Again, the Planning Commission using the BBS Household Expenditure Survey 2000 for its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (ERD, 2003) has estimated the incidence of urban poverty at 36.6 % while the most comprehensive survey of urban poverty led by the Center for Urban Studies (CUS) in 1996 showed a higher incidence of poverty in Dhaka City, that is, 52 %. Considering these controversies on the incidence of urban poverty, especially poverty in Dhaka, the present study thought it safe to accept a midpoint figure of around 45 % poverty that the Urban Poverty Reduction Project (UPRP) of CUS also used in their study in 1996. In this estimate, Dhaka's poverty now stands at 3.37 million in terms of population.



**Map I. Showing the Country Location**

Of the estimated 3.37 million people almost 47.5% live in the slums and squatter settlements. According to the above estimate the slum population of the city now stands at more than 1.5 million. Nevertheless, the field survey by CUS for the UPRP study recorded a sum total of 112669 households within the DCC slum settlements against a population size of 1104600 in the year 1996. That means each household consists of approximately 10 members. According to this household size there will be approximately 150000 households now living in the DCC slum settlements. The rest of the poor are living in mixed income areas i.e. lower, lower middle and middle-income milieus. A large number of them such as household workers, drivers and security guards live as part of the middle class or upper class households. As it was not possible to cover these types of the poor, the

present survey has been conducted at *Korail*, one of the slum locations of the city. The reasons for selecting the *Korail* slum for the survey are as under:

- *Korail* is one of the largest slums in Dhaka city with an estimated area of 90 acres. Its population is now estimated at approximately 85,000-90,000 representing 15000 households. Considering the household count, which is more than 10% of the total households living in the slum settlements, it can easily be presumed that *Korail* is representative in all respects.
- In relation to the other slums of the city the *Korail* slum is a little different in that it gets almost all the infrastructure related services which are mostly absent in the rest of the slum locations. It is quite an old slum as it came into being in 1975.
- The slum is situated almost at the heart of the city as well as inside one of the city's most posh areas, that is, Gulshan - Banani.
- Because of its location on land owned by the state telephone board, the population here has been mixed up with the lower ranking telephone board employees.

In this backdrop, it can be said that the selection of the *Korail* slum for the present study is quite rational.



**Map II. Location of the *Korail* Slum in Dhaka City**

### 1.4.3 Determination of the sample size

To determine the sample size, the study team first conducted a four-day transact-walk at the *Korail* slum and collected the following information:

- The slum was divided into two units i.e. unit number 1 and unit number 2;
- Both the units were almost equal in length;
- Both of the units were again divided into two smaller units i.e. the north and the south;
- There was an equal distribution of population between unit number 1 and unit number 2; and
- Unit number 1 was found to have more concentration of infrastructure related services than the other unit.

In consideration of the stated features of the slum the team decided to conduct the survey in unit number 1 dividing it into three clusters i.e. the front cluster, the middle cluster and the last cluster as it was not possible to conduct a comprehensive survey due to time constraints. Besides, it was thought that there must be the highest and the lowest concentration of services amongst these three clusters. As a second option, considering the north and south divisions under the units each of the clusters was again divided into two strata i.e. the south strata and the north strata. Thus, a total of six strata were identified in the study location.

Then, a quick participatory rapid appraisal (PRA) census was conducted in the study location including all its clusters and strata. Thus, a total of 598 households were identified within the study location. It should be mentioned in this connection that the households identified under the north strata were found to have almost no infrastructure service delivery. It is in this context that the team finally decided to conduct the survey within the households identified under the south strata only. Thus, finally 300 households were selected for conducting the survey under the study.

Along the way it became further noticeable that the households identified under the south strata mostly included the house owners though there remained a few tenants within each of the households. In view of this, the number of household counts was then multiplied by three with the assumption that each households had on an average at least two tenants. Thus, a total of 900 households were found in the study location. Finally, applying a systematic random sampling method, 225 households were selected for the study for conducting the survey. That means, in a systematic order every fourth household was surveyed under the study including two of its tenants.

## 1.5 Basic Infrastructure Services at the Study Locale

On a national scale, development policies during the 1950s and midway through the 1960s emphasized improving the physical infrastructure (roads, railways etc.). However, during the 1970s the focus shifted when more importance was given to the infrastructure provisions due to the high incidence of poverty and increased pressure from the donor community. Since the 1990s a service-oriented approach to infrastructure development is in place. Its main features are: 1) creating enabling environments, 2) building institutional and human capacities, 3) enhancing access to services, and/or 4) enhancing physical capital stock. A brief summary of six infrastructural services reviewed under the study showing the real status of the service-oriented approach to infrastructure development is given below.

### **Water**

Before 2002, especially before the signing of a contract between Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage Authority (DWASA) and some civil society organizations (CSOs) such as Water Aid, DSK, there was no scope for the *Korail* dwellers to get drinking water from DWASA. From 2002 they have been getting a supply of water from a reservoir constructed in the slum with the assistance of the NGOs

working in the area. Currently, the majority of people have access to supply water but very few of them are satisfied with the service. Only 12% expressed their satisfaction in terms of access level and the remaining 88% expressed their dissatisfaction with the quantity and quality of the service. The underlying causes of their dissatisfaction are the irregularity in water supply and the corruption of DWASA employees. Illegal connections are reportedly provided very often and those who have a legal claim to a regular supply of water are denied their due shares.

### ***Sanitation***

Almost all CSOs working in the community have sanitation programs. So, the scenario of poor people's access to sanitary latrines is relatively better in the community though it is yet to reach an acceptable standard in view of the global and national commitments on the issue. Only 26.70% respondents expressed their satisfaction with the sanitary latrine facilities. Among those who have expressed their satisfaction there are more house owners (48%) than tenants (12%).

### ***Electricity and Street Lighting***

It is only in 2003 that the Korail slum came under the electricity coverage provided by the Dhaka Electric Supply Company (DESCO) on condition that groups of consumers would be formed by the civil society organizations working there. Survey data show that although 85.3% households currently have access to electricity and street lighting services and 81.3% use them in a real sense, only 7.1% (6% house owners and 9.3% tenants) are satisfied with the existing services. High prices were reported as the major cause for dissatisfaction. Reality check further shows that instead of the residential rate of electricity the commercial rate is charged to the slum dwellers which is more than double the former. Besides, fewer electricity meters than required have been provided there and that without the relevant accessories (electric post, cable connection etc.). Moreover, a single electricity meter connection costs taka 30 to 40 thousand. This is incredibly higher than the legal charge of a meter connection and the amount has to be distributed to a range of staff and engineers of the electric company.

### ***Roads and Paving***

There are two east-west lying pucca (herringbone) roads within the *Korail* slum and there are some south-north lying narrow dirt passages. As reported by the slum dwellers, they themselves constructed the pucca roads by raising a fund from the community as once it became virtually impossible for them to move out of home. Despite this, only 12% survey respondents have expressed their satisfaction with the communication facilities.

### ***Drainage***

There are some unstructured water passing facilities in the community and only 12.4% have expressed their satisfaction with that. More tenants (15%) than house owners (9%) are satisfied with these facilities. But, these water-passing facilities can in no way be compared to that of a drainage system in the true sense of the term. Digging mud at about 8 to 10 inches they have been constructed and all are overflowing with household wastes. Slum dwellers reported that finding no alternative to disposing liquid household wastes they themselves had constructed these.

### ***Solid Waste Management***

Regarding solid waste management 23% respondents have expressed their satisfaction including 28% house owners and 20% tenants. Qualitative information suggests that slum dwellers mostly dump their household wastes into the lake surrounding the slum. On the entry side a few handcarts are ready to carry away household wastes for the relatively wealthy people. This has been arranged by their own initiatives and finance.

In view of the persistent dissatisfaction with the delivery of the stated six infrastructure services, the study team talked to the local representatives of the Dhaka City Corporation (DCC) who reported that the slum was on illegal land holdings and could be demolished any time. In order to legally obtain infrastructure services a holding number for an occupant is a must. Now, to obtain a holding number an occupant needs to have a structured house. But slum dwellers are not in a position to get the permission for a building or construction. So, it is very difficult on the part of the local DCC representatives to provide infrastructure services to the slum dwellers, as long as the legal tenurial security is absent there.

## 1.6 Demographic attributes

The basic infrastructure services of the study locale have been depicted above in brief. In this section a few demographic attributes of the study locale would be discussed so as to understand the relationships amongst poverty, accountability arrangements, access to basic infrastructure services and corruption more clearly.

### 1.6.1 Household Size and Sex

In total 225 households have been surveyed under the study and these include 33.3% house owners' households and 66.7% tenants' households. On an average 5 family members have been recorded in the house owners category households and 3.8 members in the tenants category households. Amongst the household members 51.5% are male and 50.5% are female. In the house owners category households 53.9% are male and 46.1% are female. In the tenants category the male-female ratio is fifty-fifty.

**Table 1.2. Distribution of Sample and Gender Composition (% of Households)**

Sex	House Owner	Tenant	Total
Male	53.9	50.0	51.5
Female	46.1	50.0	50.5
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>375</b>	<b>564</b>	<b>939</b>

### 1.6.2 Religion

Two religious categories have been found in the survey households. Among them 99.1% are Muslim households and 0.9% Hindu households as illustrated in the following table;

**Table 1.3. Religion of the Respondents (% of Households)**

Religion	House Owner	Tenant	Total
Muslim	98.67	99.33	99.1
Hindu	1.33	0.67	0.9
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>225</b>


### 1.6.3 Marital Status of Household Members

Amongst the household members 50.3% are married and 46.8% are unmarried.

**Table 1.4. Marital Status of the Household Members (% of Households)**

Marital Status	House owner	Tenant	Total
Married	49.6	50.7	50.3
Divorced	1.3	.7	0.9
Separated	.3	.9	0.6
Widow or widower	1.3	1.4	1.4
Never Married	47.5	46.3	46.8
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>375</b>	<b>564</b>	<b>939</b>

### 1.6.4 Educational Status



**Figure 1.3. Educational status of the household members (% of Households)**

As evident in the figure, the highest number of the household members are primary graduates (31.3%). Of them 30.1% belong to the house owners category and 32.1% to the tenants category. The second highest segment of the household members as reported are illiterate (26.9%). More tenant household members (32.3%) are illiterate than the members of the house owners category (18.9%). Another 23.7% household members reportedly know either the alphabet or can sign only. Amongst others 11.9% reported to have studied up to the secondary level and the rest either completed the secondary course or studied more. However, they are very insignificant in number.

### 1.6.5 Sources of Livelihood

Self-employment in micro settings in the forms of grocery shops, tea stalls, workshops etc is the highest occupation category in the study locale. 26.7% house owners and 38.7% tenants reported this (Table 1.5). In the rest of the cases there are great variations of occupation between house owners and tenants. House owners in general are found to be in professions like house renting (22.67%), small business (12%), and lower status jobs (20%) whereas, tenants are mostly engaged in day laboring (15.2%) and rickshaw/van pulling (30.7%).

**Table 1.5. Sources of Livelihood of the Respondents (% of Households)**

Sources of Livelihood	House owner	Tenant
1. Micro-enterprise/self employed	26.67	-
2. Labourer	2.67	-
3. Agriculture	-	-
4. Migration	-	-
5. Rent	22.67	-
6. Saving/remittances/pension	-	0.67
7. NGO	-	-
8. Small business	12.00	2.00
9. Low status job	20.00	12.67
10. Other (Rickshaw pulling, Van pulling)	16.00	30.67
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>150</b>


Moreover, the majority of the survey households are found to have either a secondary or a tertiary occupation. In the case of house owners (56.92%) renting out their houses is the highest-ranking secondary occupation whereas for tenants it is rickshaw pulling (30.67%).

### 1.6.6 Important Social Groups

As reported by the slum dwellers, there are at least three influential social groups within the study location i.e., people affiliated with the ruling party, people affiliated with the opposition party and the house owners. However, those who are affiliated with the ruling party are more influential than others.

### 1.6.7 Income Status

33.3% house owners have more than taka 6001+ monthly income, 30.67% earn taka 4500 to 6000, 21.3% earn taka 3001 to 4500 and another 12% have only taka 2001 to 3000 income a month. Amongst the tenants 42.67% have a monthly income of taka 3001 to 4500 only. Amongst others 28% earn taka 2001 to 3000, 10.67% earn either taka 2001 to 3000 or taka 4501 to 6000, 6.67% have taka 6001+ earnings and 1.33% have less than taka 1000 income a month. The figure below deals with the income data of the studied households:



**Figure 1.4. Income Status of the Studied Households (% of Households)**

## 1.7 Institutions in Connection to Service Delivery in the Study Locale

The study location gets infrastructure support and services from the following institutions:

**Table 1.6. Service-Providing Institutions in the Study Location**

Institutions	Services	Year Started
Dhaka City Corporation (DCC)	Solid waste management, street lighting, drainage, sanitation, roads and paving, awareness building	1983
Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage Authority (DWASA)	Water supply, sewerage and drainage, awareness building	2003
Dhaka Electric Supply Company (DESCO)	Electricity	2002
PROSHIKA	Sanitation, water, primary health care, education, housing, awareness building, policy advocacy	1989
Coalition for the Urban Poor (CUP)	Sanitation, water, primary health care, awareness building, policy advocacy	1990
Dushtha Shasthya Kendra (DSK)	Sanitation, health, water, awareness building, policy advocacy	1989

### 1.7.1 DCC

It is the only local government institution functioning in the city. The DCC Ordinance 1983 and its subsequent amendments provide the existing legal framework for this institution. Initially, it was responsible for all essential service delivery to the city dwellers. With the establishment of a few semi-autonomous service providing organizations over the years like DWASA, DESCO, RAJUK, Roads and Highways Department and so on, majority of its important services have been transferred to these institutions. Of the six infrastructure services covered under the study only solid waste management is now DCC's sole responsibility. Besides, it has partial responsibility for street lighting, drainage, sanitation and roads and paving.

### 1.7.2 DWASA

The DWASA Ordinance 1963 laid down the foundation for DWASA. With the last amendments of 1996, it is now functionally responsible to build, operate, and maintain necessary infrastructures for the proper supply of water, for treatment and safe disposal of sewerage and for removing water logging from the city.

### 1.7.3 DESCO

With the status of a public limited company DESCO first came into being in November 1996 but formally started functioning in 1998. Functionally, it is responsible to provide electricity services within Dhaka city. It has no electricity producing capacity. Purchasing electricity from the Power Development Board (PDB) and the Dhaka Electric Supply Authority (DESA) DESCO sell that to the city dwellers. Because of its company status, it pays no special attention to the electricity needs of the poor city dwellers.

#### **1.7.4 PROSHIKA**

PROSHIKA's urban Poor Development Program (UPDP) initiated in 1989 is a milestone in addressing urban poverty. Under this program a number of support service initiatives were administered at different slums and squatter settlements of Dhaka city. Of them formation of primary groups, federations and community based organizations (CBOS), providing of latrines, tube-wells, development education, launching of awareness-building programs are worth mentioning. During the recent past PROSHIKA's service delivery to the *Korail* slum found to have been reduced remarkably. An uncongenial atmosphere resulting from the present government's attitude towards PROSHIKA has reportedly caused this.

#### **1.7.5 CUP**

In view of massive slum demolition in the late 1980s, the civil society organizations were then working with the urban poor of Dhaka jointly formed the Coalition for the Urban Poor (CUP) in 1990. At the initial stage CUP concentrated on deliberate advocacy campaigns (meeting policy-makers, holding press conferences and staging protests) to influence policy-makers on the issue of better service delivery towards the poor of the city. Gradually, its activities increased with the inclusion of service delivery programs in the slums and squatters where poor people live in. In the *Korail* slum it is now providing sanitation, primary health care and education services besides its regular policy advocacy and awareness building programs.

#### **1.7.6 DSK**

DSK was established to address the health care needs of the slum dwellers following the devastating floods of 1988. Now-a-days, DSK program interventions in the slum locations include amongst others health care, water supply, sanitation, micro-finance, and education. Its water supply program again involves a community-based approach in which communities are allowed to participate in designing water points, selecting site locations, and formulating guidelines on water use and cost sharing.

### **1.8 Organization of the Report**

The present report is organized into six main sections. In the first section the study rationale has been discussed in detail. In doing so a detailed methodology as well as a brief overview of the different influential factors in relation to the study theme has been incorporated. The second section contains a literature review on corruption. The third section of the report deals with the forms and stages of infrastructure service delivery. The fourth section provides analyses of the causes and effects of corruption in the service delivery mechanisms in line with accountability arrangements. In the fifth section a critical analysis has been made of the corruption combating strategies adopted so far in the infrastructure service sectors. The necessity of strengthening accountability arrangements in service sectors in light of analyzing the impact of corruption on the poorer communities has been considered in the fourth section of the report. Finally, there has been an attempt to present a detailed framework for combating corruption in the service sectors emphasizing accountability matters.



## **2. Literature review**

### **2.1 Introduction**

Although corruption is an age-old problem, it is only in the recent years that this problem has become a major concern in both developed and developing countries. Because of its open and pervasive forms corruption received global attention during the last decade and even topped the international agenda. OECD's Anti-Bribery Convention of 1999 best reflects the global concern about the problem. Concern about corruption is also running high in policy circles and civil society in Bangladesh as the country has topped the list of corrupt countries for the fifth time as per Transparency International ranking.

In spite of this growing concern about corruption there is a paucity of empirical research on the issue in Bangladesh. There is even more paucity of research of corruption in infrastructure service delivery. The very few empirical researches on corruption that deserve mention have been conducted within a predetermined macro framework and mostly the degree and trends of corruption nationwide have been considered there. Besides, there have been some initiatives to scrutinize media reporting on corruption and thereby to determine its increasing or decreasing trends. Thus, the special features of corruption in the micro context, particularly its impact on the lives of the urban poor have been simply overlooked or negatively assessed or even misunderstood.

### **2.2 Understanding Corruption**

#### **2.2.1 By Definition**

The understanding of corruption in Bangladesh is found to vary from person to person, professional to professional. In the words of Iftekharuzzaman, executive director, TIB, "corruption is a behavior or act that breaks away from or contradicts ethical and moral standard, traditions, laws and civic virtues (2005)". Economists in general seem to perceive it as illegal economic exchange (Raihan, 2000). Public Administration practitioners are prone to view it as a bureaucratic dysfunction that hinders administrative efficiency. Sociologists of the country perceive it as a process which involves social, economic or political exchange and which often occurs in an institutionalized form (Zakiuddin, 2000). Summarizing all these it can be said that corruption in general projects a negative image of the bureaucrats, professionals and businesspeople of the country and is unacceptable to society (ibid).

This study views corruption as 'the misuse of public power for private profit' in line with the current development discourse (WDR, 1997 & ADB, 1999) although such an understanding is not altogether free from debates<sup>2</sup>. However, in Bangladesh there are ambiguities in ascertaining the degree of corruption. Hossain (1990) sees 'no difference between coming habitually late to work, receiving gifts, keeping people in power 'in good humor' or committing a corrupt act'.

It has been pointed out that in Bangladesh corruption is grounded on a social formation where social processes, structures, institutions, modes of exchange etc. all have contributory effects on the present day proliferation of corruption (ibid). Based on this argument different typologies of corruption found in the literature has been considered in brief in the following section.

---

<sup>2</sup> This understanding neglects the role of private individuals in corruption; overlooks the imperfect (immoral) market situation of the country; denies the motive and powers involved in paying bribe for securing rights (Wood, 1994).

### **2.2.2 Analyzing typologies**

There is a great variety of corruption typologies and forms in the works of different professionals in Bangladesh. In general, they fall into two broader categories i.e. grand corruption, and petty corruption. Petty corruption is most pervasive in society and harms the poor most. It is a complex, morally ambiguous and intractable issue often connected to higher levels of systematic and systemic corruption (Riley, 1999). TIB report card survey 2005 on health services in Rajshahi area in Bangladesh revealed that patients are victims of 13 types of petty corruption in the forms of bribes, which include: unauthorized payment for bed allocation, using trolleys, getting supplies like saline, bandage materials, food from the canteen, medicine from the hospital pharmacy etc.

Raihan (2000) borrowing from Shleifer and Vishny (1993) has distinguished between 'corruption without theft' and, 'corruption with theft'. Corruption without theft encompasses bribe demands of the officials in addition to the regular payment of the government while corruption with theft involves instances where the regular payment is not made to the government. In the 'Transparency International Bangladesh's baseline survey on corruption, phase two' (1997) there is a supplementation of these two types of corruption. The survey shows that sixty-percent urban households are to pay either money or to exert influence in other ways to get water line connections and to correct water bills in addition to the legal payment. The report also says that nearly one-third of the urban households have got their water bills reduced through an arrangement with the meter readers.

Wood's (1994) classification of corruption in the Bangladesh context is however bias towards Michael Beenstock's (in Raihan, 2000) classification i.e. extortionary, subversive and benign corruption based on the consideration of market imperfections and illegality or secrecy. Benign corruption does not reflect market imperfections, e.g., the low-paid bureaucrats earn commissions through corruption that competitively determines the supply price for their services (Wood, 1994). On the other hand, extortionary and subversive corruption causes market imperfections in addition to illegal doings as it involves the exercise of monopoly power to receive a bribe as well as facilitate unequal exchange of benefit to the bribe payers.

### **2.2.3 Underlying corruption perceptions**

In the developed country literature there is a consistent trend to perceive Bangladesh's corruption in light of a school of thought commonly known as 'modernization theories' which postulate that the industrialized world has reached its present stage of development by adopting a particular form of liberal-democracy and state polity. Now in order to attain the same growth, Bangladesh must go through the historical stages of abandoning 'traditional' norms that encourage patronage, patron-client relationships, patrimonial affiliations, all of which retard the process of development. Although, the poverty, social deprivation and individual forms of organization existing in the country have been recognized in the modernization theories but they link them to a particular cultural condition which includes the backward traits of people and a propensity to be corrupt (Novak, 1994 and Maloney 1991).

In contrast to the above, there are continuous attempts on the part of the national experts to postulate the issue of corruption as an imported capitalist product (Chowdhury, 1983; Bhattacharya, 1994; Chowdhury, 1985; Umar, 1994). Corruption is perceived to be the end result of an outside, essentially alien influence. It is not something indigenous and certainly, its presence does not reflect the true cultural heritage of the people of this country. TI Chairman, Peter Eigen in 1997 commented that a large share of corruption in Bangladesh is the product of multinational corporations headquartered in leading industrialized countries, using bribery and kick-backs to buy contracts.

Apart from the above, there are some who try to perceive corruption locating the issue within the nation context. According to this view, Bangladesh has a significantly different context which include amongst others: extended socio-economic and political conditions of poverty and social

cleavages, large incidence of corruption in terms both area coverage and magnitude, and a negative understanding of corruption (Zakiuddin, 2000). Wood (1994) noted that Bangladesh is a weak state and by definition poor. The state is to cope with severe socio-economic and political pressures amongst which scarcity of resources and the unstable political situation are the most common ones. Besides, it has an imperfect market, which is unable to discharge its responsibility. In such a situation the state is to play a major role in the market. More specifically, here transactions in the market place actually happen in between the state and its clients. The ultimate result has been immoral activities on the part of the state in terms of both public resources and public expenditure allocation. Taking the advantage of its fragmented social structures and codes public services are managed in absolute rent seeking conditions (Wood, 1994).

Furthermore, corruption here is often perceives to be linked to politics. In reality, political influence continues to play a vital role in all spheres of life in Bangladesh and politics is usually considered a breeding ground of corruption. Politics is so permeated by graft that a political leader who is not perceived to be corrupt is usually pushed to the background. The works of Jahan (1980), Novak (1994), Maudud (1983) and Muhith (1991) are all replete with the theme of political corruption that has taken place in Bangladesh in different regimes.

## **2.3 Trends**

There are different trends of corruption in the relevant literature. For a better understanding, the trends can be put into the following three categories.

### **2.3.1 Cultural and political patronage**

For most of the writers corruption is an indigenously created condition in Bangladesh. Patronage, patron-client relationships, factional and patrimonial arrangements are the traditional processes through which resources are mainly distributed and allocated in Bangladesh. Anti-corruption in Bangladesh: A UNDP case study, drafted by Hitomi Oikawa (2003) display these characteristics. As noted by Theobald (1990, p.56) in the past there was a kind of cultural patronage based on kinship networking, gender bias, religious bias and a kind of political patronage based on selective appointments in the country.

### **2.3.2 Economic exchange**

With the onset of colonialism in the country corruption became a kind of economic exchange between the parties involved. Treisman's (1999) investigation finds a correlation between colonialism and corruption. Very often it has been articulated that the East India Company, which effectively seized power in Bengal in 1757, perpetuated a highly corrupt system, paying its employees sub-subsistence wages, thereby compelling them to resort to private business and extortion (Mollah and Uddin, undated). Robert Clive described the employees of the company as "a set of men whose sense of honor and duty to their employers had been estranged by the larger pursuit of their own immediate advantages".

### **2.3.3 Corporate culture**

With the trade liberalization aspect of globalization particularly in the 1980s corruption has become a part of the corporate culture. 'Private gain misusing public offices' has gradually come to be accepted as the form of corruption. It has been perceived as an inevitable suffering of the vulnerable in the interest of growth.

## **2.4 Causes of corruption**

There are so many complex causes of corruption in the available literature that it is impossible to make a comprehensive account of all of them in the present study. An attempt has been made below to consider the major causes of corruption categorizing them into a few broader groups.

### **2.4.1 Governance failure**

There is persistent reputation that weak governance characterized by a lack of transparency, accountability, and rule of law are inextricably linked to corruption and are mutually reinforcing. One of the World Bank survey (2002b) has found that purchasing electricity and water costs the poor city dwellers of Bangladesh two to three times more than their more affluent counterparts. The report has cited this as an example of the inevitable consequences of poor governance and systematic inefficiencies. Poor people cannot build resistance against this. They cannot even complain, since complaining may result in losing services altogether. Ahmed and his associates (2004) notes that in Bangladesh corruption is largely the outcome of a deviant bureaucratic behavior in a decadent system in which loyalty and subordination are valued more than professionalism.

When the Bangladeshi government audits expenditures, there are few instances of follow-up actions. The public accounts committee does not function. There is an attitude that if an official spends government money illegally today it will be audited 10-12 years later. So, they are sure that they do not have to face any punishment right now (ibid).

### **2.4.2 Political reasons**

The political reasons of corruption are also widely noticeable in the corruption literature. Because of growing perceptions of political corruption in Bangladesh, before the latest national election almost all the political parties incorporated corruption-combating strategies in their election manifestos. The ruling BNP during the 2001 national election pledged a number of high priority specific actions for uprooting corruption which mainly included appointment of ombudsman, establishment of an independent anti-corruption commission, establishing transparency and accountability in sales and procurement of public and government controlled institutions, controlling the abuse of influence, and publishing accounts of the wealth of the prime minister, ministers and all individuals of equivalent status including people's representatives (Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Election Manifesto: National Election 2001, p.12.).

The Awami League (the opposition party) also attached a high priority to fighting corruption for fulfilling its commitment to establish good governance and a pro-people administration that would be transparent, efficient, honest, and accountable to the people. It promised to set-up an 'Anti-corruption Council' aimed at eliminating corruption and setting up an effective institutional mechanism. (Bangladesh Awami League, Election Manifesto 2001, p.14).

### **2.4.3 Absence of competition**

There is a general notion persisting in the literature that it is because of the less competitive market environment that the incidence of corruption is very high in the country. Competition is commonly assumed to lower the rent seeking scope of both public servants and politicians (Irwin and Brook, 2003).

### **2.4.4 Cultural Determinants**

The socio-cultural aspects of corruption are important for a better understanding of this problem (Zakiuddin, 2000). Siddiqui (2000) says, "For a long time in recent past, Bangladesh remained under authoritarian rule owing to colonialism and military dictatorship. During this time, concessions at the local level were often used to legitimize authoritarian rule at the national level. Even when

democracy was ushered in, problems remained owing to patron-client relationships, gender discrimination and other drawbacks.”

Barkat (in News Network, 2003:78) says, “We fought against two economies in 1971, but the people once again have fallen into the trap of two economies. A small group of people, may be ten lakhs among the country’s 14 crore people, are the real beneficiaries. So here we have made another economy of the distressed and deprived people and the economy of the ten lakh people - the real beneficiaries of the economy - forcing the remaining 13.90 crore people to endure all sorts of deprivation and hardship “. In spite of this strong ground, corruption literature in the country in general lacks a socio-cultural analysis of corruption.

#### **2.4.5 Colonialism**

Though there is no full-fledged studies on the impact of colonialism on the level of corruption, variables of colonial heritage are often observed to enter as control variables into some studies as stated earlier.

### **2.5 Effects of corruption/costs of corruption**

Empirical evidence suggests that in Bangladesh, corruption aggravates income inequality and is associated with slower economic growth.

There are again some empirical researches supplementing the stated theoretical propositions. Mauro in a cross-section of 67 countries finds that corruption negatively impacts on the ratio of investment to GDP and argues that if Bangladesh were to improve the integrity of its bureaucracy to the level of that of Uruguay, its investment rate would increase by almost five percent of GDP. The WB official paper “Corruption in Bangladesh, Costs and Cures”, Presented at the Bangladesh Aid Consortium meeting in Paris, 2000 clearly stated that “per capita income in a corruption free Bangladesh could have nearly double to US\$ 700 instead of US\$ 350 reflects the harmful impact of bribery, kick-backs and similar under the table payments on investment levels and misallocated resources” (in News Network, 2003a: 56).

Besides, News Network (2003a) in one of its recent papers states that corruption in every sector is frustrating the country’s efforts for sustained economic growth and people’s movement out of poverty. Nothing seems to move in Bangladesh without the so-called “speed money”. Foreign investors and businessmen thus feel discouraged to come to Bangladesh. In another initiative it has been found that in Bangladesh, more than 30% of urban household respondents got their electric and/or water bills reduced by bribing the meter readers (World Bank, 2002b).

Barkat (2002) in a seminar paper noted that it is due to corruption that the country’s poor people got the benefit of only 25% of the total foreign aid that Bangladesh received during the last 30 years, although the assistance was mainly meant for the poor. For him it is the politicians, bureaucrats, commission agents, consultants and construction contractors who take away about 30% of the total foreign aid.

In a final attempt, it has been confirmed that corruption causes human insecurity in the country. Iftekhazzaman (2005) in one of his paper examines the extent to which corruption has become a source of human insecurity in Bangladesh and notes how corruption affects almost everyone in society though the poor are the easiest victims of bribery, extortion, and intimidation. The poor are directly affected by the increasing cost of key public services by way of unauthorized payments, low quality of such services and their inadequacy or lack of access to essential services as education, health and justice.

## **2.6 Corruption combating strategies**

As stated earlier, corruption discourses suggest many measures for combating corruption but there are hardly any with an operational and analytical framework. Of the few works that have an analytical framework of corruption in the context of Bangladesh Geoffrey Wood (1994:19) is quite significant. In his analytical model he proposes to develop a 'resource profile' within the poor for combating corruption. This refers to several innovative and indigenously inspired ideas about human capital development among the poor, specifically of four categories of resources: material, human, social and cultural (Wood, 1994, p. 19, 539, 490 and passim). He further suggests that it is by strengthening these profiles that the poorer capacity will be developed to a certain level that are necessary of accessing the basic services provided by the state. According to him, the poor are marginalised and prevented from accessing resources because they lack the stated resources (ibid, p. 539).

### **3. Forms and stage of Infrastructure Service Delivery**

This chapter presents the forms and stages of infrastructure services for the urban poor and throws light on the providers of specific services. It shows how much access the urban poor actually get to those services and how they utilize them. It then describes their satisfaction and dissatisfaction as well as problems they face in accessing these services and they have to pay for the costs.

#### **3.1 Introduction**

Infrastructure services are critical to poverty reduction and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Bangladesh. Accessing infrastructure services is crucial for poor households and of central importance in all kinds of economic activities. The supply of basic services has a profound effect on the quality of life. Good infrastructure can lower production costs, increase productivity, accelerate economic growth and improve health and education outcomes. Bangladesh's Constitution states that the Government of Bangladesh is responsible for creating an environment for its citizens that would allow them to improve the quality of their lives through access to health, education and other basic services. However, delivering essential infrastructure services efficiently to meet the needs of users, particularly the poorer ones is still a major challenge for Bangladesh. Moreover, the provision of services in Dhaka is specially constrained by very fast urban growth as well as governance problems. There are severe deficiencies in both the availability and quality of services, particularly for the poor. The delivery systems are complex, inefficient and non-transparent with many households paying bribes to ensure services (World Bank, 2002a).

As shown in the first chapter, the basic infrastructure services in the slums are water, sanitation, electricity, roads and paving, drainage and solid waste management. However, access to health, education, power, water supply, sanitation and waste disposal is very limited for the urban poor. Slum dwellers find it very difficult to access infrastructure services because many service providers do not work there. The services that do exist in the slums are of low quality and their costs can be prohibitive. The services are delivered by a mix of Government, NGOs, donors and private individuals (*mastaans*, the musclemen) who often use illegal methods. *Mastaans* facilitate "illegal" connections to essential services like electricity and water, and in the process are able to benefit by diverting resources away from the state. Slums are controlled by them and they have different levels of authority and hierarchy. There are the local level *mastaans* who control sections of a slum, and more aggressive *mastaans* who have authority over the lower level leaders of the slum. Both are generally considered to be involved in illegal activity such as extortion and violence. They are frequently associated with a ruling political party. They organize themselves into gangs/groups and demand money from the urban poor who live under their "protection" in their "slum area". Many *mastaans* are reported to have close links with politicians, municipal authorities, and the police in the neighborhood. Political parties rely on links with local *mastaans* for electoral support and re-election of particular candidates in an area. A *mastaan's* power base is further consolidated if the political party he belongs to forms the government. Thus, patronage relationships characterize slum politics, which extend from the slum all the way into the local authority and political parties. These services are limited, and generally perceived to be of low quality.

#### **3.2 Forms and stages of Infrastructure Services**

##### **3.2.1 Water supply**

The supply of safe water is an essential service with important implications for public health in Bangladesh. Although Bangladesh is richly endowed with water resources, potable water

and good sanitation are unavailable to many people. Water and sanitation issues represent a major health risk and a drain on the economy in terms of time lost and deaths resulting from water-borne diseases. Water supply problems are very acute in the urban areas where the public sector has been the main service provider.

At present the main government body that provides water in Dhaka is the Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage Authority (DWASA). DWASA was set up in 1963 to supply pure, safe and dependable water to the city dwellers, dispose of sewerage on a regular and continuous basis and collect water and sewerage rates from the consumers. Previously, the City Municipal Corporation was responsible for these services. DWASA is an autonomous, city level body set up in 1963, and is responsible for capital development, production and supply of water, and the operation and maintenance of safe and dependable water services in Dhaka city. As per the WASA Act of 1996, the organization has been carrying out the responsibility to ensure water supply, dispose of sewerage on a regular and continuous basis for the improvement of the hygienic environment of the dwellers of Dhaka Metropolitan city and Narayanganj town. Later, the National Policy for Safe Water Supply and Sanitation 1998 provided that DWASA be responsible for sustainable water supply (for drinking, industrial and commercial use) and sewerage and storm-water drainage systems in the metropolitan city (DWASA, 2004). The policy also stated that DWASA and relevant agencies would support and promote any collective initiatives in slums and squatter settlements in accessing water supply services on a payment basis. Water is supplied either through a pipeline directly to the households or through licensed tube-wells or public taps outside the households. Tube-well arrangements are either private and inside the premises of the household or shared and outside the premises in a common area.


However, the services provided by the DWASA at present are hardly satisfactory. Moreover, the fast growing population of the urban areas in Bangladesh is exceeding the capacity of water supply services. Over the years, the water supply situation has not improved much. Nowadays, the DWASA water is highly contaminated (even by Pathogenic bacteria) and is not safe for drinking without boiling or further treatment by water purifying tablets. The whole water supply system is badly managed with a high system loss because of illegal connections and false billing. Only 55 percent of the poor households in Dhaka city have access to tap water and only 20 percent of them are connected to the waterborne sewerage system (Siddiqui et al 2004). Moreover, for the fast growing population of Dhaka city most of the existing water supply services are inadequate to meet demand and insufficient supply of safe drinking water. As a result, a large number of slum dwellers lack water supply, sanitation and hygiene services and are forced to live an inhuman life. Due to constrained access, not all households use drinking water from government sources of supply, but use privately owned tube-wells, hand pumps, wells, ponds and rivers. Moreover, because of the inadequacy of government efforts the private sector and NGOs are increasingly providing small-scale informal services to the public in urban fringe areas. The formal service sector is often reluctant to offer its services to slum dwellers, who have no legal standing, thus leaving them without basic services such as water supply, sanitation, and electricity. In the absence of legal channels through which to acquire these services, illegal black-market services have emerged. Slum dwellers are almost forced to purchase water from illegal connections at many times the regular rate. To improve this situation, Dustha Shasthya Kendra (DSK), a local NGO, began negotiating with DWASA. In 1992 DWASA gave legal connections to a few slums on condition that any unpaid bills be settled by DSK. DSK organised the slum dwellers into water committees responsible for management of water, collection of charges, and maintenance and bill payment to DWASA.

Previously DWASA policy was to make connections only to households who could show the legal tenures of their plot. As it is very rare for the inhabitants of Dhaka's poorest neighbourhoods (such as slum dwellers) to have legal tenure, this effectively bars them from official water provision. In addition, DWASA had no way of recovering its costs in this type of neighbourhood. By June 2002

DSK constructed 97 water points in Dhaka. Slum dwellers in these areas now have access to a regular water supply at a much lower rate. The success of such piloting eventually led to the involvement of other development partners in the process. International agencies like WaterAid Bangladesh and Plan International and a number of local NGOs such as ASD, ARBAN, PHULKI, RHDS joined the process as facilitating agents for beneficiary communities. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed on June, 2005 between DWASA and WaterAid Bangladesh, Plan International, Assistance for Slum Dwellers (ASD), Association for the Realization of Basic Needs (ARBAN), PHULKI, Rural Health and Development Society (RHDS) for improving access to safe water, environmental sanitation and hygienic promotion services, for the urban poor living in the slums within DWASA Zone-4 (Mirpur, Pallabi, part of Kafrul and Cantonment area and gradually extended to other areas of DWASA) of Dhaka city on an expanded scale and in a coordinated way.

### 3.2.1.1 Access and use

The household survey results of this study show that water is available to the majority of the households (Figure 3.1). 100 percent house owners and 98 percent tenants have reported to have access to water service and cent percent house owners and 97.33 percent tenant households are using water. Three sources of water exist in the Korail slum such as kuya (a ring well/a draw-well) water, water supplied by private individuals and tube-well water. Cent percent house owners and 97.33 percent tenants use the supply water but 2.67 percent tenants use the *jhil* (a long pool of water) water for drinking, bathing and washing purposes. Since there was no government water supply available for slum households, cent percent slum dwellers depend upon private sources for the supply of drinking water. Consequently, various private arrangements have been made for water. NGOs (DSK and others) get connections from DWASA and provide water to people living on government land in slums.




**Figure 3.1. Access and use of water service (% of Households)**

The survey results and participants of focus group discussions revealed that there were legal (through NGOs) and some illegal water supply channels in the slum. Slum dwellers are aware that a 'holding number' is required to get a legal water supply connection from the government agencies. Since Korail slum does not have any holding number, some households buy water from few the households (house owners living there for a long time) that have legal access to water or own private tube-wells in their houses and pay charges for water on a monthly basis. There is a water reservoir or two and eight - ten illegal water points in the Korail slum. In addition, some influential

persons and *mastaans* in the slum are able to obtain illegal water connection in connivance with the WASA staff. They applied for water for personal use but after getting permission from DWASA they are using the point for business purpose. From these points slum dwellers buy one kolshi of water for 1/2 taka which is two/three times costlier than the normal government rate. Most of the tenants used *jhil* water for their washing and bathing and they also dump the garbage in the *jhil* which is very unhealthy. So, one can understand the hygiene situation of the slum. Since they do not have any other option, they are bound to use contaminated water. In the different focus group discussions participants revealed that the water problem was very acute in the slum. Therefore, these households having water connection and tube-wells for personal use have to share the water with their neighbours.

### 3.2.1.2 Problems with water supply

Respondents- 90.67 percent house owners and 94.67 percent tenants-reported experiencing problems in water supply (Figure 3.2). The main problem that households have with the water service is irregular and inadequate supply; more than half of all households (66.18 percent house owners and 71.13 percent tenants) face this problem (Table 3.1). The focus group with house owners and tenants in the slum confirmed the survey results; they said that they often suffered from interruptions in supply and inadequate supply. Supply was the problem slum dwellers mentioned most often. For instance, slum dwellers said that they had a supply of water only twice a day and sometimes they had to go without water for 2 to 3 days at a time. Secondly, respondents complained about the cost of water.



**Figure 3.2. Faced problems with water supply (% of Households)**


In the previous chapter, we have seen that slum dwellers buy one kolshi water for 1/2 taka which is two/three times costlier than government rate. Therefore, 30.88 percent house owners and 26.76 percent tenants identified this as a problem. They also mentioned other problems such as low quality service, mismanagement, paying bribe for service etc.

**Table 3.1. Nature/types of problems with water supply (% of Households)**

Nature/types of problem	House owner	Tenant
Irregular Service delivery	66.18	71.13
High cost	30.88	26.76
Low quality service	1.47	1.70
Mismanagement	1.47	1.41
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>142</b>

### 3.1.2.3 Satisfaction and dissatisfaction


The level of satisfaction with water supply is very low. Among the users of water, only 12 percent of the house owners and 12.33 percent tenants indicated that they were satisfied with water service delivery (Figure 3.3). On the other hand, majority households (88 percent house owner and 87.67 percent tenants) expressed their dissatisfaction regarding water supply. In the different focus group discussions, participants also expressed their dissatisfaction about water. They have mentioned that if the government would provide water to them at a low price, they could live a quality life. In the absence of public service, they have to pay a high price for water and sometimes it is very difficult for them to collect water from water points. They have to move between water points for collecting water. Even by paying high price they cannot sometimes get sufficient water. Moreover, the supplied water is often full of dirt and unsuitable for drinking. When they complained of this, the private providers suspended the services of the water points for a while and during that time they faced a serious crisis of water. Therefore, their satisfaction level on this count is very low.



**Figure 3.3. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction about Water Service Delivery (% of Households)**

### 3.2.1.4 The cost for Water Supply

Since there is no government water supply in the slum, slum dwellers have to buy water at a high price. They buy one kolshi drinking water for 1 taka and sometimes for 2 taka. The survey households spend a monthly amount of 50 - 500 and above taka for water. The following figure reveals that the majority house owners (26.67 percent) and tenants (61.64 percent) pay 51-100 taka per month for drinking water. 21.33 percent house owners and 17.12 percent tenants spend 101-150 taka for water. In addition, 5.33 percent house owner and .68 percent tenants also pay 500 and above taka for their water. In the dry season, the situation is gets worse because the underground water level goes down. Therefore, water scarcity becomes acute at that time. On this pretext, water providers increase the price of their water maximizing their profit and forcing people to buy water at a high price.



**Figure 3.4. Monthly Service Cost for Water Service (% of Households)**

### 3.2.2 Sanitation


Good sanitation services are essential for keeping the environment clean and for the development of public health. On the other hand, unhygienic sanitation is the direct cause of large-scale incidence of diseases, such as diarrhoea, jaundice, typhoid and malaria in Dhaka. Sanitation services include sewerage and garbage disposal. In Dhaka, storm water drainage is the responsibility of the DWASA, while garbage collection and disposal are the responsibility of the city corporation. The sanitation systems in the city are made up of waterborne systems, sanitary latrines, and direct disposal of waste in open fields, pit latrines and safety tanks. However, the public sanitation service in Dhaka is very poor. Persistent drainage congestion and water logging problems in many areas of Dhaka city are aggravating the hygienic condition through on overflow of sewers, contamination of water sources, spread of diseases, mosquito proliferation, etc. Those who are most affected by this are the poor and the slum dwellers.

DWASA is responsible for the construction, operation and maintenance of the sewerage system in Dhaka. But its sewerage service has major deficiencies on both the supply and demand sides. In terms of supply, the sewerage system has problems of sewerage overflow, especially during the rainy season, and lack of connections. The sewerage treatment capacity of Dhaka city is much below the demand. Currently, both the industrial and domestic sewerages are being disposed untreated into the wetlands and natural streams in and around Dhaka city causing serious environmental hazards as well as the pollution of river water (DWASA, 2004). Slowly it is also affecting the ground water quality. Only about 50 percent of the city population has access to the DWASA sewerage system (Siddiqui et al, 2004) and the remaining population either has no sanitary latrines or is served by septic tanks built and maintained privately. The DWASA sewerage system is not at all in order (ibid). Waste material leaks out continuously through cracks in the sewerage lines, causing serious environmental pollution. The storm water sewers are also not cleared regularly, as a result of which waterlogged patches pose a permanent problem in many parts of Dhaka city.

#### 3.2.2.1 Access and use

One recent estimate shows that in metropolitan slums only 14 percent households have sanitary latrines (Nari Maitree, 2005). With respect to access to sanitary services, 92 percent house owners and 83.33 percent tenants reported that sanitation services were accessible to them (Figure 3.5). In the past, there were open toilets in the slum but now most of the households have access


to sanitary toilets and latrines. Very few households have water sealed toilets. In addition, there were some community latrines (maximum 10 people can use this) in the slum. 92 percent house owners and 81.33 percent tenants used the sanitary service. Government and some NGOs namely PROSHIKA, CUP and DSK are providing sanitation services in Korail slum. Most of the NGOs are providing slabs for toilets free of cost. Moreover, some NGOs are disbursing loans for sanitation in the slums. In the different focus group discussions, the participants have reported that they have average sanitation service in the slum.



**Figure 3.5. Access and use of Sanitary Service (% of Households)**

**3.2.2.2 Satisfaction and dissatisfaction**

Although majority households have access to sanitation and are using sanitary latrines and water sealed toilets, they are not satisfied with toilet facilities in the slum. 52.17 percent house owner and 54.10 percent tenants expressed their dissatisfaction regarding this (Figure 3.6). On the other hand, 47.83 percent house owners and 45.90 percent tenants were satisfied in this regard. The use of slab latrines and water sealed toilets does not seem to make them feel satisfied because the extent and quality of the sanitation service they are getting is very poor. Dissatisfaction is high among the tenants. Blockage of sewerage, leakage and overflow of sewerage were the reasons for their dissatisfaction. Due to this poor sanitary condition, people are often forced to defecate in open places. This practice of open defecation leads to the contamination of the local water sources and ultimately causes 80 percent of the diseases occurring in the slum- diseases like diarrhoea, cholera, dysentery, blood-dysentery etc. The children of the slum are the main victims of such poor sanitation practices.



**Figure 3.6. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction about Sanitation Service Delivery (% of Households)**

### 3.2.2.3 Cost for Sanitary Service

Generally, most of the service providers and NGOs provide sanitary services in the slum free of cost. However, the household survey data revealed that 43.47 percent house owners and 3.38 percent tenants were paying money for sanitary service (Table 3.2). In the focus group discussions the participants described the process of paying money. The service providers (those officials who are responsible for providing the material in specific slums) and some community leaders are the mediators in this process. They collect money from the households as travel and establishment costs and share it with a section of officials responsible for service provision. However, when the study team talked with the service providing agencies and NGOs, they strongly denied taking money and said that they were providing service free of cost. In addition, some house owners are taking loans from NGOs in this regard.

**Table 3.2. Monthly Service Cost for Sanitary Service (% of Households)**

Monthly Cost for Sanitation (in taka)	House owner	Tenant
<=50	43.47	3.38
51-100	5.79	-
151-200	5.79	-
301-500	1.45	-
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>4</b>

### 3.2.3 Electricity and Street Lighting


Access to electricity is an important tool for development and poverty alleviation. Reliable and quality electricity supply available to all people of Bangladesh at affordable prices can improve the standard of living and enhance economic development. The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources Vision Statement (2000) indicates that its objective is to provide “access to affordable and reliable electricity to the majority of the people of Bangladesh by 2020.” However, at present the supply of electricity is highly inadequate in comparison with the requirements of the people in the countryside, in general, and the city dwellers, in particular. Official estimates show that access to and consumption of electricity by rural and urban Bangladeshis is one of the lowest in the world: less than 20 percent of the population has access (4.3 million consuming entities), of which 80 percent live in urban areas (3.4 million) (World Bank, 2002b). Another estimate shows that only 65 percent of Dhaka’s households have access to electricity. Of them, 40 percent have legal connections and 25 percent illegal (Siddiqui et al, 2004). Moreover, when electricity is available, there is frequent voltage fluctuation and daily load shedding in most areas of Dhaka city. As a result, electric gadgets go out of order frequently. Owing to the inadequate supply of electricity, industrial production in the city suffers and as a result it directly affects the economy. The whole electricity supply system, like the water and sewerage systems, is in a mess, with system a loss of over 40 percent, mainly due to illegal connections and false billing.

Electricity services are provided by Dhaka Electric Supply Authority (DESA created in 1991) and Dhaka Electric Supply Company (DESCO created in 1996) in Dhaka and Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) in the other cities. On the other hand, street lighting service is provided by Dhaka City Corporation (DCC). DESA is not a power producing organization; therefore, it has to buy its entire requirement from the BPDB. DESA consumes about 50 percent of the total electricity generated in the country (ibid). DESA distributes electricity to the Dhaka Metropolitan area, officially serving approximately 490,000 customers (World Bank, 2002b), whereas DESCO covers the Mirpur, Uttara, Gulshan and its adjoining areas of Dhaka metropolis and has 2,49399

customers (data provided by DESCO). The present system loss in the DESA and DESCO are respectively 25 percent and 17 percent (data from DESCO). However, there is a perception of serious corruption in DESA. The various corrupt practices in DESA are as follows: illegal electricity connections to shops, industries and residential houses; inaccurate meter reading and tampering with meters for bribes through a collusion between officials and powerful customers; installation of new connections and up-gradation of existing ones only if bribes are paid; collusion with contractors in procurement of materials, installation of new lines and construction of new facilities; collective and systematic pilferage of the maintenance funds in the power stations, which ultimately results in frequent breakdowns; and bribes for lucrative postings. DESA suffers a loss of 325 crore taka every year due to malpractices like pilferage of power through illegal connections, meter tampering and under-billing by vested groups (News Network, 2003a). When contacted, official sources have acknowledged the fact that DESA had to suffer at least 13 percent system loss due to corruption and 12 percent for technical reasons. Corrupt elements in the management and the trade union leadership are often hand in glove. In the slum areas, *mastaans* are also involved in corruption as middlemen. DESA is heavily biased in favour of the rich and the powerful. In a study, 96 percent respondents reported that DESA did not bother about poor people. This was also confirmed by the overwhelming majority of journalists and researchers interviewed in the study. According to them, DESA's main beneficiaries were the rich, followed by the middle class; only a handful of the poor benefited from DESA (Siddiqui, 2000:118). In this situation, donor agencies advised the government to build a company for giving better electricity services to the urban people and this way DESCO was formed to provide electricity service in Dhaka city. *Korail* slum is under the DESCO area.

### **3.2.3.1 Access to and use of Electricity**

The survey asked respondents about their access and use of electricity and street lighting. It also enquired among the users about their satisfaction with the service. Survey results show that electricity is accessible to the vast majority of the respondents. As for street lighting, *Korail* slum does not have this service. As a result, the whole slum becomes dark at night. 96 percent house owners and 80 percent tenants reported that electricity service was accessible to them (Figure 3.7). In addition, the same percentage of house owners and 74 percent tenants reported that they had electricity connections in their households. Some tenants (26 percent) reported that because of lack of money they could not use this service. In the slum, there are legal and illegal electricity connections. However, most of the respondents were willing to admit that their electricity connections were mostly illegal. In the focus group discussions participants also acknowledged that their electricity connections were illegal and they had detailed knowledge of how illegal connections were made. Slum dwellers are generally aware that 'holding numbers' are required to get a legal electricity connection, which includes the installation of a meter. Since *Korail* slum does not have the holding number, they buy connections from people (living near the slum) with legal access to electricity and pay for the service at "market" rates. Those who are dealing in electricity in the slum got their meters legally and then started their business. In this way one person can provide electricity to 150-200 households and pay the monthly bills to the local electricity office. These people are generally the influential house owners (having money and muscle power) of the slum.




**Figure 3.7. Access and use of Electricity and Street Lighting Service (% of Households)**

A representative of DESCO reported that “influential” people were able to obtain illegal connections using threats or political influence. He also confirmed that it was common for people to steal electricity for business and personal use by directly tapping electric poles, sometimes without the knowledge of the electricity office. Most respondents of the survey reported that illegal connections were obtained in collusion with the DESCO staff such as meter readers, linemen, etc. In some cases, the slum dwellers are allowed to use electricity only for a limited period by day. In a discussion, the DCC’s Executive Engineer (Electricity) has said, “*Although the slum development unit of DCC is responsible for street lighting in the city, because of the absence of holding numbers it could not provide street light to the slums.*”

**3.2.3.2 Problems with Electricity and Street Lighting**

The vast majority of users have reported that they have problems with using electricity in their households. Between 96 percent house owners and 93 percent tenants have reported having problems with electricity (Figure 3.8).



**Figure 3.8. Faced problems with electricity and street lighting (% of Households)**

Of those who have reported problems an overwhelming majority (61 percent house owners and 69 percent tenants) have claimed that they are paying a high price for electricity consumption (Table 3.3). They have to pay 100 taka for each electric bulb, fan and TV. Moreover, 19 percent house owners and 17 percent tenants have reported mismanagement. By mismanagement they mean load shedding, voltage fluctuation, low voltage, power breakdown, over billing, etc. Although they are paying a high price, the services are not good and regular. Therefore, 11 percent house owners and 6 percent tenants have complained of irregular service delivery. Every month they are to go without electricity for 5-10 days and sometimes it goes up to 15 days.


**Table 3.3. Types/nature of problems with electricity and street lighting (% of Households)**

Nature/types of problem	House owner	Tenant
Irregular service delivery	11.11	5.71
High cost	61.11	68.57
Low quality service	6.94	8.57
Mismanagement	19.44	17.14
Have to pay bribe for service	1.39	5.71
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>140</b>

According to DESCO, there is a formal complaint box available at the Executive Engineer’s office that consumers can use to report the problems they encounter. Most slum dwellers are aware that they have illegal connections, and as they do not have holding numbers, they feel that they do not have a basis to complain. Majority house owners and tenants have reported that they never filed any complaint to the service providers. Moreover, 48.71 house owners and 61.11 percent tenants have said that service providers could not solve their problems. They are also concerned that they may be vulnerable to eviction or harassment if they complain to authorities. One participant in a FGD has complained that *‘when they went to visit the local Ward Commissioner he said that since slums situated on illegal land, the Government cannot provide electricity services.’*

### **3.2.3.3 Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction**

Though people have some access to electricity in Korail slum, their satisfaction level is very low. Only 10 percent house owners and 8 percent tenants are satisfied with the electricity service (Figure 3.9). Majority house owners (90.28 percent) and tenants (91.89 percent) are dissatisfied with the service. The reasons for dissatisfaction are many. The slum dwellers have to pay a very high price for electricity but the services are inadequate and irregular. Every month the consumers are denied electricity for 5-10 days and sometimes it goes up to 15 days. In addition, load shedding is common to the slum. In the focus group discussion, most participants have indicated that this is a daily occurrence and it happens several times a day. Moreover, voltage fluctuation, low voltage, power breakdown and over billing are common problems. In addition, they have to pay the whole month’s bill though they do not get electricity for long time. In an FGD with tenants one participant has said, *“The linemen supply electricity for 2/3days properly before getting the bill but after the payment the scenario is different”*. Another participant has said, *“If we did not pay the bill (for irregularity) in due time, the linemen will disconnect the line”*.




**Figure 3.9. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction about electricity and street lighting (% of Households)**

#### **3.2.3.4 What poor households pay for electricity?**

The survey asked respondents about the costs of getting electricity connections and using the service. It has been learnt that ironically, the poor users have to bear a larger burden of costs for electricity service. The responses indicate that households spend on an average 50-500 taka and above for electricity consumption (Figure 3.10). Majority house owners (80.56 percent) spend 151-500 taka per month for electricity consumption whereas 47.75 percent tenants spend 51-100 taka and 49.55 percent 101-300 taka per month in this regard. Generally, house owners and tenants have to pay the same price for electricity consumption, but in some cases people were paying less because of their closeness to influential people. Sometimes tenants shared the costs between 2/3 persons and each person paid 50 taka. Survey data and focus group discussions have also revealed that slum dwellers had access to illegally procured electricity only for a limited period and had to pay the prevalent “market” price of 100 taka per month for each electric bulb, fan and television. On the other hand, if they could get a legal connection, the service would be available to them 24 hours a day and their cost would not exceed 13-15 taka per month at the existing rate. They have to pay additional 200-500 taka in advance for connection.

However, the results of the survey and focus group discussions show that people are willing to pay highly for this “essential” service. In an interview, a local service provider mentioned that with the help of a DESCO official he managed a meter for his personal use. He had to pay a big amount of extra money to the DESCO staff for that. After getting the meter he decided to give connections to other households (including house owners and tenants). In this way he started a business of electricity. They have to pay the monthly bill to the DESCO office and some extra money to the providers (especially meter readers) for doing business and to get the electricity bill reduced. Moreover, they have to pay bribe as “tax” to the police every month.



**Figure 3.10. Monthly service cost for electricity and street lighting (% of Households)**


### 3.2.4 Roads and paving

According to the 1983 Ordinance of Dhaka City Corporation (DCC), construction and maintenance of roads, bridges and highways are compulsory functions of the DCC. Therefore, the DCC is responsible for this service in the Dhaka city. Although, the development budget of the DCC provides for the welfare of slum, in reality in maximum cases this arrangement does not work. In an interview, the Slum Development Officer of the DCC has said, “Last year the DCC spent 250 crore (from special and general development fund) taka for the development of roads, toilets and lighting for the slum dwellers in the Dhaka city”. However, the respondents of the survey and participants of the FGDs of the study mentioned that they never received any allocation from DCC for roads and paving. Most of the slum land is illegal and has no holding number, and therefore, the services related to roads and paving are totally absent in the slums. The President of the Busti Odhikar Surokha Committee (Slum Rights Protection Committee) has reported that NGOs also are not working for constructing paving and roads inside the slum. The slum community has constructed some narrow roads by spending their own money.

During the household survey it has been observed that there are two east-west lying pucca roads within the slum and the rest are south-north lying narrow mud passages which are mostly stingy and unsuitable for vehicles. The situation worsens during the rainy season. At that time, house owners buy rubbish (wastage of concrete materials) and throw this along the roads for walking.

#### 3.2.4.1 Access and use


Although the condition of roads and paving is not good in the Slum, household survey results show that roads and paving service is accessible to majority house owners (92 percent) and tenants (72 percent) and the same percentage of house owners and tenants used this service (Figure 3.11). In the slum open space means the roads; therefore, children use the roads for playing games. There are a few shops in the roads also.



**Figure 3.11. Access and Use of Roads and Paving Service (% of Households)**

**3.2.4.2 Satisfaction and dissatisfaction**

The satisfaction about the condition of roads and paving in the slum is very low. Only 8.7 percent house owners and 14.81 percent tenants are satisfied with this service (Figure 3.12). Besides, 91.30 percent house owners and 85.19 percent tenants are dissatisfied with the current situation of roads and paving. Most roads are very narrow and there is no paved road in the slum. Most of the roads are unstructured and made of mud and concrete/ brick dust. Dissatisfaction runs high in the rainy season because in that time the roads filled up with water and the slum dwellers face serious problems in their communication.



**Figure 3.12. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction about Roads and Paving Service (% of Households)**

**3.2.4.3 The cost for service**

The government and the NGOs are not providing any road service in the slum. Generally house owners collectively spend money for the construction of the roads in the Korail Slum. Out of 75, 34 house owners paid 50 taka each for the construction and maintenance of roads in the Slum (Table 3.4). Moreover, 10 house owners paid 51-100 taka for roads. On the other hand, only 3 tenants paid

in this regard. During the rainy season, the roads are filled with water. Therefore, house owners buy rubbish (wastage of concrete materials) and throw this along the roads for walking. Every house owner has to pay 200-500 taka for using rubbish in the rainy season. The tenants do not spend any money for this.

**Table 3.4. Monthly Service Cost for Roads and Paving Service (% of Households)**

Monthly cost for roads and paving (in taka)	House owner	Tenant
<=50	72.34	66.67
51-100	21.28	-
151-200	2.13	33.33
201-300	2.13	-
>500 Above	2.13	-
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>3</b>

### 3.2.5 Drainage


Persistent drainage congestion and the water logging problem in many areas of Dhaka city is aggravating unhygienic condition like overflow of sewers, contamination of water sources, spread of diseases, mosquito proliferation, etc. Those who are most affected by this are the poor and the slum dwellers, the most vulnerable segment of the urban society.

DWASA is responsible for the construction, operation and maintenance of drainage facilities in Dhaka city. In 1989, the responsibility of storm water drainage management was transferred to DWASA from the Department of Public Health Engineering (DPHE).

It is worth noting that Dhaka city had an excellent natural drainage system even 40 years ago. With the rapid expansion of the city, the natural drainage system has been disrupted and in some places destroyed. In the late 1960s, a master plan of city drainage and flood control was drawn up. Again, in the early 1990s, a master plan was formulated under a Flood Action Plan. By the time that has elapsed after the preparation of the Plan, the drainage scenario has changed quite significantly due to various changes in the topography, land use and development interventions. The condition of storm water drainage is also currently in a bad shape. Once Dhaka city was interlaced with numerous natural channels and wetlands which acted as conveyance passages and temporary detention systems for the storm water accumulated in the city. These are being continuously filled up by new settlements. Unplanned expansion of the city is destroying the entire natural drainage system causing flooding due to poor drainage in many parts of the city. DWASA has a service area of 140 sq. km which includes 8 km box culverts and 65 km open channel. There are 225 km pipe drain and 3 pump stations having a capacity of 41.6 cumec against the estimated storm water generation of 140 cumec (DWASA, 2004).

#### 3.2.5.1 Access and use


The survey asked respondents about their access to and use of drainage service. Although majority respondents (81.33 percent house owners and 49.33 percent tenants) have reported that they have access to drainage service and use the drains (Figure 3.13), most of the respondents of survey and participants of FGDs have reported that the quality of drainage service is very low in the *Korail* slum. Compared to the area and population of the slum, the number of drains was very small. There are a few drains inside the slum which do not cover the whole area. These drains are located near the *bajar* area and the remaining area lacks a drainage system. Moreover, the quality of the drains is not good at all, and most of them are unstructured and so narrow that garbage and wastewater could not pass smoothly. In case of raining, the wastewater from the drain flows out to the roads.



**Figure 3.13. Access and use of Drainage Service (% of Households)**

**3.2.5.2 Satisfaction and dissatisfaction**

Although majority respondents have reported that drainage service is accessible to them, their satisfaction level is very low. Among the users, only 18 percent house owners and 39 percent tenants are satisfied with the service (Figure 3.14). On the other hand, 82 percent house owners and 61 percent tenants are dissatisfied with the drainage service in the slum. In the different focus group discussions participants have frequently mentioned their drainage problem. They said that Government and other NGOs should provide drainage service in the slum for the sake of their health.



**Figure 3.14. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction about Drainage Service Delivery (% of Households)**

### 3.2.5.3 The cost for service

In the previous sections it has been mentioned that house owners have built a few drains in the slum with their own money and every week they clean these drains with funds raised from among themselves. For cleaning these drains every house owner pays 15-20 taka every week. In some cases, house owners clean the drains by themselves. There is no instance of tenants giving money for the construction of the drains and also for cleaning them. Out of 75 survey house owners, only 35 have reported spending on the drainage service (Table 3.5).

**Table 3.5. Monthly Service Cost for Drainage Service (% of Households)**

Monthly cost for drainage (in taka)	House owner	Tenant
<=50	85.71	-
51-100	14.29	-
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>35</b>	-

### 3.2.6 Solid Waste Management

Solid waste management in the city of Dhaka is a major issue and a grave concern for the city dwellers as a whole. This is mainly due to the rapid urbanization taking place on an enormous scale. Rapid population growth and uncontrolled urbanization is severely degrading the urban environment and placing serious strains on resources and consequently undermining equitable and sustainable development. Generation of waste has become a formidable problem because of its disposal and impact on the environment. The waste disposal problem will assume a serious magnitude when the city doubles its population in the next 30 years or so. Greater Dhaka will produce 4000 tons of solid household waste, as its population will swell to 19 million by the year 2015. With the unabated concentration of people in the urban areas, the use of material products is increasing manifold causing a great problem of waste management. The situation will further deteriorate and may go beyond control unless appropriate steps are taken for effective waste management.

The Dhaka City Corporation (DCC) is the only formal organization responsible for waste management (collection, transportation and disposal) in Dhaka city in an area of 360 sq km with a population of 7.5 million (Population Census, 2001). There is a separate wing called the conservancy unit in the DCC which is headed by a Chief Conservancy Officer (CCO) to accomplish the waste management activity. DCC is expected to keep the city neat and clean providing necessary conservancy services. Thirty-five thousand tons of waste is generated per day in the city with some seasonal variations. Average generation of waste in the city is 1.35 kg per family and 0.245 kg per capita (IDPAA, 2001). However, DCC is unable to provide satisfactory conservancy services to the city dwellers. In Dhaka, garbage is scattered everywhere, dumped or piled up in the streets. The environmental degradation is accelerating along with the spread of diseases. Within the Dhaka Metropolitan area, only 50 percent of the inhabitants discard their waste in allotted dustbins. Of the rest, 20 percent use roads, 20 per cent use drains and 10 per cent dispose their garbage in open places. There are certain people, who cull material from the disposed garbage and make a living out of it (Unnayan Shannmannay, 2004:7). Data provided by DCC indicate that out of the total waste generated in the city everyday, household waste turns out to be 1781 tons accounting for about 50 percent of the total.

However, being disappointed with the unsatisfactory conservancy services of DCC, some conscious people and NGOs came forward and undertook private initiatives firstly with a view to keeping their localities neat and clean and secondly, to earn something from such initiatives. Therefore, there

are three groups actively involved in the process of solid waste management in Dhaka. The first group consists of the city dwellers that generate solid waste. The second group is composed of the local people who collect wastes from door to door and carry them to the nearest bin located on the streetside. And the third group is the DCC, which collects waste from the bins, and carry it to the final disposal site.

### 3.2.6.1 Access and use


Although, the garbage disposal methods in Dhaka include garbage bins placed and serviced by municipal authorities, pick-up services by private companies and NGOs, direct disposal in open places and in drains and other methods, in the *korail* slum there is no service from the DCC, private companies and NGOs in this regard. It has been found that there is no garbage bin in the *Korail* slum, the nearest one being far away from the slum. The *korail* slum people have fewer options than do other city dwellers, they have to dispose of garbage mainly throwing it in open places or drains which is very unsanitary and reflective of how under-served their areas are by the municipal authorities. However, 67 percent house owners and 57 percent tenants have reported that garbage disposal is accessible to them and the same percentage of house owners and tenants used the service (Table 3.6). There are problems in survey results and observation in this regard. The respondents might not be careful to give their responses in the matter. The households in the front and the last clusters throw their wastage to the *jhil* and the households in the middle cluster dispose their wastes in a specific hole. In a focus group discussion with house owners from the middle cluster households, it has been learnt that participants mentioned that recently a few house owners of this cluster rent a van to collect the wastes every other day or more than once a week. The van serves 15-20 households and collects garbage and dumps them in the City Corporation's bin in Banani area.

**Table 3.6. Access and Use of Solid Waste Management Service (% of Households)**

Response	Access		Use	
	House Owner	Tenant	House Owner	Tenant
Yes	66.67	56.67	66.67	56.67
No	33.3	43.33	33.3	43.33
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>150</b>

### 3.2.6.2 Satisfaction and dissatisfaction

The satisfaction rates with garbage disposal are very low in the slum. Only 50 house owners (out of 75) and 85 (out of 150) tenants gave their responses regarding this (Figure 3.15). Among them, 28 percent house owners and 20 percent tenants are satisfied with this service. Majority respondents (72 percent house owners and 80 percent tenants) have expressed their dissatisfaction regarding this service. Garbage is scattered everywhere and dumped in the open places. People are throwing their garbage in to the *jhil* and using this water for washing and bathing. Therefore, this is creating serious health risks for slum dwellers. In this regard, BOSC president said, *"In the eye of Government and DCC slum people are not human beings; therefore, they are not bothered about the environment and health condition of the slum"*.



**Figure 3.15. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction about Solid Waste Management Service (% of Households)**

### 3.2.6.3 The cost for service

Since there is no structured solid waste management service in the slum, the slum people do not pay any money for this. However, as mentioned above, some people from the middle cluster rent a van for garbage collection. The following table shows those people's responses. These respondents spend less than 50-100 taka each for this service (Table 3.7).

**Table 3.7. Monthly Service Cost for Solid Waste Management (% of Households)**

Monthly cost for Solid Waste Management (in taka)	House owner	Tenant
<=50	77.78	90.91
51-100	22.22	9.09
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>11</b>

## 3.3 Conclusion

From the household survey, FGDs and semi-structured interviews it is evident that infrastructure service delivery is very inadequate for the poor slum people. Slum dwellers are vulnerable in accessing infrastructure services because many service providers do not work there. It has been also found that the services that exist in the slum are of low quality and their costs are very high. Most of the services are accessible to the slum people but majority of them are dissatisfied with these services. They face different problems with these services. There are both legal and illegal services in the slum and as well as corruption in the process of delivering services.



## 4. Overview of Corruption in Infrastructure Service Delivery

### 4.1 Introduction

Corruption is reportedly widespread in Bangladesh. In fact, in the country corruption and other forms of weak governance are perceived to be an impediment to the reduction of poverty. Economic growth is essential to reduce poverty, and corruption slows economic growth. The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index of 2005 rated Bangladesh as the most corrupt country in the world (score: 1.7 and ranked 158th out of 159 countries). Almost everybody suffers from corruption but the poor suffer more. The poor suffer from corruption in many ways and their access to services is reduced. Corruption invariably channels public resources to the rich while the poor lack the funds to bribe the service providers or pay for the services that are supposed to be provided cost-free as public services.

In chapters two and three, we have seen that corruption persists in the delivery of infrastructure services in Bangladesh. And the most corrupt services are water supply and electricity. Corruption takes away much of the infrastructure service delivery depriving the poor of the service and compelling them to stay in the unbreakable debt trap and vicious cycle of poverty. Ahmad et al narrates the respondents' experiences of corruption engulfing the education, health, police administration and judicial sectors. It is reported that after the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 corruption in judicial administration gradually increased but after 1982 it increased phenomenally and corrupt practices permeate 90% of the judicial actions. Moreover, the study says that the subculture of corruption in education is vertically linked from the schools to the Education Board, from schools to the Directorate and from the Thana Education Officers (TEOs) to the ministry officials. There is also a high prevalence of corruption in the health service delivery. Corruption grips this sector in the areas of procurement and registration of clinics and diagnostic complexes, appointment, posting and promotion. Corruption is also related to inadequate supply of medicine and other materials and equipment (Ahmad et al: 2004). TIB (2004) reveals that 16 percent people paid a 200 taka bribe to the union parishad leaders to get the sanitary latrines.

Therefore, this chapter narrates the respondents' experience of corruption in infrastructure services exploring the definition/meaning of corruption and its causes. It also shows the effects of corruption on the livelihoods of the poor, and the experience of those who were corrupt and describes the prevailing policies as well as the socio-economic and political climate.

### 4.2 How is corruption perceived by the urban people?

The people of the *Korail* slum have developed a different set of criteria for expressing their perceptions of corruption. The *Bangla* phrases *durniti* and *ghush* are used to mean corruption by the urban poor people. Although their meaning varies from person to person, from professional to professional, the study finds a consistency in the perceptions of people which indicates a common pattern. In general, the people of the *Korail* slum have defined corruption as a condition where people use/consume public goods for private gain and where all social processes, structures, institutions, modes of exchange etc. have cumulative effects on corruption. The study asked respondents about the definition/meaning of corruption to obtain three prioritized responses (Table 4.1). In the first priority, nearly half of the respondents (45.33 house owners and 47.33 percent tenants) defined corruption as taking bribe for service. A World Bank official in his interview has said, "*Files do not move in government offices without bribe. Bribe-taking has almost become as legitimate as taking salaries.*" A high official of DESCO also spoke in a similar vein, "*There is no department or agency in Bangladesh*

*without corruption. It is generally known that every service provider or government official is taking bribe. For this generalization, the honest people are victimized. Everybody knows who the culprits are but there is nothing to say. Actually the system is corrupt. The people of Bangladesh have little sense of proportion. Therefore, some people are taking benefits whenever they can”.*

The President of BOSC has said in this regard, *“For getting services one has to pay bribe at every step. Bribe is now known as honorarium/remuneration. In addition to the official fees people have to make ‘under the table’ payments for getting and using public service”.*

One Chief Officer of DCC has said, *“In Bangladesh, corruption exists in every sphere – government, private sector, voluntary service providing agencies etc. Somewhere it happens openly and somewhere secretly. In the DCC, nobody is perfect. Corruption is like mosquitoes which we cannot eliminate but control”.*

Secondly, 14.67 house owners and 14.67 percent tenants mentioned illegal toll collection as corruption. It is necessary to explain the phrase ‘illegal toll collection’. The following example may be useful in this context. In the slum, some people are doing electricity business. ‘Managing the local DESCO official’, they collect meters for their personal use. However, after getting the meter connection, they further sold it to the neighboring households. In that case, they are to make regular extra payments to the concerned DESCO official. Such extra payments also helps them to get the electricity bill reduced. For the same reason, they are to make regular payments to the law enforcing agencies as well as to the local *mastaans*. The *mastaans* stay in business by bribing electricity officials and the police, and government is deprived of the much-needed revenues (World Bank 2002b). That means illegal toll collection involves a group of closely connected people who hold illegal discretionary power and capture public money for their personal gain. This finding is consistent with those of several studies (World Bank, 2002b; Narayan and Petesch, 2002 and TI-B, 1997).

One electricity businessman of the slum has said, *“We are giving Tk. 5000-1000 per month as bribe to the DESCO officials and the police”.*

Some respondents tried to postulate the term adding some normative value to it such as nepotism, terrorism, illegal power play, etc. They also referred to ransom collection through abduction and kidnapping and other crimes (influence peddling, discrepancy between speech and practice, fraud, paying high prices for services, etc.).

In the second prioritized responses, majority house owners and tenants (26.56 percent house owners and 28.78 percent tenants) mentioned illegal toll collection as corruption. In the third priority rank, majority (18.64 percent) house owners mentioned illegal toll collection and 29.13 percent tenants mentioned terrorism.

Those who participated in the different FGDs have also defined corruption in a similar way. Moreover, to define corruption they have used other phrases such as, bad behaviour of the service providers and law enforcing agencies, harassment by the police, discrepancy in speech and practice, delay receiving in service and high prices for basic services, etc. Participants in the FGDs repeatedly spoke of their fear of police abuse and wrongful arrests in the slum. They have said that without any proper reason the police arrest the Slum people and against this harassment they have to pay big amounts of money to the police.

Monu Mia, a house owner, has said in an FGD, *“The police always catch the innocent people instead of the guilty ones. They do nothing without a bribe. They do not come when they are informed of incidents occurring in the slum. And without giving money to the police it is not possible to lodge any complaint in the police station”.* Other participants in an FGD have reported, *“Thana officials are corrupt, unaccountable to any one for their ‘dishonest acts’ and they show respect only to the rich”.*

**Table 4.1. Definition/meaning of corruption (% of Households)**

Meaning of corruption	House Owner			Tenant		
	1st Priority	2nd Priority	3rd Priority	1st Priority	2nd Priority	3rd Priority
To accept bribe	45.33	14.06	8.47	47.33	7.27	8.66
Nepotism	5.33	7.81	15.25	10.00	11.51	9.45
Mismanagement	8.00	15.63	5.08	6.67	10.07	10.24
Illegal toll collection	14.67	26.56	18.64	11.33	28.78	14.17
Terrorism	9.33	23.44	16.95	14.67	13.67	29.13
Illegal power play	9.33	4.69	10.17	2.00	9.35	14.96
Forcible occupation	2.67	6.25	13.56	4.67	5.04	10.24
Ransom collection through captivity	4.00	-	10.17	0.67	2.88	2.36
Others	1.33	1.56	1.69	2.67	0.72	0.79
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>127</b>

Note: Priority wise three responses considered

When the study team checked this with the local Ward Commissioner he said: “A slum is an illegal entity, therefore in slums people are doing illegal things and committing crimes on a regular basis. The police repeatedly visit this slum and sometimes arrest people and throw them into the jail for their safety”.

The findings of the study are consistent with several surveys which show that rather than protecting people, the police often harm people’s safety and public order (TI-B, 1997; BUP, 1997; BRCT 1999; World Bank 2002b and Narayan and Petesch, 2002.) In the ‘Voices of the Poor Study’, slum dwellers state that they are frequent victims of false police charges, and that the police turn them in to criminals in order to protect the real culprits. They dub the police officers illegal toll collectors. Study participants also cite numerous cases of false imprisonment of breadwinners in particular, and stress the hardship this brings to poor households when loss of income is combined with legal fees (Narayan and Petesch, 2002). In some communities poor people noted that well being to them meant freedom from police harassment and hooliganism, as well as fair justice (Nabi et al, 1999).

### 4.3 Causes of corruption

We have seen in the literature review in chapter two that the causes of corruption are multiple, complex and always contextual. Its roots tend to be grounded in a country’s political and economic history, bureaucratic tradition and process of social and cultural transformation. In the current study, 20 percent house owners have said that the failure to implement laws is the main cause of corruption (Table 4.2) in the first priority. In Bangladesh, legal frameworks are inefficient - sometimes there are no laws where they are most needed and sometimes there are too many laws where only one or two would suffice. The enforcement of these laws is often very weak and inadequate. World Bank Country Director, Frederick T. Temple in a workshop said, “One of the reasons that corruption flourishes is that hardly anybody is ever punished for it. We all know that there is massive loan default, tax and customs evasion, power theft, procurement corruption and extortion in Bangladesh. Yet detection and punishment of these offences is very rare. The weak application of sanctions

*reflects the deficiencies of the anti-corruption machinery and a judicial system in which justice is easily deferred” (News Network, 2003b).*

Misuse of political power is also responsible for corruption. Twenty percent tenants have said that political influence is the main cause of corruption. In the different FGDs participants have also acknowledge this cause. One participant has said, *“There is a connection between corruption and politics. A person, who has political involvement/connection, becomes very rich suddenly through illegal activities. This is why a class of people is getting illegal money and the gap between them and the other classes is increasing”.*

Moreover, in the second priority the same (21) percent house owners and tenants have mentioned political influence. In the different semi-structured interviews, professionals and service providers have also mentioned this cause. Amin, a sub-contractor said, *“For getting government contracts, one needs to have political connection or influence. I don’t have this, and therefore I could not compete for a government tender. Those who have a political linkage and influence, can have the work and do corruption. He also said “Poor people do not have power and position in society, therefore they cannot do corruption. They can only steal to meet their basic needs”.*

In the third priority, 19 percent house owners and 18 percent tenants have reported the misuse of power as the cause of corruption. Some people control the public goods because they become providers of service or suppliers of goods. This is not merely a misuse of public office but also role behavior of political institutions and private organization. The corrupt practices in public offices cannot have a prolonged existence without collusion with private actors (Ahmed et al, 2004).

The respondents of semi-structured interviews have mentioned poverty, lack of accountability, bureaucratic excesses, mass unawareness, the domination of the local elite, the misuse of power, lack of moral education, absence of commitment to moral values, the opportunity to make black money, greater scope to evade punishment, low salary of the officials and lack of access to information as causes of corruption. Majority respondents of the semi-structured interviews have identified the lack of transparency and accountability as a major cause of corruption in Bangladesh.

One senior staff of Water Aid Bangladesh in her interview has said, *“Mostly visible corruption exists in the infrastructure sector. For example, Government spend 1 crore taka for a building construction where the actual cost might be not more than 20 lakhs. And most of the infrastructure related works are funded by donors (like Water Aid) in Bangladesh. These donors are accountable to whom - Government, donors or people? Engineers are doing the infrastructure related works by the contractors in DCC. There is no scope for people to know how much money is spent for what purpose and what way?”*

Some mentioned that an inefficient public administration, bad economic policies, a distorted reward system and a weak law and order situation degrade the morality of public servants and account for the rise in rent-seeking. One high official of DCC has said:

*“Government built 1537 flats for poor people in Bhashantek (a slum in Mirpur). ‘We’ and ‘the people like you’ (those who have power and connection) have grabbed these flats. It is a mistake of government to make government officials ‘officers’ rather than workers. If anyone steals a big amount of money he is never caught but if somebody steals little amount of money he must be punished or demoted. If the Mayor of the City Corporation is interested in to combating the corruption of the DCC staff, he can. But it is not possible to combat the corruption of engineers. Government and bureaucrats are busy taking care of their self-interest.”*

However, low salaries and inadequate opportunity for career development also force public servants and service providers to supplement their income through illegal means. Moreover, poor socio-economic condition and the existence of a patron-client relationship reinforces corrupt practices in public dealing. Some have also said that there is a positive correlation between corruption and strong a desire for material wealth.

**Table 4.2. Main causes of corruption (% of Households)**

Main cause of corruption	House Owner			Tenant		
	1st Priority	2nd Priority	3rd Priority	1st Priority	2nd Priority	3rd Priority
Poverty	16.00	1.49	3.17	10.00	2.86	9.68
Political Influence	17.33	20.90	7.94	20.00	20.71	5.65
Unimplemented law	20.00	10.45	15.87	18.00	15.00	12.10
Lack of Accountability	5.33	13.43	3.17	12.00	8.57	6.45
Administrative difficulty	1.33	1.49	4.76	2.00	5.00	3.23
Mass unawareness	5.33	4.48	3.17	10.00	5.00	2.42
Domination of the local elite	1.33	5.97	6.35	5.33	4.29	5.65
Personnel gain	5.33	7.46	9.52	4.67	6.43	8.06
Misuse of Power	14.67	13.43	19.05	8.00	16.43	17.74
Lack of moral education	5.33	4.48	11.11	0.67	7.14	16.13
Easiest way to earn	5.33	14.93	15.87	7.33	7.86	10.48
Greater scope to avoid punishment	1.33	1.49	-	2.00	0.71	2.42
Others	1.33	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>124</b>

*Note: Priority wise responses considered*

#### **4.4 The effects of corruption on the livelihoods of the poor**

The quality of the urban environment depends largely on the quality of the basic urban infrastructure services like sewerage, sanitation, drainage, garbage disposal, drinking water supply and electricity. However, we have seen in the previous chapters that slum dwellers' access to electricity, water supply, sanitation, roads and paving and solid waste management is very inadequate. Although most of the participants in the FGDs have said that as citizens and voters of the country it is their basic right to access and use the basic infrastructure services, the fact remains that government services do not reach them in the slum. Therefore, NGOs, donors and private individuals are delivering these services. On the other hand, government subsidies in the national budget amount to more than US\$ 100 million a year in Bangladesh, more than the expenditure on health. The beneficiaries

of such subsidies are the relatively affluent 16 percent households that have electricity service. The poor lose from the budget subsidies to the power sector in two ways: lower rates of economic growth and less social expenditure from which they would benefit directly (Lovei and McKechnie, not dated).

However, corruption increases the costs of public services and simultaneously it reduces their quantity and quality. Also corruption in infrastructure services reduces their quality and accessibility to poor people. When these sub-standard and over-priced goods and services are delivered through a corrupt price system they become financially inaccessible to the poor. Corruption is forcing the poor to pay more, more often than the general people. In the absence of public services, slum people have to pay a high price for low quality services which affect their livelihoods largely. Commenting on the impact of corruption on development a report of the International Development Committee (22 March, 2001) says, *“Corruption has a devastating impact on the poorest people in society by denying them access to public services since they are frequently unable to pay the necessary bribes. The quality of services and the efficient allocation of resources are both adversely affected by corruption.”* Ahmed et al (2004) also confirms that the common man suffers much from malpractices perpetrated by government departments, local government institutions and the businessmen and even NGOs.

The current study asked respondents about the impact of paying bribes on their households and livelihoods. It enquired about how they feel confronting the kinds of corruption and also tries to find out who the prime victims of corruption are and how they cope with corruption.

#### **4.4.1 Impact of paying bribes on households' livelihoods**

The impact of paying bribes for services is enormous for poor slum people. It directly affects the poor people's livelihoods. In the first chapter, we have seen that majority households' monthly income range between 1000-6000 and above taka and the average monthly income of majority house owners was 4500-6000 taka while 2000-4500 taka for tenants. Therefore, one can imagine how tough it is for a slum dweller to give bribes or pay a high price for services. Here economic/ financial loss is the most crucial factor. Most of the impacts the slum dwellers have mentioned are related to the economic factor. We have collected three priority-wise responses from every respondent in this regard (Table 4.3). In the first priority, 25 percent house owners have reported to have incurred pecuniary loss and 19.67 percent to have got into crisis (economic crisis) because of paying bribe. They also have a debt burden (19.67 percent.) On the other hand, majority tenants (28.28 percent) mentioned that because of paying bribes they could not have enough food to eat. It is notable here that compared to house owners, the economic condition of tenants is bad and therefore the effects of paying bribes are more serious on them than the house owners. A tenant, Zahir has said in an FGD, *“Because of the cost of kerosene, and other extra payments such as giving money to the police and other officials of the law-enforcing agency for their help, we cut off our food cost. Sometimes we could not have enough food to eat.”* As effects of corruption they have also mentioned having a debt burden (26.26 percent), getting into crisis (19.19 percent) and pecuniary loss (16.16 percent). One house owner, Habib, has said in an FGD, *“In absence of electricity or in case of frequent load shedding we have to buy kerosene for hurricane (lantern). The price of kerosene is very high. Therefore, we have to spend extra money for kerosene while paying the monthly electric bill. Moreover, children's education is interrupted for load shedding”.* Another participant, Salam, has said, *“In the slum, some people like me are doing economic work for which they need electricity supply (such as electric motor renting), and if the supply goes off then we cannot do our work. As a result, we face economic loss and our family suffers a lot.”*

In the second priority, 20 percent house owners have mentioned pecuniary loss leading to fall into crisis whereas 27.40 percent tenants have mentioned debt burden and 16.44 percent pecuniary loss. Both the house owners and tenants reported that they could not spend money to meet the

necessities because of the pressure on their budget. In an FGD with tenants, one participant, Mustafiz, has said, “We have to incur food and other expenditures and cannot spend money for the children’s education. Very often we need to borrow money from relatives and neighbours.”

In the third priority, one-third (25 percent) house owners have reported that because of paying bribes they could not spend money to meet their necessities and 20 percent have said they could not save money. On the other hand, 28.85 percent tenants have mentioned debt burden and 21.15 percent have said that they fall in crisis because of paying bribe and a high price for services. In an FGD, day labourer Hossain has said, “It is really tough for a day labourer to give a high price for electricity and water. You know it is not possible to get electricity and water connection without bribe or extra money. So, our budget is strained and we cannot afford to meet our needs. We cannot save anything for our future either.”

House owners and tenants have also mentioned other impacts of paying bribes such as their deprivation of medical facilities, loss in business, interruption children’s education, etc. Moreover, the slum people have reported that they are critical of government relief services. Either they do not receive the amounts allocated, or they need to bribe officials to get the relief at all. Many have said, “Relief should be channeled directly to them and not through local government”. The study could not find any gender differences in experiencing corruption.

**Table 4.3. Impact of paying bribe on households (% of Households)**

Impact	House Owner			Tenant		
	1st Priority	2nd Priority	3rd Priority	1st Priority	2nd Priority	3rd Priority
Cannot have enough food to eat	8.20	-	7.50	28.28	15.07	11.54
Incur debt burden	19.67	12.00	10.00	26.26	27.40	28.85
Incur loss in business	-	2.00	5.00	4.04	1.37	9.62
Pecuniary loss	24.59	20.00	12.50	16.16	16.44	7.69
Fall into crises	19.67	20.00	17.50	19.9	19.18	21.15
Deprived of treatment facilities	3.28	8.00	2.50	1.01	1.37	3.85
Cannot spend as and when necessary	19.67	24.00	25.00	3.03	19.18	7.69
Cannot save	4.92	14.00	20.00	-	-	9.62
Others	-	-	-	2.02	-	-
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>52</b>

*Note: Sixty one out of 75, house owners and 99 out of 150, tenants answered the question (priority-wise three responses have been considered)*

#### 4.4.2 Feelings about the experience of corruption

The study enquired about how the respondents felt when they confronted any kind of corruption. Majority respondents (50.82 percent house owners and 47.12 percent tenants) have reported that they feel powerless when they confront any kind of corruption (Table 4.4). In the different FGDs, people have repeatedly expressed such sentiments. In an FGD with tenants, one participant Mariam has said, *“We are poor, and we are paying a high price for water and electricity. Still we have to face problems with drinking water and water for bathing. Sometimes we have to pass the whole day without food. We cannot buy daily goods and food. We cannot buy good fish for the children which makes us unhappy and helpless.”*

However, 34.43 percent house owners and 37.50 percent tenants were frightened/ intimidated when they experienced corruption. Some house owners and tenants have also expressed the feeling of embarrassment and depression. In the third chapter we see that slum dwellers are not interested in complaining about services to their providers. Profound frustration with corruption and maltreatment is compounded by a sense of being voiceless and powerless to complain, since complaining may result in a loss of services and eviction from the slum. A poor women of the slum has said, *“If anybody complaints or protests against this corruption, they are struck off the lists of all support services.”*

**Table 4.4. Feelings to confront any kind of corruption (% of Households)**

Feelings	House owners	Tenant
Frightened/ intimidated	34.43	37.50
Felt powerless	50.82	47.12
Feel embarrassed	9.84	11.54
Feel depressed	4.92	3.85
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>104</b>


‘Voices of the Poor’ study’s respondents also had similar feelings about corruption. They reported that they had little access in different services and had widespread and intimate experience with corruption. Poor people’s interaction with representatives of the state left them feeling powerless, unheard and silenced (Narayan et al 2000).

#### 4.4.3 Prime victims of corruption

It has been found from the literature relating to corruption that poor people are the main victims of corruption. The study findings also supplement this. Majority house owners (55 percent) and tenants (76 percent) have reported that poor people are the prime victims of corruption (Figure 4.1). Another 40 percent house owners and 17 percent tenants have specially mentioned the slum dwellers as the main victims. A slum is an illegal entity and the dwellers do not have any holding number. There is a constant threat of eviction and police harassment there. Therefore, they are paying high prices and bribes for services without any hesitation. However, some tenants have also said that those who have no political affiliation are the victims of corruption. In the different focus group discussions participants have also mentioned that poor people are the main victims of infrastructure-related corruption. In this regard, Centre for Urban Studies (CUS) Chairman has said, *“The poor are vulnerable in all respects to corruption. They lack financial capital with the result that they cannot compete with the rich for resources, quality services and justice. Income poverty also makes them most dependent on public services and unable to go to the private sector*

like the middle and upper classes. Besides, lack of education, civil rights awareness and social participation reduce their human, social and political capital and ability to defend themselves and hold the corrupt accountable.”

BOSC president has said in regard: “The main victims of corruption are the poor. And the slum dwellers mean fertile ground for government, NGOs and businessmen. The politicians and ward commissioners only visit the slums right before elections, and never fulfill their campaign promises once elected. They have power but no interest in the community. But what the people want is that the leaders work for their communities, they don’t want promises. The insecurity of the slum dwellers could be removed if they could just settle in a permanent place without the fear of eviction from government lands. With secure shelter, they hope that the government will take further initiatives and provide electricity and water.”



**Figure 4.1. Prime victims of corruption (% of Households)**

#### 4.4.4 Coping with corruption

The study asked respondents about their coping strategies and whom they consulted when they confronted any kind of corruption. It also enquired if any institutions supported them in coping with corruption and which problems they thought they could solve themselves and for which they required external support. The people of the *Korail* slum have said that in case of experiencing corruption they generally cannot consult others. They try to solve the problems at their own initiatives. Very few respondents (12 house owners and 7 tenants) have said that they consult others when they confront corruption (Table 4.5). Very often they consult their neighbours (specially house owners) and relatives for getting support from them. In some cases, some house owners who have linkages with political elites try to solve the problem with their help. Moreover, some people are paying big money to Lawyers to get the bail when they are implicated the case. Majority respondents have mentioned that they are poor powerless and frightened about police harassment. That is why they are not interested in consulting on such issues with others.

In the slum, house owners mainly solve all kinds of infrastructure-related problems whereas tenants only solve the water and electricity-related problems. However, in case of sanitation some NGOs help the slum people. Also, some NGOs like BRAC and PROSHIKA have established some schools in the slum and the quality of education is quite satisfactory.

**Table 4.5. Institutions/persons who can be consulted in case of experiencing corruption (% of Households)**

<b>Persons/Institutions</b>	<b>House owners</b>	<b>Tenant</b>
Local administration	16.67	14.29
Neighbours	16.67	28.57
Relatives	25.00	28.57
Political elites affiliated with the ruling party	25.00	14.29
Political elites affiliated with the opposition party	16.67	14.29
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>7</b>

#### **4.5 Experiences of those who are corrupt**

The study tried to elicit the experiences of corrupt people and to understand their views of corruption. It is important to mention here that it was really tough to identify corrupt people and collect information from them. The study team contacted different service providing agencies and talked to them about their services and related corruption. Through these interviews some events came up where the corruption issue was discussed and some names were mentioned by the service providers and also by the slum people. We then tried to interview those providers and collect information regarding corruption. Every service provider acknowledged that corruption was rampant in the infrastructure services and there was a tendency to blame other people for corruption. Ahmad et al study (2004) also narrates the respondents' experiences of corruption in different sectors.

One high-level service provider has said, *“Both service providers and recipients are responsible for corruption. Moreover, service providers/police on their own will not break the linkage which makes corrupt practices possible. It is the function of a vigilant society and committed governance to keep corruption below the tolerance level.”*

Another corrupt provider said that one of the reasons put forward for corruption was the low level of income of government officials and service providers at the lower echelon and the lack of accountability at the upper end of the civil administration.

One Ward Commissioner said that the police administration was blamed but no government brought the offending bureaucrats to book. He stressed that the police could not become corrupt without support from the politico-administrative system. He also emphasized that the police themselves would not break the linkage which made corrupt practices possible. Moreover, in a genuine civil society the role of the police is limited and their opportunity of being corrupt is limited. He expressed the opinion that when civil society harboured evil, the role of the police expanded and the opportunity of extortion increased.

However, he asked the study team how the police could work without proper compensation. Mere subsidised housing and ration was not enough. They wanted their children to attend good schools, dress properly and enjoy due opportunities for a better life. Between their legal income and their minimum expenditure there existed a gap and through this gap extortion and corruption crept in. As the state failed to remunerate them properly, people were made to pay for service and if they were not able to pay they were made to forego justice. Of course, the extorted amount went beyond the minimum need. If they were rewarded on the basis of merit, one could demand honesty and obedience. He also mentioned that they had been elected commissioners by spending their own (large amounts) money. As ward commissioners they did not have any remuneration while they were giving voluntary services. They had to maintain their offices and bear the cost of entertaining people with tea and biscuits, giving money to the destitute and attending social and religious

occasions with gifts. Moreover, they had to take care of some local influential people (leaders) to get help in their work. Therefore, it was necessary to steal and in this way the system creates room for corruption.

Another service provider said they were corrupt because the system was corrupt. Corruption in Bangladesh is largely the outcome of deviant bureaucratic behaviour in a decadent system, the reform of which is not on the priority agenda of the political system.

Weak governance characterized by a lack of transparency, accountability and rule of law is linked to corruption and these are mutually reinforcing. Extensive discretionary power of the public officials with limited accountability gives rise to corruption. Inefficient legal frameworks and weak enforcement of these laws often encourages corruption.

*One electricity businessman in the Korail slum has said, "We have to pay 5-1000 taka every month as bribe to the DESCO officials (meter reader) and police. By giving bribes it was possible to reduce the electricity bill through an arrangement with the meter reader. For example, if the electric bill amounts to 10,000 taka, the meter reader is given 1000 taka to reduce the bill to 2000-3000 taka. When the electric meters are supplied to the consumers, they are duly sealed and are considered to be tamper-proof. However, meter readers break the original seal and install a similar seal which they can tamper with whenever necessary. Moreover, meter readers also prepare 'ghost bills' (bills without reading the meter)." He also said, "We are doing this business to improve our economic condition. Therefore, we are giving electricity to the slum people at a high rate and by this high price we pay bribes and continue our business."*

The Ahmed et al (2004) study presents some cases of corruption in the health sector. For example, "In a case a person was seriously injured in a road accident and people rushed to a hospital with the victim. There was no doctor in the emergency. As the condition was serious, the people approached a doctor in Operation Theatre who just wrote something on a slip. The broken bone had to be fixed and plaster of Paris applied. The doctor demanded money before anything could be done. The people paid the money and got the patient admitted but after a few days the patient was discharged because he had no money to pay."

A doctor who listened to this allegation retorted by saying that they were corrupt because the system is corrupt. He would like to see fewer patients per day but nobody listened to his protests. He had to allow jumping the queue due to telephone calls from influential quarters. He felt the fees charged from the poor were atrocious as that was beyond their capacity to pay. Because of this they often felt ill again. The socialization of health care is a way out but the government policy is directed in the reverse direction (ibid).

The business section of Deputy Commissioner office has said there are several thousand hotels and restaurants in the capital though less than one thousand are registered. According to the Bangladesh Garments Manufactures and Exporters Association (BGMEA), there are nearly 4,000 garments industries around the country with 90 percent of those housed in Dhaka city and Narayanganj alone. All these garments units, small and medium factories and hotels and restaurants use more than one water connection in connivance with nearly 300 revenue inspectors of DWASA. These revenue inspectors are very strong and organised. Besides, they maintain political links through the trade union organisations and have regular underhand dealings with the high officials (News Network, 2004).

*"The revenue inspectors do not indulge in any illegal activity,"* said a WASA official in his interview, defending his apparently corrupt colleagues. But when the study team further probed this matter it found that one revenue officer and an inspector were suspended for such irregularities and corruption only a few months ago.

One contractor of electricity in his interview has described the process of paying bribe. He has said that in service providing agencies like PDB, DESA, DESCO the practice of *khushi kora* (making happy) exists and there are people who assure saying “do the work we will make you happy later”. Bribe taking or *khushi kora* has been seen from the lower level officials to the chief executive. At every stage of bidding contractors have to pay money. For example, to get the news of a tender one has to spend some money. Generally the news of a tender is published confidentially in uncommon newspapers and specially in festival times so that people fail to know about this. If one gets the information and submits an offer the concerned Executive Engineer demands specific amounts of money. Later, after the work is completed the final payment has to be done. In addition, one has to pay some tax or toll to the local *mastaans* for starting and doing the work peacefully. There is a provision in some departments that after the work is completed inspection has to be done by an engineer. For getting a good inspection report the contractor needs to give some money to that engineer. If he/she refuses to give money (the amount of bribe depends on the budget of the work), then he/she will not get the report and bill in due time and even there is a risk of harassment. After completing the work some company adjusts this *khushi kora* money in the budget as incidental cost. For this corruption and paying extra money (to the authority and *mastaans*), the contractors are bound to engage in *dui numbari kaj* (illegal activities).

However, most of the corrupt service providers have opined that good progress can be made in improving service delivery as well as reducing corruption by improving incentives for service providers and consumers, enhancing salaries of officials, addressing several governance-related issues such as ensuring the flow of information, strengthening voices and oversight and institutionalizing a system of accountability that makes service providers answerable to service consumers.

#### **4.6 Conclusion**

From the findings it is evident that corruption is widespread in infrastructure service delivery in Bangladesh and urban people are aware of this. They have developed different criteria in expressing their perceptions of corruption. The urban people have mentioned multiple causes of corruption and the effects of corruption on their lives. The effects of corruption on the livelihoods of the poor are enormous and they lead to economic loss and the reduction of basic needs. From the experience of corrupt people, it is evident that they are also aware about the state of corruption in the country and because of the unaccountable and non-transparent socio-economic system corruption still persists on a large scale. In order to achieve a corruption-free society, the government, NGOs, donors and the private sector have to work together.

## 5. Anti-corruption mechanisms- A critical review

### 5.1 Introduction

As illustrated in the previous section of the report, corruption in infrastructure service delivery has a very negative impact on the urban poor who are in reality the economic wheel of the city. What is worth mentioning is that over the years there also have developed different mechanisms both at the state and community levels to combat corruption in infrastructure service delivery so as to take these services to the doorstep of the poor. The underlying reason is that the traditional view of the urban poor as beneficiaries of these services has been modified by the now important right-based approaches claiming that the urban poor are as much owners of such services as the rich. In view of the above the present section is an endeavour to scrutinize the accountability arrangements in place which have direct bearings on the delivery of basic infrastructure services to the poor of Dhaka city.


On the whole, there are two different types of accountability arrangement in relation to basic infrastructure service delivery i.e. **the accountability arrangements in place and the accountability arrangements at policy/institutional level**. The former is mostly customary in nature whereas the later includes policy instruments underlying at both state and institutional levels. There is a detailed analysis below of the accountability arrangements of both the types.

### 5.2 The accountability arrangements in place

In the study location there are eight different types of actor dealing with infrastructure service delivery ranging from the poor service recipients to the central government. Between these two there are the Mayor of DCC, service providers, ward commissioners, local service providers/middlemen, local leaders, and the CSOs. There is a very complex and lengthy accountability mechanism there. Generally, the accountability arrangement amongst the actors is a vertical/top-down one while in some instances horizontal accountability is also found. Besides, there are both one way and two-way accountability arrangements. Importantly, all actors do interact in any unique service delivery situation, rather in some cases they are totally isolated. So, it is not possible to exactly pinpoint the process flow of the accountability arrangements considering all the eight actors. The following figure offers only a bird's eye view of that.

#### 5.2.1 Surface Level

As shown in the stated process flow, poor service recipients, local service providers (LSP)/middlemen and local leaders remain in the surface level of the flow chart and are accountable to one other. The accountability between local service providers and service recipients and between service recipients and local leaders are reciprocal and direct whereas the accountability between local service providers and local leaders is indirect and thereby invisible.



**Figure 5.1. The accountability arrangements in place**

Usually, the service recipients obtain necessary services from the local service providers. Though the local service providers have no obligation to render their legally or illegally owned services towards the recipients, they usually do so to reduce their losses in buying the service from government agencies, or on humanitarian grounds or solely from business motives.

**Table 5.1. The following arguments of the Korail slum dwellers may be relevant from the purpose:**

To prevent losses <sup>a</sup>	Humanitarian grounds <sup>b</sup>	Business motive <sup>c</sup>
Local service providers are to pay bribe to different actors in and around their business location on a monthly basis, the amount of which varies between Taka 5000 to 10000. It is obligatory to pay some extra amounts to the DWASA officials, to the local leaders/mastans in addition to the amounts they pay as the price for services. Besides, illegal taxes are to be paid to the police on a regular basis.	For the last eight months I am involved in the business of water service delivery in the community. It is all due to pressures from and the needs of my community. However it was not the prime concern when I first decided to get water connection, rather the motive was self-interest. Currently, of the 50 inch water pipe that I have are only two inches legal, and the remaining 48 inches are illegal.	We buy the services (Water, electricity) from someone who legally procures them. Those who have linkages with the frontline service providers get legal connections. If someone has government job and can face the associated harassment can more easily get service connection.

<sup>a</sup> Abdur Rob, FGD participant, Korail middle <sup>b</sup> Joyнал Abedin, FGD participants, Korail middle

<sup>c</sup> Habib Mistry, FGD participants, Korail East

Notwithstanding the divergent motives behind the provision of services, there is an accountability arrangement between the local service providers and the service recipients. Because, in case of dissatisfactory services provided it becomes difficult for the service providers to collect prices from the service recipients.

Similarly, service recipients also are accountable to the local service providers/ middlemen in the sense that they are all well-known neighbours and in case of illegal doings the service recipients are to keep that secret. Their failure to maintain secrecy leads to a denial of the services. As illustrated by one of the FGD participants Suruz, *“Suppose I have an intimacy with 10/20 households within the community. Now either providing bribes or playing some tricks I am to manage some specific service from the service providers. Then I can provide the services to those who have expressed interest in that and agreed to pay the definite price.”* According to another FGD participant Sekander, *“There are both legal and illegal water connections in the community. But whatever be the sources we are getting water from those and have kept ourselves surviving.”* The inability to pay bills in time may lead to the disconnection of the services received.

The accountability arrangements between service recipients and local leaders are two-way in nature. They are accountable to each other though the underlying motives vary. The local leaders of the ruling party are found most influential in the community. For the essential daily services, slum dwellers primarily depend on them. Due to their affiliation with the ruling party and thereby with the local administration, especially the police these people enjoy the illegal power to control every aspect of community life. In fact, they act as the local representatives of the central political actors. Slum dwellers fear them and consult them first in case of any crisis that they confront regarding the basic services. Explaining this Mannan<sup>3</sup>, *“We stay in the slums; this is why we are scared to express even a common feeling. Your deport may bring torture on us as we spoke to you. When I am caught, you will not come to rescue me.”* It is mentionable that during its first visit to the slum the study team faced barriers from one such influential local leader who said, *“I will not allow any PROSHIKA employees to work within the community.”* It is only after persuading the concerned ward commissioners that the study team could start its survey in the Korail slum.

Furthermore, because of their voting rights the slum dwellers often receive some humanitarian favor from the local leaders. As one woman commissioner said, *“As the slums are in illegal land holdings, we cannot officially provide any services there. But we are quite aware of the illegal services there. Although we did not provide those, from humanitarian grounds we are not opposing them either. In possible instances we are providing unofficial support to them.”* This has been confirmed by an FGD participant *“Gulshan Lake surrounds Korail slum in the south and east. In the North and west sides there are three passages on the T & T land. Recently, through an official notification T & T block the passages that were being used by the slum dwellers. Immediately after the blockade, the slum dwellers met the local representatives. After a few settings the concerned ward commissioner asked the community to demolish the blockade at night. Remaining behind the scene she however promised to provide all administrative support to the slum dwellers.”<sup>4</sup>*

A few opposition party people, wealthy house owners with a strong social capital and with the ability to donate money for elections and a few T & T employees linked to trade unions are also among the local leaders in the Korail slum. These local leaders have their own followers within the community to whom they have an obligation. The leaders usually stand by their supporters in time of need. The latter reciprocate by organizing demonstrations, processions, meetings, gatherings etc, especially in the anti-government movements. It is interesting to note that these activities alternatively provide

---

<sup>3</sup> FGD participant, House owner category

<sup>4</sup> Abdul Kuddus, FGD participants, House owners, Korail middle

the ruling party affiliated local leaders with the opportunity to use the local administration in favor of their power drive in the community. This in turn causes massive corruption and ultimately leads to people's greater in-access to services in the area. There is a trend in the slum community of the earning members of poor families being often arrested on real or fabricated charges. Now to be freed from police custody a large sum of money is needed and this pushes the arrestee's family to borrow from the neighbours. The family is thus caught in a debt cycle with reduced capacity to access basic services. The local leaders of the ruling party act as mediators in these illegal money transactions and thus they develop a kind of accountability to both slum dwellers and government officials.

The accountability arrangement between the local service providers and local leaders, however, is very indistinct. The local service providers are to provide a certain monthly amount to the local leaders (ruling party) to continue their businesses fearlessly. In some instances the transaction involves 'payment on a necessity basis'. Besides, the local leaders often enjoy free services from the local service providers. In exchange of all these, the local leaders ensure necessary political shelter for the service providers. As one of the FGD participants said, *"Those who are well-known as well as influential in the community are to pay less for the services ."*<sup>5</sup>

### **5.2.2 Mid level**

At the mid level of the flow chart remain the service providers and the local elected representatives. Both vertical and horizontal accountability are found to operate at this level. Vertically, in the upward direction service providers are found accountable to both DCC and central government. This is done either through DCC's coordination meetings or the central government's influence on policies/prescriptions, nominations, appointments, finance, regulations and often in delivering certain special services.

Also there is a mutually beneficial accountability mechanism between the legal service providers i.e. the staff of the parastatal service providing agencies and local service providers, i.e. the middlemen. Under an informal arrangement between them the field staff of the legal service providers overlook the issue of illegal connections provided by the local service providers. On the other hand it is the local service providers' responsibility to regularly bribe the legal service providers. When any conflict arises, the result is usually to disrupt these connections or take legal actions against those at the receiving end. In the FGDs, slum dwellers have repeatedly expressed their satisfaction regarding such arrangements because despite the corruption involved in the matter they are at least getting a few services, which they seriously need to maintain their livelihoods. There is rarely any example in which there has been a direct interaction between the legal service providers and poor slum dwellers.

The local government representatives in the area are the ward commissioner of DCC and their accountability to the service recipients is instituted through the electoral process and mutual arrangements with the local/community leaders. Though DCC elections are largely influenced by money, muscle power etc., those who are elected as ward commissioners are to keep their electorate in good humour as they have the voting power to re-elect commissioners after a certain interval. It is the local leaders in general who act on behalf of the ward commissioners in the community. Commissioners pay occasional visits to the community.

In the horizontal sphere it is again found that ward commissioners and service providers are accountable to each other through an indirect mutual agreement. In practice commissioners have no legal authority to oversee the service providing organizations. However, they often come into

---

<sup>5</sup> Abdur Rob, FGD participants, House owners, *Korail East*

conflict with the service providers and try to influence them. In such cases the community people collectively support the respective commissioners. On the other hand in a few instances it has been noticed that service providing organizations are seeking assistance from the local elected representatives particularly in taking important policy decisions and when they are in a serious conflict with the service recipients over any matter.

### **5.2.3 Upper level**

At the upper level of the process flow there lies the DCC and the central government. The DCC is legally responsible to regulate all activities in relation to service delivery. But in reality they have little to do with this function. Frequent interferences of the central government in service delivery and lack of jurisdictional authority of the DCC over the majority of service providing organizations have lessened the DCCs service delivery responsibilities to a great extent. Currently, the DCC is heavily dependent on the central government in carrying out its assigned responsibilities. The central government formulate the rules and policies for effective service delivery by the DCC, can supersede the orders of the DCC, can both assign and withdraw the DCC's authority, can approve its budget, can call for of any of its records and can inspect it any time. Besides, the central government has the legal authority to influence the functioning of the service providing organizations. This is basically done through political appointment in the managerial positions of the service providing organizations. Thus services for the poor are often reduced and resources are diverted to other sectors, which are considered politically important.

### **5.2.4 Accountability in CSO led Service Delivery**

Three types of civil society organizations (CSOs) have been identified in the study location i.e. the international civil society organizations (ICSOs), the national civil society organizations (NCSOs), and the local community based organizations (CBOs). ICSOs involves the international CSOs such as World Bank, IMF, Water Aid, World Vision, and Plan International. These are basically resource mobilizing organizations. Currently, they are found to influence policy makers in favor of a participatory and right-based approach in service delivery. Amongst the NCSOs working in the study community, PROSHIKA, Coalition for the Urban Poor (CUP), and Dushtha Shasthya Kendra (DSK) deserve mention. Amongst the local CBOs, Slum Rights Protection Committee (BOSC) is in the leading position. Besides, there are Bastuhara (homeless) League, Bastuhara Dol, Bangladesh Bostibashi Union etc.

In addition to channeling resources to the NCSOs, the ICSOs provide necessary technical and capacity enhancing support to the former. Thus, national or implementing CSOs are heavily dependent on the ICSOs' funding. As a result, they are to perennially adjust themselves to ICSOs' priorities. Besides, there are continuous monitoring and periodic evaluations of the activities of the implementing NCSOs by the resource mobilizing ICSOs.

In certain instances, the service providing organizations and the government as a whole are seen accountable to the ICSOs. This is for the donor role of the ICSOs. Power practices in this case involve policy prescriptions, policy advocacy and campaign, capacity building and guiding planning strategies. The recent contract between central government and Transparency International (TI) is a case in point. As per the contract, the TI currently provides both consultative and technical support to the government to root out corruption in service delivery. The WaterAid Bangladesh provides strategic directions to the NCSOs-DWASA initiated safe water and sanitation service delivery program.

In the downward direction, the NCSOs however, are accountable to the local CSOs. Usually, the NCSOs organize civil societies and communities and facilitate the formation of local CSOs. They are also responsible to enhance local CSOs' capacity in managing the services provided, arranging initial cost for the installation of giving relevant infrastructures and technical support for hardware installation and operation.

Local CSOs' accountability is two-fold; they are accountable to the NCSOs and the service recipients. It is the local CSOs responsibility to collect the price for the services provided and then to deposit it according to the NCSOs' prescriptions. Besides, they are accountable in operational and maintenance. On the other hand, local CSOs are also accountable to the service recipients to whom they provide necessary services and education and are duly paid for that. Having been formed in a participatory manner from among the grassroots' service recipients they run under a consistent monitoring system and pressure from the service recipients. As for the comparative advantages of these accountability arrangements a senior manager of the WaterAid Bangladesh stated, *"Service delivery becomes cheaper and more accountable if the service recipients are involved in the operational and maintenance activities. In the traditional contractor based system contractors tend to influence the engineers in their favor and the ultimate right-holders have no participation in that. Even the service recipients in majority of instances remain ignorant of the appropriate authority or the costs associated with any specific infrastructure service delivery. But in the participatory approach service recipients play a much more important role."*

Apart from the above, in the collaborative efforts between CSOs and service delivery organizations there is an informal coordination mechanism among the different stakeholders of a particular service delivery. The coordination mechanism involves amongst others workshops, seminars, and a few formal and informal sittings. Due to multi-level stakeholders' involvement in a single platform of these efforts everyone becomes aware of his/her responsibilities and shares of the infrastructure services and thus accountability is ensured to each other.

In spite of such multi-dimensional accountability in the functioning of CSOs, it has been questioned by some in the present study. They feel that the top CSO leadership remains unchanged for years, the board of directors/governors is in fact a subservient creation of the Executive Head and ultimately, she/he is the virtual owner of the CSO concerned. Besides, according to some, CSO activities are quite isolated from one another as well as half-heartedly devoted to service delivery. However, the survey population under the study rated CSOs as the best service providers compared to the DCC and other parastatal service delivery institutions.

### **5.3 Accountability arrangements at policy/institutional level**

The policy/institutional level accountability arrangements are guided by both global policy instruments and national policy documents and institutions. Of the global policy instruments the eight UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of 2000 are worth mentioning. The MDGs have clearly set targets to halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water as well as to achieve by 2020 a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers.

National policy documents/institutions however involves both traditional policies/ practices and a few new initiatives based on some readjustment traditional policies/ practices. Below is a brief scrutiny of the policies/instruments in national context.

#### **5.3.1 Traditional policies and practices**

Of the traditional policies and practices there are both constitutional arrangements and some policies and practices in line with the constitutional provisions.

##### **5.3.1.1 Constitutional arrangements**

The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh provides for some accountability arrangements for the officials of the public service delivery organizations. Amongst these the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General, Ombudsman, Election Commission, Public Accounts Committee, Administrative Tribunals and the judiciary are worth mentioning. Except the Election

Commission the rest of these constitutional bodies have little to do with the accountability of infrastructure service delivery. Moreover, the Bangladesh constitution does not have any provisions for DCC elections. A central Election Commission holds the elections of both national and local government institutions. With its present logistics and personnel it is not possible to hold free and fair elections by the Election Commission. Use of money and muscle power in elections has been a common phenomenon in Bangladesh, the DCC elections are no exception. As a result, after being elected in the DCC the ward commissioners concentrate more on building political networks and thereby to realize double or triple the amounts spent in the election. They take little care of the electorate. In the words of FGD participant Abdul Kuddus, *after the election whenever we talked to the ward commissioner concerning any issue he said, "you did not elect me the commissioner, it is Tarek Zia (an important leader of the ruling party) who made me the DCC commissioner."*

Even though there are provisions for appealing against an election wrongdoing in reality the practices are very disheartening. It takes about 4-5 years to dispose of an election case that means the full tenure of an elected office is spent to get the final verdict. No scrutiny takes place and no one so far been prosecuted for either false declaration or taking any other illegal means in an election. On the other hand the Ombudsman is yet to be functional in the country.

### **5.3.1.2 Civil Servants' Accountability**

The Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1976, The Government Servants (Conduct) Rules 1979, The Public Employees Discipline Ordinance 1985 and the Government Servants Rules 1985 are widely used for ensuring accountability of the civil servants in the service delivery organizations. As provided in the stated rules, disciplinary actions can be taken against any civil servant on the ground of corruption because of possessing illegal pecuniary resources or property, living beyond ostensible means or having a persistent reputation of corruption. Compulsory retirement, removal, and dismissal have been prescribed as major penalties for the corrupt officials. In spite of the stated statutory provisions for punishment there are hardly any example in the service delivery organizations of corrupt bureaucrats being punished. The procedure is so lengthy and time-consuming that it discourages the affected people from lodging complains. From the records of DWASA it has been found that a corruption complain requires at least 8 to 10 years to be resolved.

### **5.3.1.3 The Dhaka City Corporation**

The DCC currently has three level governance mechanisms i.e., the ward at the lowest level, the zone at the middle and the corporation at the top level. There are at present 90 wards each headed by an elected commissioner. There is a female ward commissioner for every three wards. The DCC has now ten zonal offices, each headed by an executive officer deputed from the central government officials. Overall the DCC is headed by its Mayor with the ward commissioners both male and female. Besides, there are five ex-officio commissioners.<sup>6</sup>

There is hardly any transparency or accountability in the way the DCC is operating at the headquarters or the ward level. The ward commissioners are always too busy to provide information or receive complains or explain their conduct to the electorate. As illustrated by one of the FGD participants, *"When the election is knocking at the door candidates have enough time to visit us, even they pledge to do everything for the slum dwellers, but after the election they just disappear from the scene. Even when we succeed in reaching them overcoming all hurdles they do not care a little for us."*

---

<sup>6</sup> Managing Director, DWASA, Chairman, DESA, Chief Engineer, DPHE, Chairman, RAJUK, and Director-General, Health Services.

At the headquarters level, lack of transparency and accountability is more acute. The Mayor, the Chief Executive Officer, and the department heads are never accessible to the common man. There are no standard operational procedures and manuals specifically designed for DCC work. There is no organization and method cell in the DCC to constantly review its work procedures, manpower deployments, and work assignments. There is no organized Management Information System for such a large organization; any important information is not readily available. The latest trend has been to take back to the head office more and more of the functions earlier delegated to the zonal levels. Above all, there is no participation in DCC affairs by the poor men and women, who constitute about 50% of the city population.

Occasional inspections and supervisory checks are most common monitoring practices. But monitoring is usually done blindly following the central government procedures. In the offices of both ward commissioners and zonal officers there are arrangements for receiving complaints but actions following such complaints are almost absent. Furthermore, the DCC officials and ward commissioners are found to be extremely dissatisfied at their salary/honorarium, and the discretionary power and authority they have.

Apart from the above, in the recent past the service delivery role of the DCC has been squeezed to a great extent. It has nothing to do with water, sewerage, and drainage because these functions have been transferred to DWASA, though in the statute book, these are still shown as DCC functions. More interestingly, while surface drains are the responsibility of the DCC, the sewerage system is managed by DWASA and due to this duality the two organizations are very often found to blame each other for the poor waste disposal in the city. Again, though the city roads are under the DCC, it has no say in the traffic control system, which is run by the police.

#### **5.3.1.4 Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage Authority**

According to the existing legal framework a 12-member Management Board headed by the Managing Director administers the DWASA. It has eight zonal offices. Centrally produced traditional rules and manuals are seen widely practiced for the regulation of DWASA officials. Very recently, a few new initiatives have been taken to bring about accountability and transparency in the functioning of DWASA. It is now possible to contract out DWASA services to third parties. Already, one of the trade unions affiliated to the ruling parties has been awarded the billing services for two of the zonal areas under DWASA. Under the revised amendment of 1996, there has been a provision to hire the chief executive and a few other managers from the market on a competitive basis. The services of DWASA officials have been made pensionable. A reward system for better performance has been reorganized. Since 2002 a public-private partnership model for providing water facility to poorer settlements is in practice.

In spite of the stated reform measures, the current performance of DWASA in water supply has been reported to be very bad by the primary level respondents. In general, it has been censured for providing undue favor to the higher income groups of the city. Negligence, bribes, delay, and poor quality services are quite common in DWASA practices and it is the meter readers and other frontline service providers who are reportedly most corrupt. According to one of the DWASA officials, *“Almost all of the meter readers and frontline engineers of DWASA are currently owners of at least one luxury house in the city, and in most cases it is more than one.”* He further noted, *‘If you do not bribe them it is not possible to be promoted to the upper post, as everyone will be your enemy there.’*

So it seems that the reform initiatives have failed to bring about any accountability in DWASA. Although the ‘Board’ of DWASA was reorganized in the recent with more representation from different segments of society it still lacks the representation of the poor and women. Public complaints are ignored, and remedial measures are taken only when there is pressure from above or violent

protests from below. Recent initiatives of contracting out services to trade unions further have led to more negligence in duties by the officials who have direct involvement in trade unions.

### **5.3.1.5 DESCO**

There is no well-established manual for functioning of DESCO. At present, it is administered by a nine member 'Board of Directors'. On the whole the accountability arrangements prescribed by the central government are followed here. Though there are complaint registers in the DESCO the service recipients rarely use those. According to the Finance and Administration Director of DESCO, *"Usually over the telephone we receive most of the complaints."* Explaining reasons he further said, *'In order to avoid the probable harassment from the frontline service providers the service recipients make complaints over telephone rather than formally register them in the complain register.'*

Moreover, he claimed that though the DESCO was not totally free from corruption, corrupt practices were not so rampant there like other service delivery organizations. Instead, as he claimed, it has been successful to lessen system loss to a remarkable extent and has gradually earned the reputation of a successful service provider. Behind the success are: the recruiting of fresh blood in the starting phase as well as effective monitoring, better salary, strict rules and regulations, and gradual contracting out of services to third party. It may be noted in this connection that stop illegal connections of electricity, under continuous pressure from both poor communities and CSOs, DESCO signed a contract with KRSP, a NCSO to provide electricity to the poor communities in 2000. But, according to the officials of DESCO it could not bring any tangible result to them.

### **5.3.2 New Initiatives**

#### **5.3.2.1 Public Procurement Regulation, 2003<sup>7</sup>**

To make uniform the various procurement practices that the different service delivery agencies followed the 'Public Procurement Regulation, 2003' was introduced in Bangladesh. According to the regulation, every public service providing organization is required to form a procurement entity within its set-up. As for the methods of tendering the Regulation emphasized the followings:

**Open Tendering:** Tenders should be floated through advertisement in the popular national dailies. Several committees under the procurement entity will regulate all matters of tendering. There is a provision for making complaint by the tenderers in case of any irregularities but the procedure is a very complex one and involves several different divisions, committees from several authorities.

**Restricted Tendering:** For purchasing goods, works or physical labour restricted tendering has been prescribed in the regulation. In this case procurement is made through the already enlisted tenderers.

**Two Stage Tendering:** In case of procurement where a proposal is necessary the two stage tendering method has been prescribed. In this method a proposal is to be sought from among the tenderers with due specifications of the service. In the second stage the contract is to be made. Ironically, the regulation is still unimplemented. Even, in the regulation, the much needed people's participation has been denied once again which we have seen in the previous chapter where one contractor described the process of paying bribe.

---

<sup>7</sup> Public Procurement Regulation, 2003, Central Procurement Technical Unit, Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation Division, Ministry of Planning.

### **5.3.2.2 Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004**

Following huge pressure both from global and national stakeholders to prevent corruption and other illegal practices in service delivery and to probe corruption allegations, the government established an Anti-Corruption Commission in 2005 as per the Anti-corruption Act, 2004. The commission consists of three commissioners including one chairman. In consultation with the selection committee<sup>8</sup> the President appoints the commissioners. The commission has the authority to appoint the supporting staff as necessary. It has the authority to summons witnesses, call for public records, and to issue warrant orders. Moreover, it has the authority to probe any corruption allegations and filing cases thereby, to review anti-corruption measures, and to conduct research and mass awareness programs for combating corruption. It has been made obligatory for all public organizations to obtain the commission's clearance before promoting anyone.

The Commission has already come in for a lot of criticism from different segments of society. The criticism is heavily centered on the issue of politicization of the commission. The much talked about peoples participation has been totally ignored in the formation of the commission. Even, the commission is yet to be effective to produce any exemplary outcome in combating corruption. Almost all the FGD participants expressed their doubt of the good will of the commission to overcome the issue of corruption saying that *"if government wishes, it is possible to combat corruption overnight, but they do not want this."*

## **5.4 Successful versus unsuccessful initiatives: Sanitation and Water Services in Focus**

As discussed in the 'Forms and Stages of Infrastructure Services' section of the study, the survey respondents expressed their highest satisfaction regarding sanitation service delivery and alternatively one of the highest dissatisfaction regarding water service delivery. In view of this, sanitation service delivery has been considered here as having relatively successful accountability arrangements and water services with one of the worst accountability mechanisms. Below, there is a detailed analysis of the accountability arrangements involved with these two service deliveries.

### **5.4.1 Accountability mechanisms in relation to Water and Sanitation Services**

There are three different types of accountability mechanisms in the study locale regarding sanitation and water service deliveries such as CSOs-DWASA collaborative effort, CSOs-CBOs joint effort, and the DCC initiated service delivery. The first two of these are very effective in encountering sanitation problems in the community as reported by both primary and secondary levels stakeholders whereas the last one has been strongly criticized.

#### **5.4.1.1 CSOs-DWASA Collaborative Effort**

The 'Advancing Sustainable Environmental Health' project funded by DFID was initiated by WaterAid Bangladesh during 1997-2001 involving eight NCSOs to ensure effective water and sanitation service delivery to the urban slums. Since June 2005 it has been replicated as a CSOs-DWASA partnership project. With a few improvements in the previous approach and practices and with the involvement of DWASA, it is now widely recognized as one of the proven models of providing slum dwellers with sustainable access to water and sanitation services. The collaborating parties and their assigned responsibilities are as follows:

---

<sup>8</sup> Selection committee included five members: one judge of the appellate division, one from high court division, Comptroller and Auditor General, Chairman of the Public Service Commission, and the immediately retired Cabinet Secretary.

**Table 5.2. CSOs-DWASA approach at a glance**

<b>Collaborating Parties</b>	<b>Identity</b>	<b>Responsibilities</b>
Dhaka Water Supply & Sewerage Authority (DWASA)	Local Govt. Institution	Lead agency in the process and is responsible to coordinate the whole process as well as to scale up the operation in the slums of the city.
WaterAid Bangladesh & Plan International	International Civil Society Organizations	The basic responsibility of the International Civil Society Organizations is to mobilize financial support and give strategic direction to the entire process.
Dushtha Shasthya Kendra (DSK), Assistance for Slum Dwellers (ASD), Association for Realization of Basic Needs (ARBAN), NGO Forum, Prodipon, Phulki, Population Service & Training Center (PSTC), Rural Health & Development Society (RHDS)	National Civil Society Organizations	The national civil society organizations are responsible to facilitate the process and implement the program

There are basically two types of authorities involved in the collaboration i.e. resource mobilizing authorities and implementation authorities. The ICSOs are acting as the resource mobilizers whereas the NCSOs and DWASA are acting as implementing authorities. Within the implementing authorities, DWASA's role is of a supervisory kind and it is the NCSOs who do the needful at the implementation level. The NCSOs again need to obtain permission from the DCC's Slum Development Cell for implementing water and sanitation programs in the slum locations. After being permitted by the DCC the next step is to form 'Community Based Organizations' (CBOs) in the concerned community in which active participation of women in leadership is a must. A nine member women committee with the responsibility of day to day operation and maintenance of the water and sanitation related infrastructure services in the community is then formed. In addition to this there is a five member men's advisory group. Participatory situation analysis and baseline survey are conducted in connection with the formation of these CBOs. The NCSOs formulate the rules and regulations for the effective functioning of the CBOs as well as directly supervising and monitoring their activities. On the other hand, because of the participatory nature of the CBOs, their accountability to the service recipient level also is ensured.

The NCSOs accountability has multiple forms: they are simultaneously accountable to ICSOs, DWASA, DCC, and the concerned ward commissioners. In addition to providing resources, the ICSOs directly supervise and monitor NCSOs' activities and provide necessary consultations. Secondly, for water and sewerage connections as well as for other technical support NCSOs are to constantly seek assistance from DWASA and DCC. Formally, NCSOs are responsible to perform

the mediatory role between DWASA/DCC and the CBOs. They act as both financial guarantor and service recipient authority to these organizations on behalf of the CBOs. In this process, the NCSOs again get assistance and due support from the concerned ward commissioner because the community is his/her constituency and getting involved in the NCSOs' programs they are ultimately credited for the achievement in service delivery. In line with the stated accountability arrangements the CSOs-DWASA collaborative effort involves a cost-recovery approach in service delivery targeting primarily the hardcore and moderate poor. The percentages recoverable from the different category households against the provided infrastructure services are as follows:

**Table 5.3. Percentages recoverable from the different category households against the provided infrastructure services**

Categories of households	Description	Rate for percentage recovery
Hardcore poor	Tenants, day laborers, female-headed households etc. who lack a two square meals a day	20% against household latrines and 10% against water and sewerage services
Moderate poor	Households having single earning members who again remain jobless for about one-third of the year lacking three square meals around half of the year.	60% against household latrines and 25% for water and sewerage services
Poor but relatively better off households	Households having more than one earning member and with the ability to meet the demand for food and housing as well as to pay for other basic services.	75% for household latrines and 50% for water and sewerage services
Not poor	Households having regular earning sources and living in pucca or semi-pucca houses with basic amenities like color TV, Freeze etc.	100% recovery for all infrastructure services provided

CUP's services are totally free of cost, the initiative is driven by the need to improve hygienic sanitation practices in order to meet MDG/PRSP targets. The ICsOs, and in some cases government, bear the cost of these services. Thus, there is a positive discrimination in tariff setting and cost recovery mechanisms for different category households. The higher the number of the poor in a group the lower is the amount to be recovered. On the other hand, the operation and maintenance cost is 100% recoverable (the service recipients pay according to their abilities). The recovered amount is then ploughed back to the principal program resulting in the increased service beneficiaries. As for the effectiveness of practicing such a cost-recovery approach, one of the senior officials of WaterAid Bangladesh noted, *"It is contributing to building a sense of ownership of the infrastructural resources in the community. It also helps more people to benefit with relatively less capital resources."*

There are clear-cut functional area distributions amongst the implementing CSOs, which help them avoid overlaps in their programs. It is the ICSOs' responsibility to specify functional areas for the partner CSOs. Of the eight partners DSK is responsible for the study locale. The FGD participants repeatedly spoke about the survey conducted by the DSK and also their sanitation programs in the community. However, regarding water services *Korail* dwellers seemed a bit cautious of the DSK activities. They feel that though there have been some initiatives by the DSK in the recent past to construct water reservoirs from where water would be supplied to the community, most of them are still in the process of construction. *'It is because of the high cost for building a water infrastructure, 86,000 taka for each reservoir'* – BOSC president Abdul Mannan stated. Now because of the 100% infrastructure cost-recovery approach CBO members repay the construction expenditure by instalments. CBOs need to share a large amount at the initial stage of the infrastructural set-up. It is difficult to collect such large amounts at a time by members of CBO. The primary instalments are often burdensome to the CBO members as it involves comparatively large amount. The result has been to delay the total process or to some extent denying the relevant services. There is also a fear of demolition of the slum any time. So, the CSOs do not feel comfortable to invest a large amount as it may be demolished any time leading to more vulnerability of the poor slum dwellers.

#### **5.4.1.2 CSOs-CBOs joint effort**

PROSHIKA, a national CSO, initiated the process of people's empowerment through building people's organizations alternatively known as CBOs. Almost a similar approach to organization building was adopted in the community though in a more participatory manner. At the primary level, 15 to 20 member groups are formed targeting effective poverty alleviation. The total slum area is further divided into a few sub-areas. Then group federations are formed including all groups in the sub-areas. Group federations in a specific area are combined together to form an area federation. Thus, there is a participatory accountability arrangement in this approach and decisions are taken in a bottom-up manner.

Besides, the ICSOs' role is relatively small and confined to only periodic evaluations as the CSOs are awarded the responsibility of specific projects on a contract basis with the complete freedom to discharge their responsibility. Several instances of collaboration between CSOs and the DCC in relation to service delivery have been noticed. In a few recent initiatives some CBO leaders have been included within the service delivery mechanisms by appointing them on a regular basis. The approach of the Coalition for the Urban Poor (CUP) is of this kind. Although initially CUP confined itself to advocacy activities recently its scope has expanded to direct infrastructure service delivery programs.

Another important feature of this approach is that mostly the infrastructure service deliveries are free of cost. Furthermore, CSOs-CBOs joint effort is currently seen to emphasize sanitation service delivery. However, water service delivery has received much less consideration. In the primary phase, it was only which PROSHIKA dealt with the water issue in the *Korail* slum in that it provided each of its primary groups with a tube-well. But, because of the lowering of the underground water level since 2000-2002 these tube-wells have become dysfunctional. Later due to the uneasy relationship between PROSHIKA and government, it has reduced its program to sanitation services only. The CUP officials have claimed that they have just started direct service delivery interventions with the community. So, it has not been as yet possible for them to conduct large-scale water service delivery. Besides, due to the huge infrastructural cost it is not possible for them to instantly conduct any such infrastructure building program though they are expecting to do so gradually. According to one of the CBO leaders though through hectic movements it has been possible to secure the DWASA's consent to provide water services legally to the slums, still the DWASA officials' commitment to the cause is questionable. Delaying in service delivery and harassing people through manipulating essential documents are two of the most important allegations against the DWASA officials who are generally perceived to be obstructing such initiatives.

#### **5.4.1.3 DCC initiated service delivery**

There also found DCC initiatives for service delivery though they are on a limited scale and are carried out in coordination with the DCC's Slum Improvement Cell and ward commissioners. These efforts are totally free of cost. The FGD participants, however, have observed that the DCC has so far provided only ten sanitary latrines for the use of the whole community. There is reportedly no initiative on the part of the DCC to provide the community with any water related infrastructural set-up as yet.

There are allocations for slum improvement in the DCC budget for the ward commissioners. On the other hand, there is a continuous pressure from both the donor communities and from the global governance to provide the slum dwellers with increased infrastructure services. So, the concerned authorities are trying to concentrate on low-cost infrastructural settings like sanitation. Also the argument that slum dwellers are all illegal occupants and can be evicted any time provide the DCC authority with an opportunity to under-emphasize large infrastructural set-ups like water reservoirs in the community.

Thus, it would be clear that the CSOs-DWASA collaborative effort and the CSOs-CBOs joint effort has been relatively successful to enable the poorer with more access to water and sanitation services than that of the DCC initiated interventions. Again, of the two services sanitation is reportedly more successful than the water service.

### **5.5 Lessons learnt**

In view of the above, the study confirms that the participation of the service recipients in the decision-making process is important for effective and sustainable delivery of services for the urban poor. Secondly, the cost-recovery approach creates a sense of ownership within the service recipients over the infrastructural set-up in the community and so they become more conscious of the services. Besides, the involvement of local government representatives in service delivery imparts more sustainability to the services as people have then more opportunity to share their problems with the local representatives and at least from on humanitarian ground the later are to act for the community.

However, if there is no effective coordination between all the stakeholders of a specific service delivery the whole initiative is bound to be ineffective as in the case of water services reviewed under the study.

Another important learning is that inadequate policy instruments coupled with conflicting authorities (central versus local and institutional) create strong barriers in the way of effective service delivery because they allow the service providers to overlook their responsibilities. So, what is important is to ensure uniform and adequate policies as well as the simplification of the procedures of infrastructure service delivery.

## **6. Conclusion and recommendations**

### **6.1 Conclusion**

This case study examined six important infrastructure services of Dhaka city i.e., water supply, sanitation, drainage, access to roads and paving, solid waste management, and street lighting. There is a great deal of overlap in the activities of service providing institutions as well as variation in the approaches of the different service providing agencies working in the community and in the relevant policies in this field. Such overcrowding of institutions and policy vacuum in the infrastructure sector has meant corruption has become widespread within the service delivery organizations with the result that the poorer people have only limited access or no access to essential services.

The study showed that whilst the people (including the urban poor) do receive services, they complain about their quality and price. Where services are delivered to “illegal” slums, these are provided ‘off the books’ or given out of charity. Thus people can’t complain because they always risk being evicted or arrested as illegal occupants. Furthermore, the few people able to get connected to services such as water or electricity, then sell service to households at high prices. In addition, the collaboration between “musclemen”--that is, middlemen with political clout, and officials is key to understanding the situation. The study shows that corruption is just one part of a complex system that provides low quality services to the poor, maintains political power of some, enriches others, and wastes lots of resources.

Corruption is embedded in the life of the slum and cannot be tackled in isolation from the conditions that produce it. It will do absolutely no good to arrest a few corrupt officials. Under an honest system, the poor would receive no services. Thus what is needed is a change in the underlying relationship between the slum dwellers and the state. Their status needs to be legalized. There need to be legal and safe ways for them to complain, and the implicit subsidies caused by the misreading or meters, illegal tapping into lines, etc. need to be replaced by legal subsidies. So that the current set-up where inadequate services are provided corruptly is replaced with somewhat better services provided honestly.

### **6.2 Recommendations**

In both the quantitative and qualitative parts of the study the respondents suggested some measures that they thought would be most useful to combat corruption and ensure accountability of the service providing organizations. A variety of responses were obtained as presented below in a descending priority order.

- To combat corruption the first and foremost task is to reform the existing penal measures by making the process of trial shorter and providing for larger sentences for those found guilty.
- There should be a proper investigation of any corruption allegation.
- Those who report corruption should be given more protection by the state.
- Appropriate program for public awareness building through a mass campaign should be taken implemented.
- A free flow of information regarding both government expenditure and functioning should be ensured.
- Moral values as a means for combating corruption should be promoted through appropriate education reform.

Important recommendations extracted from the qualitative investigations as listed below:

- Coordination amongst all of the stakeholders of service delivery including government, CSOs and the community level participants should be ensured.
- Political will must be created to combat corruption. As in the words of slum development officer, DCC 'If Mayor wishes it is possible to root out corruption from the DCC within one day'. However, politicians tend to be part of the corrupt network and benefit from being providers of patronage. Are there realistic ways of gaining their support by maintaining patronage while reducing the amount of money and benefits that flow into private pockets?
- The NGOs are an important factor and seem to sometimes be a counterweight
- to corrupt officials. They might have more bargaining power vis a vis officials so they could get a better deal. However, NGOs also had to pay bribes.
- An obvious first step toward a solution would seem to be to regularize slum households' residency by legalizing the settlement or giving them title to their land for a nominal fee with generous financing (following positive examples with shanty towns in Latin America).

## References

- Ahmad, M., Khan, A.M.R., and Nazneen, S. (2004) *Bangladesh: Corruption as People See It*. [WWWhttp://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN004877](http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN004877) (March, 2005).
- Asian Development Bank (1999), *Combating Corruption in Asian and Pacific Economics*, ADB and OECD, Manila.
- Ahmed, M. (1983), *Bangladesh: Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman*, Dhaka, University Press Ltd.
- Ades, A. and R. Di Tella (1995), *Competition and Corruption*, Draft Paper, Keble College, Oxford University.
- Ades, A. and R. Di Tella (1997), National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic, *The Economic Journal*, CVII, 1023-1042.
- Ades, A. and R. Di Tella (1996), The Causes and Consequences of Corruption: A Review of Recent Empirical Contributions, *Liberalization and the New Corruption*, ed. by B.Harris-White and G. White, (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies Bulletin, XXVII), 6-12.
- Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004.
- Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (2002/3), *Population Census 2001*.
- Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (2001), *Household Expenditure Survey 2000*, Dhaka.
- Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad (BUP) (1997), *Social Weather Survey, April 1997*, mimeo.
- Blair, H (2000): Participation and Accountability at the Periphery: Democratic Local Government in Six Countries, *World Development*, **Vol. 28, No 1**.
- Bhattacharya, H. and Rahman, Md. M.(1994), Rajnoitic Biponon Paddhyati: Bangladesh Prosonge (Mode of Political Marketing: Bangladesh Perspective), *Samaj Nirikkhon*, No **52**, Dhaka.
- Bangladesh Nationalist Party (2001), Election Manifesto: National Election 2001.
- Bangladesh Awami League (2001), Election Manifesto 2001.
- Barkat, A. (2002) *The Past, Present and Future of Economy of Bangladesh: A Political-Economic Arithmetic*, Paper Presented in a Seminar in Dhaka.
- Chetwynd, E., Chetwynd, F., Spector, B. (2003), *Corruption and Poverty, Management Systems*, International, Washington DC.
- Centre for Urban Studies and Urban Poverty Reduction Project (1996), *Survey of Slum and Squatter Settlements in Dhaka City*, Dhaka.
- Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh.
- Chowdhury, A. (1999), *State of Custodial Torture, Death and Prison Conditions*, Bangladesh Rehabilitation Center for Trauma Victims, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
- Chowdhury, M. (1983), *Durnity, Biplob O Samakalin Prosanga (Corruption, Revolution and Contemporary Issues)*, Dhaka, Hakkani Publishers.
- Chowdhury, S.I. (1985), *Bangladesher Samaj: Ashir Dashaker Nirikhe (Society in Bangladesh in the Eighties)*, Samaj Nirikkhon, No 15, February, Dhaka.
- Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage Authority Act, 1963 and 1996, Bangladesh Gazeded.

- Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage Authority (2004), *Concepts Notes on Strategic Development Plan (2004-2010)*, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
- Doig, A. and Riley, S (no date), Corruption and Anti-corruption Strategies: Issues and Case Studies from Developing Countries, In: UNDP and OECD, *Corruption and Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Countries*, [WWW]<http://magnet.undp.org/Docs/efa/corruption.htm#Message%20from> (August, 2004).
- Dollar, D., R. Fisman and R. Gatti (1999), Are Women Really the 'Fairer' Sex? Corruption and Women in Government, *Policy Research Report on Gender and Development, Working Paper Series, No. 4*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
- Gupta, S. Davoodi, H. and Terme, R.A. (1998), Does Corruption Affect Income Equality and Poverty? *IMF Working Paper*, **98/76**.
- Gupta, S. Davoodi, H. and Tiongson E. (2000), Corruption and the Provision of Health Care and Education Services, *IMF Working Paper*, **00/116**.
- Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh (2003), *Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper*, Economic Relations Division, Ministry of Finance, Bangladesh.
- Harris-White, B. and White, G (1996), Corruption, Liberalization and Democracy, In: Harris-White, B. and White, G. eds. (April 1996), *Liberalization and the New Corruption*, IDS Bulletin, Vol 27, No2.
- Henderson, D.R. (1999), Power Corrupts - Editorial Comment, *The Wall Street Journal*, April 19.
- Hussain, S. (1990), *Corruption in Public Offices: Some Conceptual Issues in the Context of Bangladesh*. Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, Comilla, Bangladesh.
- Husted, B. (1999), Wealth, Culture, and Corruption, *Journal of International Business Studies*, XXX (2): 339-60.
- Heidenheimer, A.J and Michael J. eds (2002), *Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts*, 3d edition, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Institute for development Policy Analysis and Advocacy (2001), *Solid Household Waste Management in Dhaka City*, Draft Research Report, IDPAA, PROSHIKA, Dhaka.
- Iftekhazzaman, (2005), *Corruption and Human Insecurity in Bangladesh*, Paper presented at the seminar on Corruption and Human Insecurity in Bangladesh,
- Transparency International Bangladesh, on the Occasion of the UN International Anti-corruption Day, 9 December 2005, Dhaka.
- Irwin, T. and Brook, P. (2003), Private Infrastructure and the Poor: Increasing Access, **In: Infrastructure for Poor People: Public Policy for Private Provision**, the World Bank, Washington DC.
- Jahan, R. (1980), *Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues*, Dhaka, University Press Ltd.
- Johnson, M. (1989), Corruption, Inequality and Change, In: Ward, P.M. eds. (1989) *Corruption, Development and Inequality, Soft Touch or Hard Graft?* Routledge, London.
- Johnson, M. (1999), Corruption: The Costs for Development and Good Governance, **In: Asian Development Bank, (1999), Combating Corruption in Asian and Pacific Economics**, Asian Development Bank, Manilla.
- Johnston, M. (2000), *The New Corruption Rankings: Implications for Analysis and Reform*, paper presented in the Political Science Association, World Congress, Quebec City, Canada.

- Knack, S. and Keefer, P.(1997), Does Social Capital have an Economic Pay Off? A Cross Country Investigation, *Quarterly Journal of Economics* **112**:1251-1288.
- Krueger, A.O. (1974), The Political Economy of the Rent-seeking Society, *American Economic Review*, **64**:291-303.
- Lovie, L. and Alastair, M. (undated) The Costs of Corruption for the Poor, [WWW] [http://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/esmap/energy\\_report2000/ch8.pdf](http://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/esmap/energy_report2000/ch8.pdf) (November, 2004).
- Lambsdorff, J.G. (1999), Corruption in Empirical Research-A Review, Transparency International Working Paper, [WWW][http://www.icgg.org/downloads/contribution05\\_lambsdorff.pdf](http://www.icgg.org/downloads/contribution05_lambsdorff.pdf) (September,2004)
- La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F.A., Shleifer, A. and R.W.Vishny (1997), Trust in Large Organizations, *The American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings*, **CXXXVII (2)**, 333-8.
- Muhith, A.M. A. (1991), *Bangladesh Punargathon O Jatiya Oikamatta (Bangladesh Reconstruction and National Consensus)*. Dhaka, University Press Ltd.
- Maloney, C. (1991), *Behaviour and Poverty in Bangladesh*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, Dhaka, University Press Ltd.
- Masood, A.R. (1993), *Durniti Daman Ain (The Anti-Corruption Laws)*. Dhaka, Published by A.K.M. Shafiqul Islam.
- Myrdal, G. (1968) *Asian Drama: An Inquiry of Poverty of Nations*, Periodicals Service Co.
- Mauro, P. (2002), *The Effects of Corruption on Growth and Public Expenditure, Chapter 20*, In: Heidenheimer and Johnston, 2002.
- Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (2000), *Vision Statement*. Bangladesh.
- Mollah, M.A.H and Uddin, M.N. (Undated), *Combating Corruption in Bangladesh: Some Strategies*, University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh. [WWW] <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNPAN/UNPAN009521.pdf> (August 15, 2005).
- Novak, J. J. (1994), *Bangladesh: Reflections On The Water*. Dhaka, University Press Limited.
- Nandy, Ashis, In: Sachs, (?) Wolfgang, (ed) (1992), *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power*, London, Zed Books Limited.
- Nari Maitree (2005), *Base line and Situation Analysis for Child Labour Project: Mapping of Child Rights Situation*, Unpublished Report, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
- News Network (2003a), *Endemic Corruption in Bangladesh: A Handful of Corrupts Hurt Millions*, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2003b), *Corruption and Transparency in Bangladesh, A Workshop Report*, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2004), *Poor Governance Hurts Bangladesh Hard: Promises to Combat Corruption Are all But Fulfilled*, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
- Narayan, D. and Petesch, P (2002), *Voices of the Poor-from Many Lands*, The World Bank and Oxford University press.
- Nabi, R. et al (1999), *Consultations with the Poor: Participatory Poverty Assessment in Bangladesh*, Dhaka, NGO Working Group on the World Bank.
- Paldam, M. (1999), *The Big Pattern of Corruption. Economics, Culture and the Seesaw Dynamics*, *Unpublished manuscript*, Aarhus University, Denmark.

- Public Procurement Regulation (2003), Central Procurement Technical Unit, Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation Division, Ministry of Planning.
- Quah, J.S.T. (1999), Accountability and Anti-corruption Agencies in the Asia-Pacific region, **In:** Asian Development Bank (1999), *Combating Corruption in Asian and Pacific Economics*, Asian Development Bank, Manila.
- Robinson, M. (1998), Corruption and Development: An Introduction, **In:** Robinson, M (ed), *The European Journal of Development Research*, Corruption and Development, **Vol 10, No 1**, June 1998.
- Rose-Ackerman, S. (1978), *Corruption: A Study in Political Economy*, New York: Academic Press.
- Rose-Ackerman, S. (1996), Democracy and Grand Corruption, *International Social Science Journal*, **149, Sep**, 309-20, **In:** Williams, R, ed. (2000), *Explaining Corruption*, The Politics of Corruption 1, An Elgar Reference Collection, Cheltenham.
- Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999), *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform*, Cambridge University Press, UK.
- Riley, S.P. (1999), Petty Corruption and Development **In:** *Development in Practice*, Vol.9 No. 1& 2, February 1999.
- Rijckeghem, C. V. and Weder, B. (1997), Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?, *International Monetary Fund Working Paper*, **97/73**.
- Raihan, A. (2000), Political Economy of Corruption, [WWW] <http://www.ti-bangladesh.org/olddocs/research/PolEc.htm> (August 13, 2005).
- Siddiqui, K. et al (2004), *Megacity Governance in South Asia*, Dhaka, The University Press Limited.
- Siddiqui, K. (2001), *Costs of Corruption and Misgovernance at Local Levels: Findings of a Survey*, Program for Research on Poverty Alleviation, Dhaka, Grameen Trust.
- Siddiqui, K. et al (2000), *Overcoming the Governance Crisis in Dhaka City*, Dhaka, Bangladesh, The University Press Limited.
- Stapenhurst, R. (2000), *The Media's Role in Curbing Corruption*, [WWW] <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/media.pdf> (October 10, 2004).
- Swamy, A., St. Knack, Y. Lee and O. Azfar (1999), *Gender and Corruption*, Draft Paper, IRIS Center, University of Maryland.
- Sachs, J. and A. Warner (1995), Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration, *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, 1-118.
- Shleifer A. and Vishny, R (1993), Corruption, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1993.
- Schacter, M. (2000), *When Accountability Fails: A Framework for Diagnosis and Action*, Policy Brief **9**, Institute on Governance, Ottawa, Canada.
- Treisman, D. (1999), *The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study*, Unpublished Manuscript, University of California, Los Angeles.
- Theobald, R. (1990), *Corruption, Development and Underdevelopment*. London, Macmillan.
- The World Bank (2002a), *Bangladesh: Improving Governance for Reducing Poverty*, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
- The World Bank, PROSHIKA and Survey and Research System (2002b), *Bangladesh Urban Service Delivery: A Score Card*, Dhaka.

- The World Bank (2002c), Bangladesh Financial Accountability for Good Governance, A World Bank Country Study, Washington DC.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2001), *World Development Report 2000/2001, Attacking Poverty*, World Bank, Washington DC.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2000), *Corruption in Bangladesh, Costs and Cure*, Paper Presented at the Bangladesh Aid Consortium Meeting, Paris, April 13-14.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1997), *World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World*, World Bank, Washington DC.
- Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2005, [WWW] <http://www.transperency.org/cpi/2005/2005.10.18.cpi.en.html>, (December 7, 2005).
- Transparency International Bangladesh (2005), *Corruption Data Base Report 2004*.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2005), Report Card Survey on Health.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2004), *Union Parishader Sheba: Report Card Zarip Pratibedan* (A report card survey on service delivery by union parishads). Dhaka, Transparency International Bangladesh.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1997), *Survey on Corruption in Bangladesh: Summary on Phase 1 Activities: Pilot Study, Summary on Phase 2 Activities: Baseline Survey*, Dhaka.
- The Dhaka City Corporation Ordinance, 1983, Bangladesh Gazeded.
- The Government Servants Rules 1976, 1979 and 1985, Bangladesh Gazeded.
- The Public Employees Discipline Ordinance, 1985, Bangladesh Gazeded. .
- Unnayan Shannmannay (2004), Waste Management: Featuring Waste Disposal in the Metropolis and its Adjacent Areas, *Ecofile*, **Vol 7 (4)**, pp.7-11.
- Umar, B. (1994), *Bangladeshe Durniti Santrash O Noirajya (Corruption, Terrorism and Anarchy in Bangladesh)*. Dhaka, Prakritojan Prokashani.
- UNDP (2003), Anti-corruption in Bangladesh: A Case Study, drafted by Hitomi Oikawa
- Wood, G.D. (1994), *Bangladesh: Whose Ideas, Whose Interests?* Dhaka, University Press Ltd.
- Williams, R. J. (1976), The Problems of Corruption: A Conceptual and Comparative Analysis, PAC Bulletin 22, 41-53, In: Williams, R, ed. (2000), *Explaining Corruption, The Politics of Corruption 1*, An Elgar Reference Collection, Cheltenham.
- Zakiuddin, A. (2000), Corruption in Bangladesh- An Analytical and Sociological Study, Transparency International Bangladesh Chapter, [WWW] <http://www.ti-bangladesh.org/olddocs/research/Corbang1.htm>(September 2, 2005).



## Appendices

### Appendix I. Tables for Executive Summary

**Table A1.1. Access and uses of different services (% of Households)**

Services	Access		Use	
	House owner	Tenant	House Owner	Tenant
Water	100	98	100	97
Sanitation	92	83	92	81
Electricity and Street lighting	96	80	96	74
Roads and paving	92	72	92	72
Drainage	81	49	81	49
Solid Waste Management	67	57	67	57

**Table A1.2. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction of different services (% of Households)**

Services	House Owner			Tenant		
	Satisfaction	Dissatisfaction	Total (N)	Satisfaction	Dissatisfaction	Total (N)
Water	12	88	75	12	87	146
Sanitation	48	52	69	46	54	122
Electricity & Street lighting	10	90	72	8	92	111
Roads and paving	9	91	69	15	85	108
Drainage	18	82	61	39	61	74
Solid Waste Management	28	72	50	20	80	85

## Appendix 2. Tables for Figures

**Table A2.1. Educational status of the household members (% of Households)**  
(see Figure 1.1)

<b>Educational Qualifications</b>	<b>House Owner</b>	<b>Tenant</b>
Illiterate	18.9	32.3
Know the alphabet/ can sign only	22.9	24.1
Primary	30.1	32.1
Secondary	17.3	8.3
SSS	4.5	1.6
HSC	3.7	.9
Degree	1.3	.4
Masters	.5	--
Vocational/technical	.3	--
Refuse to answer	.3	.4
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>375</b>	<b>564</b>

**Table A2.2. Income status of the studied households (% of Households)**  
(see Figure 1.2)

<b>Average Monthly Income (Tk.)</b>	<b>House Owner</b>	<b>Tenant</b>
<=1000	0.00	1.33
1001 - 2000	2.67	10.67
2001 - 3000	12.0	28.0
3001 - 4500	21.33	42.67
4501 - 6000	30.67	10.67
6001 +	33.33	6.67
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>150</b>

**Table A2.3. Access and use of water service (% of Households) (see Figure 3.1.)**

<b>Response</b>	<b>Access</b>		<b>Use</b>	
	<b>House Owner</b>	<b>Tenant</b>	<b>House Owner</b>	<b>Tenant</b>
Yes	100.0	98.0	100.0	97.33
No	-	2.0	-	2.67
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>150</b>

**Table A2.4 Faced problems with water supply (% of Households) (see Figure 3.2)**

<b>Response</b>	<b>House Owner</b>	<b>Tenant</b>
Yes	90.67	94.67
No	9.33	5.33
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>150</b>

**Table A2.5. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction of water service (% of Households)**  
(see Figure 3.3)

Response	House Owner	Tenant
Satisfaction	12.0	12.33
Dissatisfaction	88.00	87.67
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>146</b>

**Table A2.6. Monthly service cost for water service (% of Households)** (see Figure 3.4)

Monthly Cost for Water (in taka)	House Owner	Tenant
<=50	1.33	8.90
51-100	26.67	61.64
101-150	21.33	17.12
151-200	16.00	4.10
201-300	13.33	5.47
301-500	16.00	2.05
>500 Above	5.33	0.68
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>146</b>

**Table A2.7. Access and use of sanitary service (% of Households)** (see Figure 3.5)

Response	Access		Use	
	House Owner	Tenant	House Owner	Tenant
Yes	92.0	83.33	92.0	81.33
No	8.0	16.67	8.0	18.67
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>150</b>

**Table A2.8. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction of sanitation service (% of Households)**  
(see Figure 3.6)

Response	House Owner	Tenant
Satisfaction	47.83	45.90
Dissatisfaction	52.17	54.10
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>122</b>

**Table A2.9. Access and use of electricity and street lighting service (% of Households)**  
(see Figure 3.7)

Response	Access		Use	
	House Owner	Tenant	House Owner	Tenant
Yes	96.0	80.0	96.0	74.0
No	4.0	20.0	4.0	26.0
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>150</b>

**Table A2.10. Faced problems with electricity and street lighting (% of Households)**  
(see Figure 3.8)

Response	House Owner	Tenant
Yes	96.00	93.33
No	4.00	6.67
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>150</b>

**Table A2.11. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction of electricity and street lighting service (% of Households)** (see Figure 3.9)

Response	House Owner	Tenant
Satisfaction	9.72	8.11
Dissatisfaction	90.28	91.89
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>111</b>

**Table A2.12. Monthly service cost for electricity and street lighting (% of Households)**  
(see Figure 3.10)

Monthly cost for electricity and street lighting (in taka)	House Owner	Tenant
51-100	4.17	49.54
101-150	4.17	8.11
151-200	27.78	27.93
201-300	29.17	13.51
301-500	23.61	.90
>500 Above	11.11	-
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>111</b>

**Table A2.13 Access and use of roads and paving service (% of Households)**  
(see Figure 3.11)

Response	Access		Use	
	House Owner	Tenant	House Owner	Tenant
Yes	92.0	72.0	92.0	72.0
No	8.0	28.0	8.0	28.0
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>150</b>

**Table A2.14 Satisfaction and dissatisfaction of roads and paving service delivery (% of Households)** (see Figure 3.12)

Response	House Owner	Tenant
Satisfaction	8.70	14.81
Dissatisfaction	91.30	85.19
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>108</b>

**Table A2.15. Access and use of drainage service (% of Households) (see Figure 3.13)**

Response	Access		Use	
	House Owner	Tenant	House Owner	Tenant
Yes	81.33	49.33	81.33	49.33
No	18.67	50.67	18.67	50.67
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>150</b>

**Table A2.16. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction about drainage service delivery (% of Households) (see Figure 3.14)**

Response	House Owner	Tenant
Satisfaction	18.03	39.19
Dissatisfaction	81.97	60.81
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>74</b>

**Table A2. 17. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction about solid waste management (% of Households) (see Figure 3.15)**

Response	House Owner	Tenant
Satisfaction	28.0	20.00
Dissatisfaction	72.0	80.00
<b>Total(N)</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>85</b>

**Table A2.18. Prime victims of corruption (% of Households) (see Figure 4.1)**

Victims	House Owner	Tenant
Poor People	54.67	76.00
Slum dwellers	40.00	16.67
Powerless	5.33	6.00
Those who have no political affiliation	-	1.33
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>150</b>



## Codes for Questions

<b>2.4</b>	<b>Age</b>	
	1-12 years	1
	13-24 years	2
	25-36 years	3
	37-48 years	4
	49-60 years	5
	61 year or older	6
	Refuse to answer	7
<b>2.5</b>	<b>Marital Status</b>	
	Married	1
	Divorced	2
	Separated	3
	Widow or widower	4
	Never Married	5
<b>2.6</b>	<b>Relationship to the head of household</b>	
	Head	1
	Wife/Husband	2
	Child/Adopted child	3
	Grand child	4
	Niece/Nephew	5
	Father/Mother	6
	Sister/Brother	7
	Son in law/Daughter in law	8
	Sister in law	9
	Grandfather/Mother	10
	Father in law/Mother in law	11
	Other Relative	12
	Servant or Servant's Relative	13
	Tenant/Tenant's Relative	14
	Others	99

<b>2.7</b>	<b>Educational Qualifications</b>			
	Illiterate	1	HSC	6
	Literate	2	Degree	7
	Primary	3	Diploma	8
	Secondary	4	Masters	9
	SSS	5	Vocational/technical	10
			Refuse to answer	11
<b>2.8 &amp; 2.9</b>	<b>Main and Secondary occupation</b>			
	Service (Govt.)	1	Remittance	8
	Service (Private)	2	Rickshaw/CNG/other vehicles driver	9
	Labour	3	Money lender	10
	Business	4	Small business	11
	House owner/Shop rent	5	Raw materials seller/ vendor	12
	Broker/Contractor	6	Housewife	13
	Student	7	Unemployed	14
			Others	99

### Livelihoods

<b>Q 1</b>	<b>What are the different sources of livelihood for your household? (Priority wise main three)</b>	
1.	Micro-enterprise/self employed	
2.	Labourer	
3.	Agriculture	
4.	Migration	
5.	Rent	
6.	Saving/remittances/pension	
7.	NGO	
8.	Business	
9.	Public sector (government)	
10.	Informal employment	
11.	Other (SPECIFY)	
<b>Q 2.</b>	<b>Average Household Income (From all sources of income)</b>	<b>Total amount .....</b>

<b>Q 3.</b>	<b>Do you think you have a voice in decisions about how the city is run?</b>	Yes 1 No 2 Don't know 3
<b>Q4.</b>	<b>Do you have adequate number of meals every day?</b>	Yes 1 No 2 Don't know 3
<b>Q5.</b>	<b>Do you feel safe where you live?</b>	Yes 1 No 2 Don't know 3
<b>Q6.</b>	<b>Are there health risks where you live?</b>	Yes 1 (SPECIFY) No 2 Don't know 3
<b>Q7.</b>	<b>Have you experienced threat of removal from land/house - from landlords, property developers, and landowners?</b>	Yes 1 No 2 Don't know 3
<b>Q8.</b>	<b>Is your house near employment, transport links, health-care, education and other social services and civic amenities?</b>	Yes 1 No 2 Don't know 3
<b>Q9.</b>	<b>Do you have access to credit and loan?</b>	Yes 1 No 2 Don't know 3
<b>Q10.</b>	<b>In the past how have you coped with a crisis (such as losing a job, sickness, business loss, dowry etc.)? (Priority wise main three)</b>	
1.	Sales of household assets	
2.	Ask for help from extended family	
3.	Ask for help from friends and neighbours	
4.	Contact influential people in your community/Individuals patron/client relations	
5.	Affiliation with social and political institutions	
6.	Find other jobs/diversification of livelihood strategies	
7.	Self-help groups/collectives	
8.	Credit and Loan	
9.	Don't know	

## Service Delivery

Q. 11. Fill up the following table related to service delivery:					
Services	Access & Use		Service cost (monthly)	Satisfied	Dissatisfied
Water					
Sanitation					
Electricity & Street lighting					
Roads and paving					
Drainage					
Solid Waste Management					
<b>Q12. Have you approached any of the service providers with a problem?</b>			Yes 1 (SPECIFY WHICH)		
			No 2		
			Don't know 3		
<b>Q13. Were your problems solved by the agency?</b>			Yes 1 (SPECIFY WHICH)		
			No 2		
			Don't know 3		
<b>Q 14. Do service providers regularly monitor their services?</b>			Yes 1 (SPECIFY WHICH)		
			No 2		
			Don't know 3		
<b>Q15. How often have you had personal contact with a service provider in last year?</b>					
<b>Services</b>			<b>How often (code)</b>		
Water					
Sanitation					
Electricity & Street lighting					
Roads and paving					
Drainage					
Solid Waste Management					
<i>Code: Once a month-1, More often-2, Less than once a month-3, Once in last year-4, Don't know-5</i>					
<b>Q16. Were you happy with the behaviour of staff?</b>			Yes 1 (SPECIFY WHICH)		
			No 2		
			Don't know 3		

<b>Q17. What are the most important problems in the delivery of infrastructure (Please refer to the most important three problems)?</b>	
<b>Services</b>	<b>Types/nature of problem</b>
Water	
Sanitation	
Electricity & Street lighting	
Roads and paving	
Drainage	
Solid Waste Management	
<i>Codes for types of problem:</i> <i>Irregular Service delivery - 1    High cost - 2    Low quality service - 3</i> <i>Mismanagement - 4                Have to pay bribe for service - 5    Harassment - 6    Others - 7</i>	
<b>Q18. Do you think you have enough information about infrastructure services?</b>	Yes 1 (SPECIFY WHICH) No 2 Don't know 3

### **Corruption in Society**

<b>Q19. What do you mean by "corruption"?</b>	
<i>Codes:</i> <i>To accept bribe - 1        Nepotism - 2                Mismanagement - 3        Illegal toll collection - 4</i> <i>Terrorism - 5                Illegal power play - 6        Forcible occupation - 7</i> <i>Ransom collection through captivity - 8                Others (Please specify) - 99</i>	
<b>Q20. Can you think of an example of corruption in relation to infrastructure service delivery?</b>	
<b>Q21. Whether corruption a burning problem in the public, NGO or the private sector? (Choose three in order of priority)</b>	
1. Public sector	
2. Private sector	
3. NGO	
4. About the same	
5. Don't know	

<b>Q22. Whether corruption a serious problem in the other spheres of the society? (Choose three in order of priority)</b>	
1. Business	
2. Education	
3. Community organizations	
4. Religious institutions	
5. Sport	
6. Different Committees	
<b>Q23. Which do you think is the leading cause of corruption in society? (Priority wise main three)</b>	
<p><i>Codes:</i></p> <p><i>Poverty - 1, Political Influence - 2, Unimplemented law - 3, Lack of Accountability - 4, Administrative difficulty - 5, Mass unawareness - 6, Domination of the local elite - 7, Personnel gain - 8, Misuse of Power - 9, Lack of moral education - 10, Easiest way to earn - 11, Greater scope to avoid punishment - 12, Others (Please specify) - 99</i></p>	

### Corruption in infrastructure Service Delivery

<b>Q24. Amongst the various infrastructure services, which would you think have the greatest levels of corruption?</b>	
<p><i>Codes:</i></p> <p><i>Water - 1, Sanitation - 2, Electricity &amp; Street Lighting - 3, Road &amp; Pavement - 4, Drainage - 5, Waste Management - 6</i></p>	
<b>Q25. Whether any service provider asked you or anyone you know to pay a bribe for his or her services within the last one-year period?</b>	Yes 1 No 2 Don't know 3
<b>Q26. What happened?</b>	
1. The service provider asked for tips/bribe	
2. The offer actually made by the respective citizen	
3. Everyone knows you have to pay something extra	
4. Don't know	

<b>Q27. What do you think would be the consequences if you/they disagreed to pay?</b>	
1. Would make no difference to service	
2. Would get an inferior service	
3. Would have receive threats/harassment	
4. There would be delay/denial of services	
<b>Q28. How often do you think the average person pays a bribe to someone?</b>	
1. Every day	
2. Every week	
3. Every month	
4. Every year	
<b>Q29. How much do you think the average person typically pays as bribe a year?</b>	Total amount (In taka).....
<b>Q30. What in your consideration should be the punishment to a service provider if found guilty of corruption? (Priority wise main three)</b>	
1. Should sack of his/her position and to imprison the	
2. Should sack of his/her position and to impose penalty to incur the due losses	
3. Should sack of his/her position only	
4. Depends on the severity of the crime	
5. There should be no punishment for corruption	
6. Don't know	
<b>Q31. What impact does paying bribes have on you and your household? (Choose three in order of priority)</b>	
<p>Codes:</p> <p>Cannot have enough food to eat - 1,  Incur debt burden - 2,  Incur loss in business - 3,  Pecuniary loss - 4, To fall in crises - 5,  Deprived of treatment facilities - 6,  Cannot spend according to necessities - 7,  Cannot save - 8,  Others (please specify) - 99</p>	
<b>Q32. How do you feel when you are to confront any kinds of corruption? (Choose three in order of priority)</b>	
<p>Codes:</p> <p>Frightened/ intimidated - 1,  Felt Powerless - 2,  Feel embarrassed - 3, Feel depressed - 4  Others (please specify) - 99</p>	

<b>Q33. Whom do you consider the prime victims of corruption?</b>	
<p>Codes:</p> <p>Poor people - 1, Slum dwellers - 2, Powerless - 3, Those who have no political affiliation - 4, Those out of government services - 5, Low paid service holders - 6, Others (please specify) - 99</p>	
<b>Q34. Are there any institutions/persons that can be consulted with when there are any evidences of corruption?</b>	<p>Yes 1</p> <p>No 2</p> <p>Don't know 3</p>
<b>Q35. If yes, then please specify them</b>	
<p>Codes:</p> <p>NGOs - 1, Local Government - 2, Local Administration - 3 , Neighbors - 4, Relatives - 5, Political elite in affiliation with ruling party - 6, Political elite in affiliation with opposition party - 7, Others (please specify) - 99</p>	
<b>Q36. Which of the infrastructure service delivery relevant problems solved off by the community initiatives and for which did you asked for external support during the last one-year period?</b>	
<p>Codes for community initiatives:</p> <p>Electricity connection - 1, Water supply - 2, Sanitation - 3, Drainage - 4, Construction of road inside the slums - 5, Drain waste management - 6, Others (please specify) - 99</p>	
<p>Codes for external support:</p> <p>Sanitation - 7, Construction of Drain - 8, Construction of Roads - 9, Establishment of Educational Institutions - 10, Establishment of Religious Institutions - 11, Others (please specify) - 99</p>	

## Fighting/Combating Corruption

<b>Q37. Do you find the following ways of fighting corruption as effective or ineffective?</b>	
Tight prosecutions and longer sentences for corruption	
Increased opportunity to be informed about the way government works and their means of expenditures	
Corruption relevant news investigations	
Campaign to raise public awareness of the extent and costs of corruption	
Explicit codes of conduct to promote professional ethics	
Promoting moral values in everyday practice	
Increasing salaries of public employees	
More ways for citizens to report corruption	
More protection for people who report corruption	
Special government agency dedicated to fighting corruption	
Community/local actions to fight corruption	
<b>Q38. Which role do you consider more crucial to fight corruption?</b>	
1. Government	
2. NGOs	
3. Politicians	
4. Service providers	
5. Others (please specify)	
<b>Q39. Is it possible to combat corruption by the mass people?</b>	Yes - 1      No - 2      Don't know - 3
<b>Q40. If the answer is yes, then how? (Choose three in order of priority)</b>	
<p>Codes:</p> <p><i>Enforcement of strict policy to combat corruption - 1, Laws require to be implemented in full - 2, If general mass can be made aware - 3, Collective action by the mass people to resist corruption - 4, Transparency within the service providing organizations and increased opportunity to be informed of their services - 5, Appropriate monitoring arrangements from the part of the government - 6, Government must be made accountable to the public - 7, Elected representatives must be honest and competent - 8, Emphasizing moral education - 9, Others (please specify) - 99</i></p>	

**Thank you for completing this questionnaire.**

## **Appendix 4. Checklist for Focus Group Discussion**

**Participants: House Owners/Tenants**

**No of Participant: 6-8**

**Duration: 1 Hour**

### **Service Delivery**

- What does service delivery means? Are you satisfied with service delivery?
- Existing services in the households and define their legality.
- Sources of above mentioned services and probable charges.
- Evaluation of participants about the quality of services (Water supply, sanitation, electricity and street lighting, roads and paving, drainage and solid waste management).
- Are there any problems with supply?
- If you have a problem, whom do you speak to?
- Is there any community involvement in service delivery? Does all the professionals of the society have a voice in service delivery?
- Do you trust service providers?
- Identify the legality of the settlement and probable risks

### **Corruption**

- Are bribes required/offered or demanded for service delivery and getting quick service?
- How do you avoid paying bribes? Do you think that it is the informal strategies for combating corruption?
- What happens if you don't pay bribes?
- How much the average person usually pay as bribe?
- Which services do you usually pay bribes for?
- How do you think corruption (in service delivery and general) can be stopped?
- What do you think about accountability initiatives to combat corruption?
- Describe any events of corruption from your experiences.

### **Livelihoods**

- What are the costs of this kind of corruption for you? Financial (in terms of income, impacts on employment/enterprises); Social (violence or harassment; gender relations; household relations; levels of trust/cooperation in society); Human (Health, information, skills); Natural (access to land, water resources etc.); Physical (access to infrastructure services)
- Are there any benefits of corruption for you?

## **Appendix 5. Questionnaire for Semi-structured Interviews/Informal Discussion with Service Providers**

Date:            /        /

Name of the Interviewer:

Location:

### **Background Information**

Name of the respondent:

Sex:

Age:

Marital Status:

Educational qualification:

Occupation:

Designation:

Income: Total amount (monthly)

Other facilities from service (Residence, transport, health allowances etc):

Satisfaction/dissatisfaction related to these facilities:

(Reasons for satisfaction and dissatisfaction should be mentioned)

### **General Issues**

- Please describe the aims and objectives of your organization/institution. Do you think you are fully successful to implement those aims and objectives? If not, what are the constraints?
- Does the functions/policies of the organization are pro-poor? How?
- What are the policies of this organization regarding service delivery? Do you think these policies are properly implemented? If no, why?
- Is there any provision to know the opinion of general people regarding service delivery in your organization? If so, how?

### **Corruption**

- It is generally said that 'the main constraint to implement policies of your organization/institution is corruption'-do you disagree with this? Why?
- What do you actually mean by corruption? Do you think that your organization is free from corruption? Why or why not?
- Can you describe any case of corruption in your organization? What is the result?
- Is there a commitment to fight corruption within the organization? Please briefly describe anti-corruption regulations related to service delivery.

- What is the policy on personal accepting, soliciting payments/bribes/gifts/benefits/hospitality?
  - Forbidden
  - Accepted
  - Depends on situation
- Do the organization provides specific trainings on integrity and honesty issues?
- Are staffs required to report attempts to bribe/induce/undermine the impartiality/independence of staff?
- Are policies and procedures clear to employees?
- How do you punish the corrupt staff? What sanctions are applicable to staff for accepting/procuring bribes?
- Is there any accountability mechanism taken currently for combating corruption? If so, what are the mechanisms?
- Have there been any improvements to levels of corruption since taking reforms?
- Do you have any suggestion regarding the improvements of corruption?
- Are there any NGOs or independent actors to monitor services?

### **Ethics**

- Is there a code of conduct for staff? Does it specially address corruption issue? Is it effective for combating corruption?
- Is the integrity of the staff monitored?
- Is there protection for whistle blowers? Are informants protected against retaliation?

### **Complaints**

- Is there a complaint center within the organization/institution? Is it known? Is it used?
- Are there complaints procedures?
- What happened if a complaint about corruption is valid?
- Can you sight any event of problem resolution?

### **Procurement**

- Describe the process of procurement (through procurement committee, tender, open or close system, one or two way documentation process).
- In case of procurement through tendering, please describe the related procedures. (Characteristics of tender, process of quality record of the goods, period of tender, the selection procedures of tender etc.).
- Is there any monitoring system to monitor the contractors (those who have getting the contracts) activity?
- What are the results of any indiscretion by the procurement related people?
- Do you disqualify contractors who have attempted to bribe an official?

## **Human Resources**

- Is there a fair system for recruiting, discipline and promoting staff?
- Are their fair pay and benefits for staff?
- How do you ensure transparency?
  - Rotation of officers (transfer, deputation)
  - Decisions validated and activity monitored by other department officials
  - Or other way
- How the inter-departmental coordination done in specific service delivery related issue (for example: electricity connection in a new area)?
- Are there any coordination between different (government/private/civil society/ local government or local people) service providers? If so, how? If not, why?
- Are the public involved in shaping service delivery e.g. budget priorities?
- Are regulations, policy guidelines publicly available? If yes, from where and how it can be collected?

## Appendix 6. Questionnaire for Semi-structured Interviews/Informal Discussion with Contractors

Date:            /        /

Name of the Interviewer:

Location:

Time:

### Background Information

Name of the respondent:

Sex:

Age:

Marital Status:

Religion:

Educational qualification:

### Occupation and Income

Occupation	Duration of involvement	Present Income	Hostility among occupations if any
Occupation - 1			
Occupation - 2			
Occupation - 3			

### Information about Entrepreneurship

Business	Initial Capital	Existing Capital	Sources of Capital

### About Business Dealings

- How do you obtain contract for your businesses?

By dropping tender on advertisement	
Through personal connection	
Appointing lobbyists	
Through political influence	
Others (specify)	

- Is there sufficient supervision in the businesses by the concerned authority?
- What might be the consequences in case of deviation of standards specified in the contract for materials used?

- Is there any participation of the local government in setting of any service providing infrastructures? If so, then how?
- Is there any participation of the local community to which the services are being rendered? If so then how?

### About Corruption

- How do you actually perceive corruption?
- How do you rated corruption in terms of your business dealings?
- Usual
- Moderate
- Corruption Free
- Others
- Do you consider corruption a must behind the prevailing socio-economic conditions? Yes / No
- Reasons for considering corruption a must

Insecurity	Each and every supplementary issue should be covered
Low income/salary	
Competition	
Luxury	
Part of cultural life	
Others	

- What are the different aspects/stages of corruption concerning to your present occupation?

Aspects/stages of Corruption	Amount (Approximately)	Importance Ranking
Corruption in license obtaining		
Corruption in information securing		
Tender relevant		
Relevant to supervision/ monitoring		
Related to financial management		
Political corruption		
Others (specify)		

- What are the natures of corruption?

**Financial transactions, Materialistic transactions, Social privileges, Political influence, Subscription, Income tax fraud, Others**

- Please tell us any of the single corruption cases in relation to anyone of the issues of your occupation as you have experienced so far. (Procuring of license, to secure information, tender relevant, relevant to supervision and monitoring, linking to financial management, political influence etc.)
- What are the possible impacts of corruption in connection to your profession?

**Deviation in quality output, reducing of workers facilities, lengthy implementation procedures, business defaults, declining of quality businessmen, hazards in personal life, impacts on poor, and any other impacts.**

- Please specify the remarkable changes in relation to your occupation in the last one-year period.

Changes in Policy	
Changes in Customs and Practices	
Changes because of Displacing of Officers	
Others	

- Whether the changes have been supplementary to effectively deals with accountability and corruption? If so, then how?

### **Reporting Complains**

- If there is any arrangements to report corruption? What is the dispute resolution strategy?
- Do you ever report of any such corruption? What had been the reason? What has been the consequence?
- Do you consider your front line officials' corruption free? If not then what are the stages for corruption?
- What might be the consequences for practicing honesty in your profession?

### **Corruption and Violence**

- There is a general consensus that 'illegal earnings manifest inequality in the society and thus accelerate violence' - do you agree or disagree? Why?
- 'Corruption is often reputed to be mixed up with illegal tool collection' - do you of the same opinion? How?

### **Combating Corruption**

- What is to be done to effectively curb corruption?
- What, in your opinion should be the role of civil society and local government to curb corruption?

## **Appendix 7. Checklist for Elected Representatives**

### **General Issues**

- As an elected representatives please identify the problems related to infrastructure service delivery (water, sanitation, electricity and street lighting, roads and paving, drainage and solid waste management) in your locality.
- Identify the nature of these problems in the context of Korail slum.
- Identify your roles and responsibilities (as an elected representatives) regarding the above issues.
- Identify the constraints to execute the roles and responsibilities properly.

### **Corruption**

- As an elected representative of the locality, do you agree that corruption is the main constraint to implement the above mentioned issues? Give the opinion from your own experience.
- In your opinion, what are the main causes of corruption in the infrastructure service delivery?
- Amongst the various infrastructure services, which would you think have the greatest levels of corruption?
- Is there any accountability mechanism taken for combating corruption currently?
- If so, what are the mechanisms?
- Have there been any improvements to levels of corruption since taking reforms?

### **Complaints**

- Is there a complaint center in your office? Is it known? Is it used?
- Are there complaints procedures?
- What happened if a complaint about corruption is valid?
- Can you sight any event of problem resolution?

### **Peoples Participation**

- Identify the levels of participation of the people in shaping service delivery e.g. budget priorities.
- Identify the involvement of local government in the implementation stage of service delivery.
- Identify the involvement of local people in the implementation stage of service delivery.
- In the local context, identify the roles of government, NGOs and civil society regarding service delivery.

### **Combating Corruption**

- What should be done to combat corruption effectively?
- What role civil society and local government can play to combat corruption?

# DFID

Sponsored by the Department for International Development

The sustainability of the livelihoods of the poor in low- and middle-income countries is compromised by corruption in the delivery of infrastructure services. Such services include water supply, sanitation, drainage, the provision of access roads and paving, transport, solid waste management, street lighting and community buildings. For this reason, The Water, Engineering Development Centre, (WEDC) at Loughborough University in the UK is conducting research into anti-corruption initiatives in this area of infrastructure services delivery.

This series of reports has been produced as part of a project entitled *Accountability Arrangements to Combat Corruption*, which was initially funded by the Department for International Development (DFID) of the British Government. The purpose of the work is to improve governance through the use of accountability arrangements to combat corruption in the delivery of infrastructure services. These findings, reviews, country case studies, case surveys and practical tools provide evidence of how anti-corruption initiatives in infrastructure delivery can contribute to the improvement of the lives of the urban poor.

The main objective of the research is the analysis of corruption in infrastructure delivery. This includes a review of accountability initiatives in infrastructure delivery and the nature of the impact of greater accountability.

For more information, please visit WEDC's web page:  
[http://wedc.lboro.ac.uk/projects/new\\_projects3.php?id=191](http://wedc.lboro.ac.uk/projects/new_projects3.php?id=191)

Please note: The views expressed in this document are not necessarily those of the Department for International Development or WEDC, Loughborough University.

Published by the  
Water, Engineering and Development Centre  
Loughborough University UK

ISBN: 978 1 84380 115 3



*People-centred solutions  
for sustainable development  
since 1971*

